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# **The Perpetrators of Gross Human Rights Violations in Zimbabwe from February 2000 to March 2003.**

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## **1. Background**

The violence that has afflicted Zimbabwe since the Constitutional referendum has received considerable international attention, mainly due to remarkable documentation from the press, the media and human rights groups. The findings of the human rights groups, and particularly the Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, have additionally been corroborated by a number of the reports from international human rights groups. Finally, there has also been corroboration from a large number of election observer groups. However, despite sustained international pressure, organised violence and torture continues in Zimbabwe, and the violence associated with militia groups continues today.

The President and Government have made no credible attempt to end the violence, with the only defense being that this is either violence provoked by the original violence of the MDC and other groups, such as white commercial farmers, or, that the violence is due to the frustrations expressed by ordinary Zimbabweans in their quest to acquire land that is rightfully theirs. At best the President and the government condone lawlessness and violence, but, at worst, they are guilty of planning, orchestrating, and implementing this violence against their own people<sup>i</sup>. It is relevant to point out that the situation today is little different to that pertained in May 2000 when a group of ZanuPF militia attacked the "Peace March" in the middle of Harare.

The violence began with the use of militia, both against the peaceful demonstrators in Harare and in the invasions of the commercial farms, and militia continued to be deployed in the 2000 Parliamentary Elections, the various by-elections in 2001, and the Presidential Election in 2002. The militia continues to be a significant factor in the violence to date, with reports from Zimbabwe continuously demonstrating the many ways in which militia are involved in both the violence and the ordinary lives of Zimbabweans. For example, a report in the Zimbabwe Independent recently shows militia imposing dusk to dawn curfew on the residents of Kuwadzana, the latest constituency to face a by-election<sup>ii</sup>. This curfew is imposed by a group that has no power to do this, in the absence of any declaration of martial law or the imposition of emergency powers, and without any interference by the police. Finally, there have been some of the worst human rights violations seen to date occurring in the aftermath of the nationwide stay away called by the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), and this did seem to provoke some regional comment.

The use of militia has been a cornerstone of the campaign by Robert Mugabe and ZanuPF to maintain political power, but, to date, this not been carefully investigated against the background of an enormous amount of documentary material. As will be seen from the following analysis, the evidence suggests a well-worked out strategy on behalf of the State, and this strategy has involved the use of both militia and the State security agencies, mainly the CIO and the Zimbabwe Republic Police, in complementary roles. Against this onslaught, the supporters of the MDC and the ordinary people of Zimbabwe have been victims on a very large scale. This is a factual assertion based on the evidence, which quite clearly shows who have been the primary targets, but this evidence cannot show the scale. However, some inferences can be drawn regarding scale, and one estimate put the number of victims of torture in 2000 alone somewhere in the range of 200,000 persons<sup>iii</sup>.

The present paper is a summary of a number of previous papers examining perpetrators, the militia, and crimes against humanity<sup>iv</sup>. The analyses drew upon all the publicly available reports on the organised violence and torture over the past three years. They also drew upon a number of private sources and interviews that will remain anonymous for obvious reasons.

## **2. The Strategy for maintaining political power**

A key to the Mugabe strategy was contained in the draft constitution; the controversial land clause that was inserted after the constitutional process was completed and the acrimonious meeting to agree the final draft. Bemused Zimbabweans saw in the final draft a clause requiring

the United Kingdom to compensate commercial farmers for their land, failing which the State would be entitled to acquire these farms without compensation. This clause became the cornerstone for the electoral campaigns for the next three years as well as for the highly successful international campaign waged by Mugabe, a campaign that enabled him to return to the Liberation War, colonialism, imperialism and globalisation.

As with all good strategies, the land problem was very simple and capable of extension into a wide variety of other areas. It allowed for a wide variety of tactics to be employed in its pursuit, and, above all, could be maintained over a very long period. This last was the greatest value of the strategy: by changing the goals, refusing to allow its solution, and by dragging in an increasing number of protagonists, the land problem could be used infinitely<sup>v</sup>. Scarcely surprising that Mugabe had kept this problem in reserve for all the twenty years of his rule: it had been on the stove quietly simmering, never wholly turned off or completely cooked<sup>vi</sup>.

The "*land problem*" thus had the possibility of being linked to other problems in very useful ways, and the most important was its linkage to the war veterans, the Liberation War, and the colonial past. For this allowed Mugabe to insert the militia programme right into the centre of the election. Here it must be remembered that the war veterans had become deeply discredited in 1997 by the revelations of massive corruption in the pension awards under the War Victims Compensation Fund. The Chidyausiku Commission produced huge public interest, and the testimonies of those called to account before the Commission were undoubtedly humiliating to all those who felt that there had been great honour in fighting for the liberation of the country from colonial rule. When, after all the tackiness and humiliation of the Chidyausiku Commission hearings, the war veterans began to assert themselves against the party, Mugabe solved the problem in characteristic fashion: he paid them all a substantial pension. That the wage bill led directly to the collapse of the Zimbabwe dollar in November 1997 and food riots the following year was less serious than the binding of the war veterans to Mugabe directly. At the time, many speculated that there would come a time when Mugabe would demand payment for his support.

