NATIONAL TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE WORKING GROUP ZIMBABWE

Transforming the Security Sector in Zimbabwe: Key challenges and strategies to enhance citizen safety and security

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Introduction

This short paper cannot possibly adequately cover the vast landscape suggested by the ambitious title. It aims instead to broadly cover the ground, to address some issues which have not been adequately covered by other writers on the subject and to present experience gained and lessons learned by the Zimbabwe Peace and Security Programme (ZPSP) between 2010 and 2017.

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The paper begins by outlining a basic framework of the traditional and modern concepts of the security sector with reference to global models and the African context, specifically the African Union Policy on Security Sector Reform, and the comparative processes underway to address security sector transformation in this regard, before assessing transformative processes in post-colonial Zimbabwe with specific reference to the security sector and with reference to the legacy of the liberation war. This latter aspect, the colonial and liberation legacy has, in the opinion of this writer, not been given sufficient attention in previous efforts at analyzing and assessing transformation processes after independence. In this regard the paper also makes reference to the "Dealing with the Past" agenda in Zimbabwe today in the overall context of security sector transformation. The paper then moves on to briefly analyse the historical and current content of security sector policy and governance in Zimbabwe, identifying the key challenges to be addressed. Finally the paper outlines the work conducted by the Zimbabwe Peace and Security Programme (ZPSP) in addressing security sector policy and transformation, specifically with regard to the development of a National Security Sector Transformation Plan for Zimbabwe.

In April 2017 the ZPSP published an assessment of "Contemporary Narratives of Security Sector Transformation in Zimbabwe: 2000-2016". The introduction to this paper noted that "the discourse around SSR/T[2] in Zimbabwe in the first decade of the twenty-first century, such as it was, reflected precisely the polarized divisions in the country… [and] remained locked in shallow accusation and counter-accusation between two opposing views, which simply reflected the two most narrow interpretations of what SSR/T actually might be, and how it might be applied in the Zimbabwean context".[3] Having reviewed the existing literature on the subject the paper concluded: "In the schematics of college student theses, SSR/T literature in Zimbabwe would be held to have merely reached the stage of 'the statement of the problem'. Fortunately the body of literature in Zimbabwe continues to grow steadily, and is beginning to move beyond the stalemate of a simple polemical contestation. The journey has at least begun".

The polemical contestation noted by the writer of that paper concerning literature on SSR/T in Zimbabwe did indeed reflect the reality that research, publications and debate on the subject were locked in stalemate. Moreover in this writers view (as mentioned above) the historical context had frequently been obscured and distorted, or simply neglected. If we are to move beyond stalemate and "shallow accusations and counter-accusations" we need to apply more effective historical context and more rigorous analytical method to addressing the challenges of

[2] The terminology applied to the concept of Security Sector Reform (SSR), originally coined by the British Department for International Development, varies throughout the world. The UN and AU have stuck with the original term, but some organisations have applied more technically neutral terminology such as governance or management whilst others use Security Sector Transformation.
[3] "Contemporary Narratives of Security Sector Transformation in Zimbabwe: 2000-2016", *Peace and Security Briefing No 1,* ZPSP, Harare, April 2016.

security sector governance in Zimbabwe today, and to assessing the challenges of tomorrow.

Such an approach is essential if we are to establish a framework for genuine national dialogue on the subject. The safety and security of citizens, the state and the sovereignty of Zimbabwe are a critical national issue and need to be addressed as such. On this journey it is high time we moved beyond 'the statement of the problem' and began to tackle the real challenges we face. But in order to do this we must be able to establish a genuine national dialogue and that requires us to put national interests above purely partisan politics and disputation.

The challenges are real and the consequences of continued neglect will be very serious.

This short paper is offered in support of the challenge facing all citizens of Zimbabwe to urgently consider and discuss the critical questions of national safety and security policy and to engage each other, and the state, in a genuine national dialogue aimed at the elaboration of a consensus-based and people-centered security sector transformation process.

What is the security sector?

If you wish to answer this question you first need to define security. Traditional notions of security, and still the dominant concept of security across many societies including our own in Zimbabwe, may be defined as being narrowly focused on the security of territory (boundaries and borders) and the state (the ruling political authority). Historically this concept of security emerged alongside the development of more complex social and economic human settlements, accompanied by centralized and more powerful political governance structures, for example the feudal states in Europe or the Zulu kingdom. These systems raised taxes in various ways and mobilized military formations to defend or conquer territory and sustain the authority of the feudal lord or the king. Nation states consolidated this framework, sustaining the traditional concept of security and developing ever more powerful capacity to defend and seize territory and support the political authority. Colonial states were simply an imperial expression of this same security concept.

Citizen safety and security, if it was ever an objective in the past, was always subservient to the interests of the ruling authority and the security of that authority and its territory.

Over many decades, political action and struggle by citizens across the globe sought to extend and in some cases transform this concept of security to include citizen safety and security. In our own context, the nationalist movement had three basic demands. The first two (independence and majority rule) were inter-related political objectives, whilst the third (freedom) was a transformational goal. Freedom

from what? Freedom from racial oppression and discrimination; from arbitrary arrest; from persecution; freedom of expression; and of course more broadly freedom to till the land, to send children to affordable schools and to have access to the resources and opportunities only available to a minority population during colonial occupation. Our liberation struggle was very obviously not just a battle for control of the state but also a struggle for human security and human rights.