Thus, there was little surprise when the Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans Association declared that its members would be campaigning for ZanuPF in the 2000 Parliamentary Election. This perhaps was another indicator ahead of the Referendum that there was a strategy in the offing for this important election<sup>vii</sup>.

The primary targets of the "land reform" were ostensibly the white commercial farmers, but in reality were the commercial farm workers in the three Mashonaland Provinces, since this group, under the auspices of the General Agricultural and Plantation Workers Union of Zimbabwe (GPWUZ) had been extremely active under the NCA in the constitutional process. GAPWUZ represented a substantial block of voters from amongst the 350,000 families working in agriculture, and a very large proportion of these were found in the three Mashonaland Provinces. Their votes cast in favour of the MDC would certainly have spelt defeat for ZanuPF in three crucial Provinces, and hence it was essential that this threat be neutralized. There was not an equivalent threat in the Matabeleland Provinces, where commercial agriculture was mostly livestock rearing and the number of workers involved was considerably lower. There were pockets of large numbers of farm workers down in the low veldt at Triangle and Chiredzi, and these areas did become targets too.

The strategy, like all effective strategies, was supported by a highly effective marketing campaign: the rhetoric of the Liberation War. The land issue was marketed as a liberation war, or rather the unfinished business of the Liberation War. The enemies were those who held the land, and coincidentally these were the "same people" against whom the original war had been fought. The age-old colonial and imperialist powers supported these "people", and the two had now combined to set up a political party - the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) - to drive their

interests. Thus, the struggle was against the old interests, now supported by their “sell out” supporters, evoking the problems of the 1970s and the roles played by Bishop Muzorewa and Ndabaningi Sithole. Thus, a liberation war campaign could be used internally against these enemies, and logically the “war veterans” were exceptionally well equipped ideologically to drive this.

#### **4. The use of militia**

A crucial component of the strategy for maintaining political power was the use of militia, and especially the youth as militia. But why the youth in particular?

Since 1980 the demographic character of Zimbabwe has shifted very dramatically. Notwithstanding the depredations of HIV and AIDS, more than 50% of the population is under the age of 18, which means that a very large proportion of the population was not alive during the Liberation War, and has no recollection of either the racism of the previous government or the effects of colonial policies. Since 1980, education, at least for primary school, has largely been free, but the promises of an education have not been matched in the aspirations of most young Zimbabweans. During the 1990s, under the economic structural adjustment programme voluntarily adopted by the Mugabe regime, the situation worsened considerably, especially for the young and the rural. The proportion of school leavers obtaining jobs has shrunk annually, as has the economy. The reality for most young Zimbabweans is the prospect of leaving school without a job, and little likelihood of getting one. In effect, there has been a huge disaffected population, without any basic allegiance to the philosophy of “liberation”, and amenable to the persuasions of any opposition group. And certainly, since the government of the day always bears the responsibility for the misfortunes of the country, this was a group that might well turn against ZanuPF.

Thus, there was a careful process of engaging the youth, and then of incorporating them into the political campaigning machine, as well as using them for other areas of political control. This involved at least three distinct phases, as summarised below:

- ◆ **The First Phase: using the “War Veterans”**

The first phase of the militia programme involved the use of the “war veterans”. This first phase may have only been intended to last as long as the Parliamentary Election which ZanuPF considered they could win overwhelmingly, but the results of the election clearly indicated that the Presidential Election would be exceedingly difficult for Mugabe. Furthermore, the very large number of election petitions (39), with the possibility of a losing a large number of bye-elections if the MDC petitions were successful, meant that the hold on political power was still threatened seriously.

- ◆ **The Second Phase: Training and Recruiting**

The second phase was mostly a formal consolidation of the processes involved in the first phase. It was evident from the scanty information available that a degree of training had been given to the young men recruited into the militia groups during the Parliamentary elections. This training was mainly in the nature of modelling through exposure: that is, the youth were exposed to methods of torture, running *pungwes* and rallies, carrying out military-type actions in the community, using mass psychological techniques such as slogans and songs. From the reports this exposure strongly resembled the types of tactics seen both in the Liberation War and also in the Gukurahundi period in the 1980s.

◆ **The Third Phase: Deployment into the communities**

Although the third phase seemed initially to be wholly concerned with the Presidential Election, it is evident that the militia have remained a cornerstone in the Mugabe regime's strategy for maintaining political control in the aftermath of highly discredited election. During the Presidential Election, the relationship between the militia, both "war veterans and youth militia, and the bases was once again seen.

In the first phase, described above, the target for the militia strategy was the rural unemployed youth. There were clearly great advantages for this group in joining the militia, and, as has been described in other African settings, much of the recruiting did not have to rely upon force since the excitement and power that came with being associated with the militia was inducement itself. There are good reasons for using the young, as has been described in Liberia<sup>viii</sup>:

*I think they use kids because the kids don't understand the risks. And children are easier to control and manipulate. If the commanding officer tells a child to do something, he does it. In this society, children are raised to follow instructions.*

Similar comments could be made about Zimbabwe. The strength of a patriarchal, commandist society puts young people in a position where they are amenable to control and adult authority. However, this is only part of the story: the susceptibility to authority and control was complimented by excitement and inducements. This too has been seen in other African settings<sup>ix</sup>:

*Food was very scarce; some joined to get food for themselves and their families. Some joined from peer pressure; they saw their friends join. Some joined from adventure. Most of them joined voluntarily. Sometimes they were promised money or told they would learn to drive.*

There were many reports that the young men that joined the militia would get jobs, be paid, or get further education. This is evidenced not only by these reports, but also by the reports indicating that the youth were very disgruntled by the failure of ZanuPF to make good on its promises after the Parliamentary Elections and the Presidential Election. In one story carried in the Zimbabwean press, Vice-President Msika was confronted by angry youth demanding payment for their "support" during the Presidential election<sup>x</sup>.

*"We worked for you and you should pay us because we sacrificed our lives campaigning for the party in dangerous conditions but some of the people who were supposed to pay us put the money to their own use," the youth said.*

Loyalty is not merely bought by inducements however. The militia, and certainly the adults in the "war veterans" and ZanuPF Youth, must all have been aware that many of the activities in which they were engaged were criminal, but the rationale – another "Chimurenga" – helped overcome many of the militia's scruples. For the young though, there was no prima facie allegiance to the rhetoric of the Liberation War: these were the stories of the previous generation. Thus, other methods must have come into play, and the most likely method was compulsion, which operated in two ways.

Both methods use well-known psychological techniques. The first revolves around creating a forced commitment: quite simply, get someone to participate in an act and they will be more likely to continue to do so. The process of commitment will be stronger if such commitment is done publicly, and putting young men in the situation where they commit actual violence is well known as a form of recruiting in many countries, as has been shown in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and

Rwanda. This will be more effective if allied to a strong psychological induction process. The second method also relies upon compliance, and is produced again through exposure to violence: witnessing the torture of others for their political or religious beliefs will produce a strong self-protection motive, identification with the aggressor, and at the least compliance to the aggressor.

However, it is probable that the strongest motive for young men, and occasionally young women, to associate with the militia was community pressure, and some evidence for this comes from the reports on the organised violence and torture by the Human Rights Forum. Analysis of the perpetrators shows a very high proportion of family names amongst the perpetrators; 608 names were given in this report<sup>xi</sup>. If one sorts through the names given as the worst perpetrators, and leaves in the data only names that match with another, then one is left with a total of 322 names for which one other match can be found. These names can be examined to see whether they have any geographical correspondence; that is, do the names match and do they come from the same area.

On the first run – merely examining the data for names that match – the data generated 322 names in total, which was 53% of the total number of serious perpetrators. As can be seen from Table 1, the vast majority of these were ordinary ZanuPF supporters, but the percentage was markedly higher than those observed in previous reports for ZanuPF supporters as a category.

**Table 1.**  
***Matching names only of the most serious perpetrators.***  
***(n=322)***

Category	Number	%
ZanuPF (Supporter)	282	87.5
War Veterans	9	2.8
CIO	3	0.9
Government official	2	0.6
MP	5	1.6
ZanuPF (Youth)	3	0.9
Zimbabwe Prison Service	1	0.3
Zimbabwe Republic Police	17	5.3

The second run – matching names and places – was more interesting, and, as can be seen from Table 2, came up with a list of 108 names that were matched with places. As can be seen, there are changes in both the number of categories and in the constitution of the categories, but ZanuPF supporters remain still the largest grouping by far. It is within this category that militia are likely to be found.

**Table 2.**  
***Matching names and places of the most serious perpetrators.***  
***(n=108)***

Category	Number	%
ZanuPF (Supporter)	97	89.9
CIO	2	1.9
MP	2	1.9
War Veteran	2	1.9
ZanuPF (Youth)	1	0.9
Zimbabwe Republic Police	4	3.7

However, it is interesting that there is a match between names, but not between the same person, and places. For example, in Mberengwa, the name "Hove" comes up 9 times, and since it is commonly known that Rugare and Joram Gumbo (both MPs) are also related to the Hove's, thus we end up with 11 names matching in one area. Staying with the Mberengwa example, we thus have 11 names, with 2 MPs and a former Minister (Richard Hove) who is also a councillor.

Here, it seems very plausible that there was a family and community process of recruitment into the militia and the consequent violence, and it becomes important to examine this further. This cannot be done with the data available, but would undoubtedly be adequately tested by a commission of inquiry.