This concept of human, or citizen, security is therefore deeply rooted in people's struggles including our own liberation struggle in Zimbabwe.

When we define security in this context we need to move beyond territorial defence and security of the state. The contents of this new definition of security are far wider than the traditional definition and must be determined by specific contexts. But broadly we can include a range of social, economic and political factors if we are seeking to incorporate citizen safety and security into a more balanced relationship with state and territorial security. These might include access to justice, access to land, access to health and education services, access to national resources, economic opportunities and employment and freedom from arbitrary arrest, protection under the rule of law, equal rights for women and freedom of expression. In this regard it is noteworthy that the new Zimbabwe Constitution (2013) incorporates these rights and protections and effectively broadens the concept of security in Zimbabwe to include the safety and security of citizens, although no national debate took place to situate these rights and protections within the context of security sector transformation.

Having thus answered the question "what is security" we can now answer the question "what is the security sector". If we have defined security in this broader sense, it follows that we also need to broaden the definition of the security sector.

Obviously in the *state sector* we must include the traditional state security providers (armed forces, police, the intelligence service, border management and customs services) and the state justice providers (courts, prosecution service and prisons). In addition in the state sector we have the executive policy and management structures (ministries of Justice, Defence and Home Affairs but also many other ministries which manage non-security portfolios like Land and Agriculture and Finance) and we also have the state governance and oversight system, which includes parliament, ombudsmen and statutory commissions.

In the *non-state sector* we also have security providers which in Zimbabwe would include private security companies (the largest security service in Zimbabwe), community security groups including township vigilante gangs or 'magweja' and unofficial groups such as political party security formations and war veterans (although war veterans are also classified as a "reserve force " and therefore seemingly part of the state sector). In addition in the non-state sector we have justice providers who include traditional courts (although the new Constitution seeks to incorporate them into the state sector as judicial officers), lawyers, legal aid

and victim support groups and prisoner assistance organisations like ZACRO. Finally in the non-state sector we have various oversight organisations including human rights organisations and other NGOs, academic and research institutions, women's associations, trade unions and the media. We should also in this context add citizens, not just as recipients of security services, but as partners in developing policy and implementing safety and security measures.

Thus the actors involved in a broader definition of the security sector and in security sector transformation must include both traditional state actors and a range of non-state actors who have previously been excluded from policy formulation and implementation in the security sector.

It is this broader definition of the security sector that I will largely refer to in addressing the challenges of transforming the security sector in Zimbabwe.

What is security sector reform (or transformation)?

In 2013 the African Union (AU) Heads of State and Government adopted an AU "Policy Framework on Security Sector Reform (SSR)" which closely follows this broader definition of the security sector, and which as I have asserted is clearly reflected in the new Zimbabwe Constitution adopted in the same year, although without using any of the security sector reform or transformation terminology.

The AU SSR policy framework locates itself within the logic of necessary institutional transformation, which "should be part of a broader reform effort and an essential element of peace-making, early recovery, peace-building and sustainable development agendas" but also requires that "the security sector should be subject to regular institutional review". The latter element is of course perhaps obvious. All institutions and processes benefit from regular assessment and review and the incorporation of new information, technologies, challenges and opportunities.

The AU framework itself conforms to the core elements of the global conceptual framework on SSR, reflected for example in the United Nations formulation, which essentially requires a holistic and integrated approach taking account of the full range of factors and actors impacting on citizen safety and security and bringing human security into a more balanced relationship with state security. Other key elements of both the AU and global frameworks address issues of modernization, professionalization, effective delivery of security and democratic oversight.

Establishing a clear set of "core African principles" the AU Policy Framework strongly emphasizes national ownership and context specificity, noting that: "Current African security sectors are a result of very diverse backgrounds that have

been affected by different historical experiences. SSR processes [therefore] need to be tailored to the unique histories and cultures of each national context."[4]

Over the past two decades a wide range of security sector transformation processes have been undertaken across the African continent, ranging from customs and border management reforms in east Africa and Mocambique to the introduction of community policing in several countries and more substantial reform processes in South Africa, Namibia and Ghana. The principal lesson of all these processes has been the danger posed by externally driven SSR and the need for nationally driven dialogue and ownership, confirming the AU warning that each African country must determine its own challenges and needs.

Significantly the AU policy framework also specifically prohibits the use of security sector reform to promote 'regime change'. It was precisely this 'regime change' threat which prevented Zimbabwe from either engaging in the continental debate on security sector transformation or indeed in developing its own national framework for dialogue and engagement on the challenges facing the country in the arena of security sector governance over the past decade and a half. 'Regime change' was indeed the stated policy objective of several western governments at the time and 'security sector reform' was acknowledged to be a means to such regime change. As a result 'security sector reform' was a no-go area in recent years in Zimbabwe and anyone suggesting the need for assessment, review and transformation of the security sector was quickly denounced as an enemy agent.

The issues and challenges of security sector governance in Zimbabwe were therefore largely ignored and frequently suppressed. This ostrich-like reaction to real and perceived challenges has not only stifled innovation, modernization and transformation of the security sector but prevented education, training, research and national dialogue on the actual challenges and needs of a nationally owned transformation process, and ironically has made Zimbabwe less secure and less able to resist external influence and intervention in this critical arena.

This however was not the only missed opportunity for transformation of the security sector and it is to this aspect that I will now turn.

The colonial and liberation legacy

In assessing and understanding post-colonial transformation prospects and realities in the security sector in Zimbabwe it is essential that we take account of two specific legacies and capacities, that of the colonial state and that of the liberation movement itself.