The suggestion that recruiting to the militia operated through family and community pressure is perhaps different to other settings. The point here is that not all situations in which militia operate are the same. Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Rwanda are distinct in many ways. Recruitment of the youth in the first two countries was in the context of civil wars, involving massive internal disruption and destruction of communities: children and young people were dragged in by force of circumstances, although their individual motives for joining an armed group may have varied greatly, as suggested above. In Rwanda, there was a deliberate process of recruitment along ethnic lines, backed by a ferocious propaganda campaign to foster recruitment.

Unfortunately few of the reports on Zimbabwe provide detailed enough information on the breakdown of the perpetrators by category other than gross political affiliation, and thus it is hard to determine trends in any statistical fashion. Regarding the identification of the perpetrators of organised violence and torture, virtually no reports show the changes over time in this, apart from very gross indices. One report, relying wholly on medical examinations and affidavits, showed that "war veterans" and youth militia was a very significant proportion of the total (33%). This is shown in Table 3 below.

**Table 3.**  
**Perpetrators identified by victims.**  
**(Taken from Amani Trust, "Beating your opposition. Torture during**  
**The 2002 Presidential Election in Zimbabwe", 25 June 2002)**

Perpetrator	Percentage
ZanuPF supporters	46%
Youth militia	29%
Zimbabwe Republic Police	12%
MDC	5%
War veterans	4%
Zimbabwe National Army	2%
Unknown	2%

However, the assertion in this paper is not that the youth militia were the organisers of the organised violence and torture rather that they were the "foot soldiers" under the control of other leaders (see above). In 2000, these were assumed to be "war veterans", and this assumption seems to be held by a recent analysis of the worst perpetrators<sup>xii</sup>. As the analysis above indicated, relatively stable numbers of perpetrators were found per category – MP, police, "war veterans", etc – between the two elections, but, interestingly, when the data was sorted according to frequency of mention, then "war veterans" and ZanuPF youth were much less frequently mentioned. "War veterans" however were a very high percentage of the top 50 worst offenders, and some "war veterans" were the most frequently mentioned of all. When ZanuPF MPs, many of whom make much of their "war veteran" credentials, are added to the "war veteran" category, then these two categories make up 15% of the total of the worst perpetrators mentioned by victims.

It thus is not difficult to see a link between the youth militia and their likely leaders. In fact, given the decision by the Mugabe government to constitute both "war veterans" and the youth militia as official auxiliary forces, this link must be denied rather than proven.

Another interesting use of the data is the examination of the use of the bases and their association with militia and the violence. Using the reports of the Human Rights Forum, it is possible to see some trends and some changes over time. As is seen from Table 4, there are some marked changes. It is clear that no strong statement can be made about the overall number

of bases operating at any time, but it can be seen that there is a reported increase in the number of bases identified in the reports of victims. There is nearly a four-fold increase in the number of bases from 2000 to 2002, which clearly correlates with the many reports from human rights groups and the increased number of gross human rights violations attributed to the youth militia. It is also evident that there is near-national spread of the bases: there are no reports from Matabeleland South, but reports of bases from every other Province in Zimbabwe.

**Table 4.**  
***Number of bases identified by victims of gross human rights violations.***

	<b>2000</b>	<b>2002</b>
<b>Bulawayo</b>	0	14
<b>Harare</b>	3	3
<b>Manicaland</b>	3	2
<b>Mashonaland Central</b>	12	26
<b>Mashonaland West</b>	4	18
<b>Mashonaland East</b>	12	21
<b>Masvingo</b>	0	3
<b>Matabeleland North</b>	0	30
<b>Midlands</b>	5	6
<b>Total:</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>123</b>

A considerably more sinister change is reflected in the actual positioning of the militia bases, and, as can be seen from Table 5 below, there was a very dramatic shift towards using schools as bases. The use of official buildings – government offices, council offices, etc – and farms does not change very much, but the shift to schools is dramatically large.

**Table 5.**  
***Positioning of militia bases in Parliamentary [2000] and Presidential Elections [2002].***

	<b>Schools</b>	<b>Official building</b>	<b>Public building</b>	<b>Farm</b>
<b>2000</b>	0	22%	61%	17%
<b>2002</b>	41%	18%	19%	22%

The use of schools must be read together with the blatant campaign to target teachers as potential MDC supporters. As was seen in an earlier report of the Forum, teachers became increasingly targets during 2001 and 2002<sup>xiii</sup>. The effects upon the personal lives of the teachers and their families are only part of the story, as the attacks and subsequent displacement had powerful effects upon their pupils and the communities in which the schools were placed<sup>xiv</sup>. Closure of schools and the consequent disruption of pupils' education were one obvious consequence, but added to this was the effect of pupils witnessing the humiliation and torture of their teachers.

There was also the consequence of pupils being "taught" political correctness, and the very high possibility of them experiencing considerable fear if their parents were teachers or supporters of the MDC. It is not difficult to appreciate all the possible consequences of targeting teachers and using schools as places of torture and political indoctrination. Whilst this might be acceptable in the old style communist regimes, it is wholly out of place in the modern political dispensations that favour democracy: it is even out of place in the former communist bloc countries!

## 5. Who has been responsible?

The argument outlined above is clearly at odds with the general thesis that land is at the core of the Zimbabwe crisis, and this thesis has been credibility not only by regional governments, but also by the over weaning focus on white farmers in the international press. It is not a thesis supported by the reports of Zimbabwean human rights groups, but these reports do not seem to have been given their due weight.

The reports of the Human Rights Forum indicate that a total of 1,352 individual persons are mentioned in the statements given by victims<sup>xv</sup>. There are also a very large number mentioned in the same reports derived from press reports, but I have concerned myself only with the names that have come directly to the Human Rights Forum, since these are supported by affidavits and medical reports. This is a large number of names, but it should be stressed only represents a sample of the actual total. The names are derived from only those who reported to the Forum, and cannot be even an indicator of the actual total; only a Commission of Inquiry or epidemiological investigation can determine the actual total<sup>xvi</sup>.

The first step in the analysis was to look at differences between the Parliamentary Election in 2000 and the Presidential Election in 2002<sup>xvii</sup>. As can be seen from Table 6 below, there are not great differences in the total numbers of perpetrators identified between the two elections. There is about a 10% increase in the number of perpetrators identified for the Presidential Election, but the interesting changes are in the types of perpetrators identified between the two elections.

**Table 6.**  
**Percentages of different categories of perpetrators reported to human rights organizations in the Parliamentary and Presidential Elections**

	<b>2000</b> <b>n=648</b>	<b>2002</b> <b>n=704</b>
Member of Parliament	3.4	0.57
Central Intelligence Organisation	1.39	0
Zimbabwe Republic Police	2.01	6.68
Zimbabwe National Army	0	0.85
Zimbabwe Prison Service	0	0.28
Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans Association	19.8	23.6
ZanuPF supporter	67.4	63.9
ZanuPF (Youth)	3.7	0.14
ZanuPF (Officials)	0.93	0.14
Movement for Democratic Change	0.15	0.28
Government Official	0.46	0.14
Unknown	0.77	3.27

*(These percentages are based on the number of names mentioned and do not reflect the number of times that a name is mentioned.)*

The number of reports involving the MDC is wholly insignificant<sup>xviii</sup>, and hence the remainder of this report will not concern itself with the MDC, but concentrate on the other categories of perpetrators.

As is seen from Table 6, ZanuPF supporters form the overwhelming majority of the perpetrators, and together with the war veterans (ZNLWVA), the second most frequent category, and account for over 85% of the perpetrators in both elections. A small trend can be seen during the Presidential Election for more categories of perpetrators to appear: as the percentage of ZanuPF supporters falls slightly – from 67% to 64% - so is there a corresponding increase in the percentages for the Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP), the Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA), and the Zimbabwe Prison Service (ZPS). There is also a relatively marked decrease in the number of

Members of Parliament mentioned in the Presidential Election. Presumably MPs were more prepared to be involved in violence in their own cause than in the cause of their President. The reports of the Forum do not allow much analysis of the category – ZanuPF supporter – and it is therefore not possible to make any comments on the role of the youth militia, but this group has been mentioned in other reports of the Forum and in the reports of member organisations of the Forum<sup>xix</sup>.

It is thus of interest to examine cases of multiple involvement in gross human rights violations, both in the sense of being involved at different times and also in the sense of being involved in multiple incidents - and in different places - within the same time frame. It is also of interest to examine cases where persons having some official status – MP, policeman, member of the CIO, soldier, party official, government or local government official, etc – are named as perpetrators.

Thus, the analysis then sorted through the names mentioned in the reports, and removed all cases in which the person was only mentioned once, or did not hold any public office or political office, such as a party official. When this was done, the total number of cases was reduced considerably; from 1,352 to 608, a drop of 55%. However, it still meant that 45% of the names mentioned were either officials or multiple offenders. Table 7 below is thus an extension of Table 6 above.

**Table 7.**  
***Serious offenders in the Parliamentary and Presidential elections, and in both Elections (percentages).***

	<b>2000</b>	<b>2002</b>	<b>Serious Offenders from both elections. N=608</b>
Member of Parliament	3.4	0.57	4.28
Central Intelligence Organisation	1.39	0	1.15
Zimbabwe Republic Police	2.01	6.68	9.21
Zimbabwe National Army	0	0.85	0.49
Zimbabwe Prison Service	0	0.28	0.16
Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans Association	19.8	23.6	4.11
Zane PF supporter	67.4	63.9	76.3
Zane PF (YOUTH)	3.7	0.14	0.99
Zane PF OFFICIALS	0.93	0.14	1.32
Movement for Democratic Change	0.15	0.28	0
Government Official	0.46	0.14	1.97
Unknown	0.77	3.27	0

As can be seen from Table 7, the relative percentages do not change much when we consider only the serious offenders. The major perpetrators remain overwhelmingly ZanuPF supporters and war veterans (ZNLWVA), but, interestingly, the ZRP becomes a higher ranked category and MPs become the third ranked category. This clearly speaks to the suggestions made by all human rights groups that this campaign of violence was organized, the clear implication to be drawn from the involvement of state agencies.