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[4] *AU Policy Framework on Security Sector Reform (SSR)*, adopted by the Assembly of the Heads of State and Government, 20th Ordinary Session, 27-28 January 2013, Addis Ababa.

With regard to the former, the foundation of security sector governance in Rhodesia was built on the violent military subjugation of the indigenous people and the establishment of an oppressive and discriminatory system of exploitation, which was maintained by various degrees of coercion and force as required. The security system was designed and developed to ensure colonial occupation and to sustain the safety and security of only a small (white) minority of the inhabitants of the country.

Its main features were reinforced and more directly expressed in response to the emerging resistance of the nationalist movement and subsequently the direct threat posed by the armed liberation fighters. These features included increasingly oppressive legislation, selective application of the rule of law and indeed systematic violations of the law as required to suppress resistance, obsessive secrecy and absence of accountability and oversight, systematic use of violent means and legitimization of the use of violence and illegal acts to counter the liberation struggle. Interestingly corruption was widespread in the political and security apparatus of Rhodesia and much of it was disguised and condoned as patriotically inspired sanctions busting or as an integral part of the fight against "terrorists".

In many respects the Rhodesian concept of security was holistic and integrated, as more modern concepts of security today require. Legislative frameworks such as the Land Apportionment Act or discriminatory laws that prevented black Zimbabweans from living in white urban areas or attending white schools, hospitals or even entering white department stores, supplemented direct 'hard security' enforcement by ostensibly protecting white communities from black people. Agricultural subsidies and services enabled commercially unsuccessful white farmers to remain on the land in part for security reasons. Maintaining a colonial political and economic system largely for the benefit of a white capitalist elite and its imperialist allies also required incentives and measures which benefitted the white community as a whole and these included safety and security policies.

This was the security sector governance system and machinery we inherited in 1980.

The liberation legacy with which we tackled the task of transformation of the colonial state and its security system was largely determined by two factors, willingness to transform the colonial inheritance and capacity.

With regard to "willingness" we should be aware of the fact that the liberation movement as whole contained a range of perspectives, interests and intentions concerning transformation of the colonial state. These included both those committed to a radical revolutionary transformation and those inclined to slip comfortably into the shoes of the former colonial masters. If we want to assess the prospects for transformation in 1980, including transformation of the security system, we might also include the impact on the liberation movement and transformation itself of the presence of enemy agents recruited and planted over

many years into liberation movement ranks and the direct recruitment of a significant number of black Zimbabweans into the repressive Rhodesian system. What was the balance of forces in the liberation movement? How strong was the commitment to a fundamental transformation of the embedded Rhodesian machinery and its doctrines?

With regard to capacity it is clear that even ZANU (ZANLA) and ZAPU (ZPRA) combined did not have sufficient capacity to overwhelm and rapidly overhaul the Rhodesian state and security system without undermining the broader frameworks, which had underpinned the Lancaster House compromise agreement. Once the two liberation parties parted ways this capacity was further reduced.

Whilst we may debate these questions long and hard without reaching an agreement, we could perhaps for the sake of this discussion simply concede that the challenges were enormous, the commitment was somewhat ambivalent and the capacity was insufficient. Divisions, inter-party rivalry and then the direct assault on ZAPU, ZPRA and communities in western Zimbabwe, which emerged in the early 1980's, obviously made prospects for transformation even worse.

The transformation agenda since 1980

A common assumption by many younger Zimbabweans today is that a major transformation of state institutions and doctrine took place soon after independence in 1980. This was not actually the case, certainly with regard to the security sector.

In the first instance the majority of liberation fighters remained contained in Assembly Points for a significant period after the ceasefire and their influence on prospects for transformation was severely curtailed. This certainly reduced the momentum for, and content of, the radical transformation agenda. Nationalist politicians dominated the political landscape in the immediate post-independence period and the Rhodesians still dominated the security establishment.

When former liberation fighters were demobilized this operation was conducted and managed by the former Rhodesian forces in their own bases and barracks. When they were integrated into the newly established Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA) this process too was managed by the Rhodesian security establishment, with assistance from British military advisors who seldom managed to hide their sympathy with the Rhodesians. This had a major impact on the transformation prospects and process in the national army for several years.

Very few former liberation fighters were integrated into the other security services (police, intelligence and prisons) in those first years after independence, whilst the air force remained entirely unchanged.

As for the newly established Government, its circumstances are well depicted by the late Comrade Edison Zvobgo who compared his first day as a Minister to being "a

black fly in a glass of white milk". The civil service and the system as a whole remained largely Rhodesian, as of course did the economy.

When the first major systemic and structural changes in the state and its security apparatus did take place in the mid-1980's, the primary focus was on removing whites and replacing them with blacks. The real beneficiaries of this restructuring process were largely black Zimbabweans who had served the Rhodesian state and were quickly learning new slogans and camouflaging their past. With the exception of the ZNA, the majority of senior command and management in the state security sector, and indeed in much of the state machinery, were in fact from the former Rhodesian security apparatus.

So whilst we can say that the state and the security sector machinery were transformed from being white dominated to black dominated in the mid-1980's, the real question is whether this process resulted in qualitative transformation, including changes in doctrine and orientation.

Finally in this regard we should look at the legislative framework governing the security sector. Here it is all too clear that almost nothing changed for over three decades. The Rhodesian security laws remained intact in most respects until the adoption of the 2013 Constitution, and even today we still await re-alignment of many of the Rhodesian legacy security laws.

I would therefore argue that all the factors I have outlined above impacted enormously and negatively on fundamental transformation prospects and processes and that, in this regard, key aspects of security sector doctrine and its application did not fundamentally change during the first decade of independence.

There were however other opportunities and I will briefly examine these and their impact on security sector policy and doctrine.

Following independence itself, the next transformational opportunity could have been triggered by the Unity Accord between ZANU (PF) and PF- ZAPU. Whilst ZAPU veterans might argue that some useful changes did take place, and of course the carnage in western Zimbabwe ceased, no fundamental policy or doctrinal shifts followed this event. Much of the disputation leading up to this agreement had been about the name of the party and the allocation of leadership posts. The inclusion of ZAPU into the new united ZANU(PF) does not appear to have had a significant impact on transformation prospects or triggered any substantial debate about security sector governance despite the fact that senior ZAPU leaders had previously complained vociferously about the absence of the rule of law and the cruel and repressive treatment visited on ZAPU members and leaders including the Gukurahundi events. And whilst the hostility towards former ZPRA cadres decreased in the army and soldiers could focus on developing their military capacities on a more professional basis, few major changes in the military or other security services doctrine or posture were observed. One should note however, that

it was during this period that Zimbabwe emerged as a highly valued and well-regarded participant in peacekeeping missions around the world. Finally one should note that no parliamentary or public debate took place on fundamental issues of security sector governance and policy on the basis of the 1987 Unity Accords.

Other opportunities for transformation of the security sector might have been occasioned by the 2002 constitutional referendum process and although some might argue that this issue was an element in the rejection of the proposed constitution, no changes subsequently took place. Thereafter the elections of 2008 and the subsequent SADC mediation process leading to the establishment of the Government of National Unity (GNU) provided a major opportunity to address security sector governance issues. But neither the mediation process itself, nor the GNU implementation, addressed these issues as the parties to the GNU held widely contested and partisan views on security sector governance and failed to agree on a common approach. On its part SADC was clearly unwilling to press the issue in such circumstances.

As previously detailed above, Zimbabwe also missed the continental dialogue on security sector governance and subsequent adoption of an African Union policy as a result of the 'regime change' threat and for much the same reasons as had prevented the GNU from productively addressing the issues.

Having reviewed the missed opportunities it is necessary to ask whether we have in fact transformed the inherited Rhodesian security sector policies in a fundamental and people-oriented manner and if not, how we might actually move towards a serious national dialogue and process in order to do so.

To illustrate this point in a relatively uncontroversial manner let me assess the transformation of border management as an example.

Colonial border management policy was designed and implemented to manage and facilitate migrant labour, to supervise and facilitate trade for capitalist industry and commerce and to secure the physical borders and prevent either free movement of communities, as had been possible in pre-colonial times, or criminal activities or threats. What has changed? Specifically what has changed for communities divided by artificial colonial borders or for market women who seek to move goods across the Limpopo River in order to feed their families? Surely a free and independent Zimbabwe could have a more people-oriented border management policy.

Finally and on a more controversial note, let me simply repeat my characterization of the freedom component of the liberation struggle objectives I outlined earlier:

> "Freedom from racial oppression and discrimination; from arbitrary arrest; from persecution; freedom of expression and of course more broadly freedom to till the land, to send children to affordable schools and to have access to the resources and opportunities only available to a minority

population during colonial occupation. Our liberation struggle was very obviously not just a battle for control of the state but also a struggle for human security and human rights."

Which of these freedoms have we secured in order to provide enhanced safety and security to our citizens? Certainly we have delivered on freedom from racial oppression and made advances on freedom to till the land. In recent months we have improved our capacity to enable freedom of expression and to some extent freedom to dissent and protest. But clearly we still face major challenges on some of the hard issues including policing, rule of law and most importantly the development of a national consensus and process to transform the security sector in its widest sense in order to ensure effective delivery of safety and security to all Zimbabweans, male and female, in an independent and sovereign Zimbabwe.

Dealing with the Past

With regard to issues of legacy we also need to confront the more unpalatable aspects of the liberation legacy, which have been omitted from the official historical narrative, and which have not been addressed by government since independence.

These concern two key challenges to the security sector transformation process, the first of which centers on the broad issues of war, violence and trauma and can be situated within the Dealing With the Past (DWP) agenda.

The unresolved traumas of war and violence and the unmarked graves of the liberation war dead are core elements of the inexplicably neglected question of making peace with the past in Zimbabwe. Former ZANU (PF) Secretary General, the late Edgar Tekere, expressed his own deep bitterness about the failure to "report to the parents of all those who had died... to summon the chiefs and give them a full report which they would then carry to their villages... (to give an account to) the representatives of the ancestral spirits who had fought the first chimurenga".[5]

Tekere describes how it had been agreed that a ceremony to address these issues, to commemorate the dead and cleanse the survivors, would be held and that immediately after independence, as Secretary-General of ZANU (PF), he made all the necessary preparations and then informed Mugabe of the plans. According to Tekere, Mugabe responded by saying he was too busy and a furious row ensued. Tekere "stormed out the office, banging the door".

> *"Since independence many people have asked why there was no cleansing ceremony after the war, and many of the ills which subsequently fell upon Zimbabwe have been attributed to this fact. Even the Mocambican people asked*

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[5] Tekere, Edgar, "A Lifetime of Struggle", SAPES Trust, Harare, 2007, p 89.