Table 8 (over) shows the numbers of persons in each category, the number of times that this group was involved in alleged torture, and the percentages. Statistically, the average number of times that this group as a whole was involved in torture was 2.64 (s.dev.1.63). However, some individuals distinguished themselves and were reported on many occasions as having been involved in torture. Mr Norman Josaya was mentioned no less than 16 times, whilst Messrs

Mupamombe (15), Mashonga (14), "Biggie" Chitoro (11), and Rwodzi (10) all received frequent mention.

**Table 8.**  
**Total numbers of times persons in each category identified as a perpetrator**

Category of Perpetrator	Nos.	Nos. of times mentioned.	Percentage
Member of Parliament	26	58	4.2
Central Intelligence Organisation	7	9	0.65
Zimbabwe Republic Police	56	88	6.31
Zimbabwe National Army	3	9	0.65
Zimbabwe Prison Service	1	0	0
Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans Association	25	150	10.8
ZanuPF PF (Supporter)	464	1045	74.9
ZanuPF PF (Youth)	6	13	0.93
ZanuPF PF (Official)	8	7	0.5
Government & local government officials	12	15	1.08
<b>Total:</b>	<b>608</b>	<b>1,394</b>	

Amongst the Members of Parliament, there were a large number who were mentioned more than once. Shadreck Chipanga (6), Saviour Kasukawere (5), Border Gezi (5), Elliot Manyika (5), J.B. Matiza (4), and Mark Madiro (4) were all multiple offenders according to the reports received by the Forum<sup>xx</sup>. Dr. Chenjerai Hitler Hunzvi, the deceased Member of Parliament for Chikomba and leader of the Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans Association (ZNLWVA), of course is probably the most notorious, as is the deceased Border Gezi. In respect of the latter, there has been at least one report to the Human Rights Forum alleging that Border Gezi had set in place a "hit squad"<sup>xxi</sup>. Doctor Hunzvi made no attempt to hide his involvement in violence and was on record many times threatening violence and clearly indicating that he was in charge of the "war veterans".

Over 13% of the total above can be considered to be "officials" of one kind or another, and this again speaks very strongly to the idea that the violence was organized and condoned by the State. The involvement of Members of Parliament in gross human rights violations is a very serious problem, and this has been recognized by the placing of most of these MPs on the personal sanctions lists of the US and the EU. I will return to this issue later, as well as the issue of the most notorious of the perpetrators, but it now worth while looking at patterns, especially as they relate to elections.

## 6. The relationship with elections

Many of the reports on the elections, as well as the human rights reports, make the observation that there was a curious association between the violence and the areas in which ZanuPF would have been expected to have done well in elections<sup>xxii</sup>.

It is curious that so much torture was reported from areas in which ZanuPF would expect to be strong, and it is tempting to merely conclude that the organized violence and torture from both elections was merely to ensure demand for ZanuPF and abandonment of the MDC. This was undoubtedly part of the purpose, but it should also be noted that the Provinces that rank highly are also those Provinces in which there reside large numbers of commercial farm workers, and particularly plantation workers. Some Zimbabwean Provinces have very high numbers of farm workers, whilst others do not, and the difference lies in whether the climate allows cropping, which involves large manpower, or livestock, which requires only small numbers of people.

This links directly to the so-called land reform process, which, while it was clearly a major propaganda issue for the Zanu PF government, it was also a pretext for eliminating the support in an enormous constituency for the MDC. The union representing the plantation workers, the General Agricultural and Plantation Workers Union of Zimbabwe (GAPWUZ), had been part of the trade union support for the NCA, and the rejection of the draft Constitution in February 2000. It is very clear in retrospect that the votes from this sector would have wholly overcome the advantage that ZanuPF held in the agricultural, as opposed to the livestock, Provinces. Whatever else the land reform campaign was, it was also a pretext for attacking the support for the MDC in the commercial farm worker population. Here it is argued that the attacks upon the commercial farmers were a pretext for the attacks upon their workers. Here all reports, both local and international, have commented upon the support, both manpower and logistical, that the government gave to the land invasions.