> *why we hadn't held a ceremony at Chimoio. Well this is how it happened. Mugabe decided that no cleansing was necessary in his Zimbabwe".*[6]

Whatever the truth about this angry account of Tekere's meeting with Prime Minister Mugabe, the fact is that the Government of Zimbabwe did not address these deeply significant issues. Gravesites remained unmarked and cleansing ceremonies never took place. Many of the families of liberation war veterans who failed to return home after independence continued the hunt for their missing children for decades.

Ironically it was not the government but former ZPRA fighters who made efforts to address the issues of liberation war dead and missing, acting on instructions issued by the late ZPRA Commander, Lookout Masuku, shortly before he died on 6 April 1986. Having been released from detention to a hospital bed Masuku gave instructions concerning commemoration and propitiation of the ZPRA war dead, including proposals for the establishment of shrines. Following his eventual release from detention his close friend and comrade, Dumiso Dabengwa, established the ZPRA War Shrines Committee and later the Mafela Trust (Mafela was Masuku's *nomme de guerre*) to carry out the instructions Masuku had left.

A research programme was launched "to establish the exact location of the graves of the fallen heroes, areas of origin (homes) and next of kin (so that we can) announce to the entire nation the fate of their sons and daughters who died in the liberation struggle".[7] In August 1990 the first list of 553 ZPRA war dead was published in *Parade* magazine by the Mafela Trust, and subsequently further lists were published.[8] Grave sites were also located in this exercise and sites for the erection of proposed shrines were identified. It was whilst on a visit to one such proposed site at Pupu in Lupane, where a *Mwali* shrine was located, that Dabengwa was told by the spirit medium of the shrine that: "Mwali (the High God) was angry because the soldiers of the liberation war had still not come to be cleansed of their sins committed during the war. According to the custodian the suffering which rural people had endured since independence was the result of this failure to deal with the legacy of the war."[9]

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[6] Tekere, Edgar, "A Lifetime of Struggle", SAPES Trust, Harare, 2007, p 89.

[7] Brickhill, Jeremy, "Making Peace with the Past: War Victims and the Work of the Mafela Trust", in Bhebhe, Ngwabi and Ranger, Terence, (Eds) "Soldiers in Zimbabwe's Liberation War" Volume One, University of Zimbabwe Publications, Harare, 1995, p 167

[8] Over the years the Mafela Trust has identified more than 800 ZPRA war dead and 400 grave sites, identified next of kin and arranged visits to the sites, as well as collecting and collating records of the liberation war including photographs published in SAHA, "ZAPU: Through Zenzo Nkobi's Lens", South African History Archive, Braamfontein, (nd)

[9] Brickhill, Jeremy, "Making Peace with the Past: War Victims and the Work of the Mafela Trust", in Bhebhe, Ngwabi and Ranger, Terence, (Eds) "Soldiers in Zimbabwe's Liberation War" Volume One, University of Zimbabwe Publications, Harare, 1995, p 173.

Dabengwa informed Dr Joshua Nkomo of this message and following further consultations it was decided that a cleansing ceremony should be held at Pupu.[10] This extraordinary event took place over a period of several days in 1992, and was attended by thousands of people, including chiefs and headmen, spirit mediums, liberation war veterans, political and community leaders and ordinary folk. It was never reported in the state controlled media.

In the absence of such cleansing processes, liberation war fighters have recourse to other traditional methods of purification as Pamela Reynolds recounts in one of the very few studies published concerning the personal traumatic legacies of the liberation war.

> *A male patient was brought to Gororo (a spirit medium) because he was disturbed and spoke nonsense. Gororo became possessed and instructed her acolyte to make an infusion of herbs and incense, over which the patient had to lean covered with a blanket. After some time he called out that he was ready to talk. He admitted killing nine people in the war as a fighter against the Rhodesian Army. Some he killed in battle; some he killed as varoyi ('witches') because he believed they had eaten the corpses of comrades killed in battle and others he killed for being sellouts. Gororo divined that two spirits of the last category had returned to trouble him as they had been wrongfully accused. Had they been guilty they would not have sought revenge. Gororo cleansed the patient. The purification ritual would not have been effective (she said) if the patient had not revealed the truth".[11]*

The Gororo story illustrates how overcoming the trauma of war requires that we identify the sources of trauma and reveal the truth. Whilst this advice applies to an individual as part of a personal healing, it certainly also applies to people who share a traumatic experience or a history together.

The neglected liberation war legacy of trauma and violence, and one should add of colonial violence too, finds expression in post-independent Zimbabwe in many respects, and in relation to security sector governance and policy specifically in respect of the manner in which violence by the state and its functionaries has frequently been condoned. The use of coercion and violence in pursuit of political objectives, which was legitimatised during the liberation struggle, has continued and been institutionalized in parts of the state security apparatus. Ironically the Rhodesian security system, which conducted regular torture and many illegal and

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[10] The shrine is located at the site of the historic battle between King Lobengula's soldiers and the pioneer soldiers led by Major Allan Wilson in 1893, all of whom died in the encounter. In preparation for the cleansing of ZPRA fighters the spirit mediums insisted that the pioneer soldiers had to be propitiated first, expressing the extraordinary humanity of traditional reconciliation.

[11] Reynolds, Pamela, "Children of Tribulation: The need to heal and the means to heal war trauma", *Africa*, 1990, LX, 14.

violent acts itself, colluded with the post-independence security machinery in entrenching this doctrine.

Our collective failure to address these issues, or even talk about them publically, is one of the more frightening and destructive aspects of our failure to transform the security sector in Zimbabwe. As the late Edgar Tekere lamented in parliament:

> *"I have put a lot of effort into cleansing this Party, ZANU, of its image as a 'killer' Party. Now it is clear that my efforts were wasted, and it is disgusting to see that instead of polishing and maintaining our security instruments of State as guardians of our statehood and people, there are efforts to use them as killer instruments among the leadership".*[12]

The second major challenge in dealing with the liberation legacy concerns the conflation of party and state in Zimbabwe.

During the liberation struggle itself the relationship between the political leadership and the armed forces was complex and contested in both ZANU and ZAPU at various times. Both liberation parties always proclaimed that the party ruled and oversaw the gun and did so in pursuit of the noble objectives of national liberation. In post-independence Zimbabwe, ZANU (PF) proclaimed the supremacy of the party and its leadership over state institutions, including the elected parliament, on the basis that the party determined policy and the government implemented it in pursuit of national development goals. Whilst Dr Nkomo and other ZAPU leaders rejected this notion in the early 1980's, insisting that in an independent Zimbabwe the parliament should be the supreme authority, this doctrine remained unchallenged after the Unity Accords were signed in 1987 and this remains the official position of the ruling party today.

This policy is justified in the context of the liberation legacy and has on many occasions been publically proclaimed not only by political leaders but by state functionaries, including those in the security services.

What does this mean for security sector governance and what has its impact been?

It very obviously means what it says, namely that ruling party interests are the only legitimate expression of national interests and that state institutions and functionaries have a duty to be loyal to a political party above that of their responsibility to national institutions such as parliament. Despite the fact that expressions of this position by state functionaries are specifically outlawed by the new constitution it continues to be an ongoing reality in practice and has not been contested by the government.

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[12] Tekere, Edgar, "A Lifetime of Struggle", SAPES Trust, Harare, 2007, p 142.

The implications of this party/state conflation and its impact on our safety and security policies can be summarized as follows:
- Party interests are more important than national interests;
- Party loyalty is more important than competence in state institutions;
- Which undermines national perspective and interests and marginalizes minorities;
- Leaving no space for national dialogue and critical reflection;
- Undermining meaningful oversight (role of parliament is weakened);
- Leading to failure to build a national service ethos and effective institutions;
- Which has encouraged patronage and resulted in massive corruption;
- And prevented state security institutions from fulfilling their mandated constitutional roles or delivering effective citizen-focused security services.

Finally in this regard we need to consider the implications of the military intervention of November 2017 - the not-a-coup-coup - essentially to address inner-party conflict in the ruling party. There are certainly contested interpretations over the constitutional and political content of these events. These have been widely canvassed in Zimbabwe and indeed in the international community. I do not intend to repeat these polemics here, but simply to put the question: what are the implications for Zimbabwe of such an intervention?

The events of November 2017 suggest that the party/state conflation in Zimbabwe includes the security sector to such a degree that internal party contestation requires military intervention and that such intervention is legitimate. Indeed the High Court has made such a declaration, and parliament itself in its attempt to impeach a sitting state president on the basis of the military intervention did much the same, which only raises more worrying questions concerning the implications of these events.

Security sector policy and governance in Zimbabwe today

With regard to security sector policy - and doctrine - it is obvious that we still retain many of the vestiges of colonial policy today, as illustrated by my earlier example of border management. The same could be said of our failure to resolve the contradictions between customary law (and the role of traditional leaders) and the western legal system we inherited from colonialism with its white-wigged judges and judicial focus on retribution rather than restitution. Have we established a genuine and indigenous system of justice, which is available to the ordinary and often poor citizen on the basis of equality and universal access to justice? Or do we still have special privileges and impunity for a minority whilst the majority must answer to the laws of the land?

What of policing and the freedom demands made by the earlier generation of freedom fighters? Have we actually established those freedoms that the pioneers of the struggle yearned and struggled for? Do our police today treat dissenters and

demonstrators any differently from the cruel manner in which our former colonial masters treated protest? Have we found an appropriate way to channel youthful dissent and impatience for fundamental change in a society still plagued with poverty and inequality?

Do we have a national vision for safety and security for all citizens? Or do we simply continue to implement policies and procedures we inherited but have never seriously questioned and transformed?

These are profound questions in my view and the fact that we still ask them today is a reflection of our collective failure to complete the fundamental transformation of the independent Zimbabwe state which the pioneers of our movement and the lost generation of liberation fighters believed they were fighting and dying to achieve.

Most worrying is the fact that we are still unable to ask these questions and engage in a national discourse on the challenges we face and the way forward, including honestly admitting the failures and mistakes of the past, without apportioning blame and denouncing alternative views and perspectives as unpatriotic and unacceptable. Developing a national vision, and building the capacity to engage each other in an honest national dialogue in order to find a national consensus on the means to achieve that vision, are essential steps to nation-building in every respect, and most directly in terms of the basic right of every Zimbabwean citizen to live and prosper in a safe and secure environment.

The challenges we need to address

Colonial occupation and rule left behind a legacy in the security sector, which we have never adequately addressed. The key elements of this legacy can be summarized as:
- A coercive security sector imposing narrow state-focused security;
- Absence of meaningful democratic governance and oversight;
- A culture of secrecy, impunity and human rights violations;
- Centralised security institutions unresponsive to local needs or control;
- Security policies protecting elite political and economic interests.