**Table 9.**  
***The 20 worst constituencies in the Parliamentary and Presidential Elections based on the total number of human rights violations reported per constituency.***

<b>CONSTITUENCY</b>	<b>2000</b>	<b>2002</b>	<b>Total</b>
HURUNGWE	184	16	200
GOKWE	80	96	176
MBERENGWA EAST	119	23	142
HARARE	119	73	107
BINDURA	22	68	90
MUREHWA NORTH	37	38	75
BUHERA	9	65	74
MUDZI	72	2	74
UMP	15	59	74
GURUVE	0	72	72
MUTOKO	45	11	56
CHIKOMBA	28	26	54
MT DARWIN SOUTH	42	10	52
MUREHWA SOUTH	36	12	48
MAKONI EAST	30	15	45
HWEDZA	16	28	44
ZHOMBE	0	40	40
ZVISHAVANE	34	2	36
<b>Total:</b>	<b>958</b>	<b>991</b>	<b>1949</b>

Table 9 shows the 20 worst constituencies for the Parliamentary and Presidential elections combined. As can be seen from Table 7, some constituencies show consistent patterns for both elections; for example, Gokwe, Harare, and Murehwa North had relatively consistent patterns for both elections. Hurungwe, Mberengwa East Mudzi, and Zvishavane show higher violence for the Parliamentary elections, whilst Bindura, Buhera, Guruve, and UMP show much higher violence for the Presidential Elections.

There is obviously an association between the worst constituencies and the worst Provinces, and also between both of these and the officials involved. For example, most of the MPs mentioned are those from constituencies in Mashonaland Central, East and West, whilst the remainder comes from constituencies where the reported violence and torture was high. In Mashonaland Central, Border Gezi, Mark Madiro, Elliot Manyika, and Saviour Kasukawere were all frequently mentioned: it takes no rocket science to discern the pattern, or to conclude that this was not random but organized, and organized with the connivance of the government.

## 7. The “Top Fifty”: The worst of the worst

As will be seen from Table 10 (also Appendix 1), the 50 most frequently mentioned perpetrators, from amongst the total of 608, show a very interesting spread of affiliations, and this spread to some extent modifies some of the trends above.

**Table 10.**  
***The top 50 worst offenders by category***

<b>Category of Perpetrator</b>	<b>% of total</b>	<b>% of the worst</b>
Member of Parliament	4.2	12
Central Intelligence Organisation	0.65	2
Zimbabwe Republic Police	6.31	4
Zimbabwe National Army	0.65	0
Zimbabwe Prison Service	0	0
Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans Association	10.8	28
Zanu PF (Supporter)	74.9	54
Zanu PF (Youth)	0.93	0
Zanu PF (Official)	0.5	0
Government & local government officials	1.08	0

“War veterans” and ZanuPF supporters previously accounted for about 85% of the total, and this trend is again seen in the top 50, but the weightings for the two groups change. Amongst the worst, “war veterans” now account for 28% and ZanuPF supporters only 54%. This again suggests organization behind the violence, with the role of “war veteran” leaders such as Dr Hunzvi and Border Gezi being complimented by their subordinates such as Norman Josaya or Biggie Chitoro.

MPs again form a much higher percentage of the worst perpetrators, with the overall percentage shifting from 4% of the total to 12% of the worst. This again reinforces the view that the violence and torture was organized, and that, at the core of the organization, were important ZanuPF supporters and government officials.

As will be seen from the list of names in Appendix 1, the worst perpetrators are persons mentioned many times in the reports of the Human Rights Forum, as well in the data derived from the Zimbabwean press reports. Very few – Biggie Chitoro and Joseph Mwale only – are implicated in extra-judicial killings or summary executions, and the majority is alleged to be involved in torture. Torture is the most frequent gross human right violation, and torture – either as assault with intent to commit grievous bodily harm or common assault – was one of the categories of crime covered by the Presidential Amnesty of October 2000. This amnesty is yet another piece of evidence supporting the assertion, made through this paper, that the violence and torture were organized and condoned by the ZanuPF government.

## 8. The “rape” problem

Rape deserves specific mention. The association between militia groups and rape is well established, and has been reported widely from many countries undergoing civil wars of internal upheavals<sup>xxiii</sup>. However, as well as the problem might be known, there are considerable difficulties in documenting rape for a wide number of obvious reasons, and this is especially so whilst the violence is still continuing. There are also some difficulties in determining various categories of rape, although it must be said that rape, irrespective of the motive of the perpetrator, is the same for women: it matters little whether the rape was politically or personally motivated. However, it is nonetheless important to categorise different form of rape, for the intentions behind rape are an

important clue to the nature of the violence and whether the sexual violence is part of planned programme as in Bosnia or Rwanda.

There are four broad categories that can be distinguished here:

- *Genocidal rape where the intention is to destroy an ethnic or political group;*
- *Political rape, where there is intention to use sexual violence against women as a tool to punish individuals, families, or communities; or to create fear in individuals, families, and communities; or to force individuals, families, and communities to accept a particular political power;*
- *Forced concubinage, where women are forced into sexual relationships for their and their families survival, usually occurring during wars, civil wars, or in situations of massive internal conflict;*
- *Opportunistic rape, which usually occurs during wars and the like, where military personnel or militia take advantage of the destabilised situation and lack of civilian control to rape women.*

There is no assertion here that the first category has been found in contemporary Zimbabwe, although there are assertions that this might have occurred during the Gukurahundi period in the 1980s. However, there have many reports of rape since February 2000, and these reports illustrate all the latter three categories. It is worth firstly noting that women have not been spared from torture during the violence that has occurred since February 2000. One study, of commercial farm workers, showed firstly a very high prevalence of torture, but also those women were a substantial percentage (42%) of the total<sup>xxiv</sup>. Where women and girls are not exempt from torture, then rape is more probable.