The liberation struggle left its own legacy, which includes both positive and negative components.

The positive components of our inheritance from the liberation struggle, including selfless sacrifice and service, self-critical reflection and internal constructive dialogue and criticism, discipline and an ethical code of conduct and above all else loyalty to the interests of the people, appear to have been long forgotten. The iconic African revolutionary leader, Amilcar Cabral, once exorted us to "tell no lies and

claim no easy victories". I wonder what he, or perhaps Thomas Sankara, would say if they could visit Zimbabwe today. Closer to home what are our fallen heroes and heroines saying about our conduct and adherence to our liberation ideals?

Among the negative aspects of our liberation legacy are our continued acceptance of the use of violence to achieve political goals and our inability to develop a national vision and national institutions, which can serve all the people of Zimbabwe irrespective of their political party loyalties.

At the more technical level, and specifically with regard to state security performance and provision, a range of serious challenges confront us. Aside from very obvious deficiencies in basic citizen safety and security services such as policing or access to justice and more broadly regarding access to shelter, water and public utilities, employment and social services (health and education) all of which impact directly on citizen safety and security, we have two major strategic challenges to address.

The first concerns the urgent need for a comprehensive assessment of national security policy involving both state security and broader human security questions. We have failed to undertake a range of routine policy review processes, which are common in most modern democracies, including defence, police, justice, prisons and intelligence reviews as part of a broader threat assessment process which allows policies to be critiqued, renewed and refined and enable innovation, modernization and meaningful policy development to take place. Such reviews as have taken place in these sectors have been purely internal, but these internal processes are profoundly inadequate precisely because they are internal. External stakeholder participation backed by evidence-based knowledge (research and external evaluation) enable new and alternative perspectives to be engaged. In this regard the introduction of human security perspectives and policies is long overdue.

The second major strategic challenge involves the absence in Zimbabwe of any longer term vision or strategy to address forthcoming safety and security threats. Our security focus in recent years has been primarily reactive and inward looking, most especially with regard to political and social contestation in parochial and partisan terms. Meanwhile storms are approaching for which we have no plans.

 A basic threat assessment in Zimbabwe today, looking forward to threats over the next decade, would have to include the following dangers for which we have made no preparations:
- Climate change and resulting livelihoods threats;
- Specific water resource shortfalls throughout sub-Saharan Africa;
- The impending threat of small arms in Zimbabwe and the resulting impact on crime, resource conflict and political violence;
- Increasing levels of poverty and unemployment and their impact on safety and security;

- Global competition for resources and increasing conflict triggered by global corporate interests over resource acquisition.

Taken together these challenges are undoubtedly formidable, and in this regard the scale of the tasks in security sector transformation mirror the massive challenges facing economic recovery in Zimbabwe. But whilst we do discuss and contest the economic options, there is simply no meaningful national debate on security sector governance, modernization and transformation. The real question to ask in this regard concerns whether security sector governance and a national dialogue on policy and doctrine and transformation in the security sector are issues of national policy formulation or still remain trapped in partisan political contestation.

Is there an understanding of the real nature of the problems? Is there a basis for a genuine national dialogue and the development of a national consensus and vision on the issues? Is there the political willingness to address the challenges? Is there capacity (or plans to build capacity) to enable us to undertake the necessary transformation? What are the prospects for transformation in the security sector and the development of a genuine national dialogue, which could lead to a national consensus and the implementation of a national vision for such a safe and secure, sovereign and independent Zimbabwe in the future?

Strategies to enhance citizen safety and security

For the past ten years I have worked, together with other comrades from both the liberation movement and younger generations, to develop a National Security Sector Transformation (NSST) Plan. We have worked closely with both the state sector and civil society, at times harmoniously and often with difficulty. This is sensitive terrain after all.

When we started this work in 2009 it was certainly a very difficult time and there were many who expressed doubts that we could make any progress. Indeed there were many who expressed outright opposition and hostility. Fortunately there were others who recognized the challenges and the need to address them and were prepared to accompany us despite the obvious risks.

The organization we established is called the Zimbabwe Peace and Security Programme (ZPSP). It's Trustees included former liberation fighters from both ZANLA and ZPRA and members of the MDC formations.[13] The programme Steering

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[13] The Founding Trustees were: Sobusa Gula-Ndebele (former ZANLA and Zimbabwe National Army officer and former Attorney-General), Professor Reginald Austin (former ZAPU member, distinguished international lawyer and civil servant and first Chairperson of the Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission), Ms Freedom Nyamubaya (former ZANLA officer, feminist and poet and rural development activist), Paul Temba Nyathi (detainee under the Rhodesian regime, civil society activist and founder member of the MDC-T), Dr Augustus Mudzingwa (medical practitioner and former ZANLA officer, MDC-T Secretary for Defence and Security Affairs and Deputy Minister of Transport in the GNU), Nyasha Masiwa (former ZANLA officer, journalist and broadcaster and former UN conflict

Committee established in 2010 included representatives of the President's office, the Office of the Prime Minister and Deputy Prime Minister and five political parties (ZANU-PF, MDC-T, MDC-N, ZAPU and Mavambo) and was chaired by an officer from the ZNA.

We undertook a range of activities, always approved by consensus, aimed at developing a knowledge-based approach to security sector transformation and creating capacity and projects to establish a willingness to address the challenges of safety and security in Zimbabwe.

I do not have opportunity here to catalogue the work and achievements of ZPSP. But I do want to raise two points, which I think provide lessons for the future. The first is to identify our core principles in approaching the sensitive task of developing dialogue, consensus and collaboration across a wide range of national – state and non-state - actors with regards to security sector transformation in Zimbabwe. These principles were:
- Consensus-based national ownership;
- Inclusive dialogue with all national stakeholders;
- Knowledge based professional implementation;
- Transparency and political impartiality.

I think these are self-explanatory and provide a framework for addressing complex challenges and contested views across the spectrum of Zimbabwean society.

The second issue I want to raise concerns building consensus specifically, and the process by which we negotiated and adopted a draft "Conceptual Framework for National Security Sector Transformation in Zimbabwe". Our process included consultations with a wide range of non-state actors working in different sectoral groups to identify specific safety and security challenges and aspirations for their constituencies. These were: The Academic sector; the national NGO and CBO sector; the Traditional Leaders Sector; the Gender and Security Sector Transformation (GSST) sector[14]; the Faith-based sector; the Parliament of Zimbabwe sector; and the Liberation War Veterans and Liberation Legacy sector.

In all of these sectoral consultation processes representatives of the state sector were present, including the military, the police, prisons and intelligence service and a range of other state institutions, ministries and departments as appropriate.

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advisor and programme specialist), Jeremy Brickhill (former ZPRA officer, trainer, advisor and programme specialist on security mediation, conflict mitigation and security sector transformation).

[14] The GSST deliberately named itself in this manner to ensure that whilst its core focus was on women and their perceptions and needs for safety and security, issues of patriarchy and the role of men in addressing gender transformation were incorporated into the process.

We obviously did not always agree but by engaging in a genuine dialogue and applying the principle of consensus we found that there were issues we could agree on. These issues of agreement provided a starting point, which enabled a diverse range of opinions and interests to find ways to co-operate and work together in addressing the challenges we face as a nation.

In May 2017 we collectively adopted the Draft NSST Plan at a conference in Harare.[15]

The Draft Plan endorsed the core Guiding Principles of ZPSP and adopted a Strategic Framework establishing a National Steering Committee, which would take decisions by consensus, to oversee implementation of the plan on the basis of "a strategy of consultation and constructive engagement with the Parliament of Zimbabwe, the Government and state agencies". The Operational Framework of the Draft Plan contained formal commitments to dialogue, mainstreaming of gender and human security frameworks and a knowledge-based approach. Thematic Priorities identified by the Draft Plan included research, documentation and information, capacity-building in academic institutions, state agencies and civil society, consultation and collaboration between and within non-state actors, communities and the state and the promotion of genuine national dialogue. Each of the seven sectoral working groups (detailed above) then provided specific Action Plans based on Sectoral Priorities identified and agreed by their constituencies.

Finally the Draft Plan contained proposals on nine (9) National Priorities for security sector transformation in Zimbabwe as follows: Constitutionalism and the Rule of Law; Adherence to Normative Frameworks; Peace-building; Respect for Human Rights; Building a culture of political tolerance; Engaging citizen participation; Corruption; Election safety and security; Assessing and preparing for future threats to safety and security. The peace-building component incorporated reconciliation and national healing and specific attention to Dealing with the Past.

The NSST Plan contains a menu of actions on which it was believed that state and non-state actors could begin to co-operate. It therefore excluded some of the toughest issues. Could the implementation of the NSST Plan create platforms for further dialogue and build sufficient confidence and capacity to enable the difficult and contested issues to be addressed in the future? We could only hope so.

Conclusion

The NSST Plan and the work of ZPSP which underpinned that process was predicated on a strategy of incremental engagement between state and non-state actors based on the consensus principle. It aimed to build an evidence and

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[15] Working Draft of the "Conceptual Framework for a National Security Sector Transformation (NSST) Plan for Zimbabwe", 24 May 2017.

knowledge-based willingness and capacity to address the challenges and to establish a framework for genuine national dialogue and national ownership of a security sector transformation process in Zimbabwe. This strategy offered a negotiated alternative to continued contestation, conflict and stalemate, continued insecurity and the abdication of our collective responsibility to identify challenges to our safety and security as a nation and attempt to rectify them. Can such a strategy be implemented in the current climate and following the dramatic developments of the past year? If not what are the likely consequences?

The momentous events of the last year have thrown a harsh spotlight on security sector governance in Zimbabwe. Aside from the military intervention in the ZANU (PF) leadership succession itself we have subsequently witnessed an apparent purging of state security institutions which appears to many commentators and analysts to be based on factional loyalties and criteria, and the controversial deployment of military forces in support of public order in Harare in circumstances which have necessitated investigation by a commission of inquiry.

President Mnangagwa has said that we stand at a crossroads and that the 'new dispensation' aims to chart a new path for Zimbabwe. I do agree with the President that we are at a critical crossroads. Reform of national security policy and governance and transformation of the security sector is a critical component of the changes we need to make now because effective delivery of safety and security in a tolerant, peaceful and secure environment are essential foundations for sustainable development and prosperity in an independent Zimbabwe.

Contemplating the unwelcome necessity of reform in the face of harsh realities embattled apartheid zealot, Prime Minister BJ Vorster once remarked: "The alternative [to reform] is too ghastly to contemplate". And then he backtracked. The rest is now history.