The prevalence of political rape is unknown, but several reports quite clearly indicate political rape has occurred. It should not be thought that sexual violence is confined to women, although it is rarely reported that men are sexually assaulted. The following case is thus unusual, but illustrates sexual violence aimed at both men and women, and seems a combination of both political and opportunistic rape.

***Case: AG (2 January 2002)***

*AG was abducted from his home at night by 4 men and taken in a car to a farm (thought to be called 'Chidikamwedzi' in the MZB forest). He was beaten with sticks all over his body, particularly on his buttocks and put with a group of about 50 others who are made to work in the fields and deprived of proper food. He was forced to have sex with women whilst the others were watching. They were also forced to watch war veterans having sex with some of the women in the group and men were made to have sex with other men. He was kept at the base for 2 weeks then they took him and left him on the road to Centenary. He found his way home, but fearing for his life he sought refuge in Harare. His wife has now joined him and tells him that his house has been burnt down. AG was very tearful and disturbed at the interview, had bad chest pains and a STD.*

The issue of forced concubinage has generated enormous controversy in Zimbabwe during the past year. With both young men and women being forced to attend meetings at militia bases, there have been continuous allegations of young women being forced to undergo intercourse. In a parody of the Liberation War, women have been forced to live at the bases and provide cooking and other domestic duties for the men. This has led to one highly publicised protest by the mothers of young women, and continual comment in the pages of the local press<sup>xxv</sup>.

It is apparent that sufficient evidence exists to raise concerns about the militias and rape in all the categories described above, and, given the enormous problems in documenting rape and in women being able to make reports about rape, this becomes one of the most urgent areas for a commission of inquiry<sup>xxvi</sup>.

### 9. The involvement of the Police

The involvement of the Zimbabwe Republic Police has been another crucial component of the strategy. From the very beginnings of the crisis in February 2000, it was evident that the role of the police was critical. By acting proactively within the terms of the Police Act and the Constitution, the Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP) in a position to easily curb public violence and control violent groups. However, it is abundantly clear from all the evidence that the ZRP have shown a distressing tendency to inaction and even partisan action. The various reports of the Human Rights Forum document very well the movement of the ZRP in recent years to active involvement in the organised violence and torture itself<sup>xxvii</sup>. As the Forum commented in 2001:

*In this respect, we reiterate our concern over the failure by the government to ensure that the police carry out their duties in terms of the Constitution of Zimbabwe and the Police Act. During the year, the failure by the police to provide protection to victims of gross human rights violations was a continuing cause for concern. Partisan policing must end and all Zimbabweans must be afforded the equal protection of the law.*

However, despite these reports chronicling well the spiraling down of the ZRP into a wholly partisan force, they do not show clearly the linkages between the role of the police and the militia. However, some reports have examined the linkages, and, in particular, the recent report of the Human Rights Forum shows strong evidence for the involvement of the police and other security agencies in the commission of gross human rights violations<sup>xxviii</sup>. As this report shows, the police are the State agents most frequently reported as being responsible for gross human-rights violations, and, as can be seen in Table 3 earlier, the ZRP are the third most common category of perpetrator previously identified by human rights organisations during the Presidential Election in 2002.

If the breakdown is done for the police alone, it becomes clear, as Table 11 shows, that the uniformed branch of the ZRP is reported as massively the major perpetrator, with other branches implicated to a lesser extent. This is a considerable change from previous years, where, in 1998 to 2000, the CIO, PISI, the Riot Squad and the Support Unit were alleged to be the most common offenders and the uniformed branch tended not be reported as being involved in gross human rights violations. This picture does accord with the public domain reports of transfers of professionally-minded uniformed officers and the reports of "war veterans" and CIO officers being placed in positions of authority.

**Table 11.**  
**Perpetrators according to branch of ZRP.**

<b>Branch of the ZRP</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
Uniformed branch	61%
CID	14%
Riot Squad	12%
Support Unit	12%
PISI	1%

As will be seen from Appendix 2, which is a consolidation of all the published information on police involvement in gross human rights violations, there is a very high proportion of senior officers identified by the victims. In fact, of the 152 names given by victims, the ranks could be established for 39% of the police and CIO officers named, and, as can be seen in Table 12 (see over), slightly less than 70% of these ranks are officials with a degree of executive power. It seems implausible that these officers were acting on their own initiative, and, given the serious

allegations of state involvement in the violations, it seems more probable that these officers mentioned were acting according to a strategy and orders.

**Table 12.**  
**Ranks of Officers identified as committing gross human rights violations.**

Rank	Number	Percentage
District Commanding Officer	1	1.7
Officer-in-Charge	6	10.2
Chief Superintendent	1	1.7
Chief Inspector	1	1.7
Inspector	12	20.3
Assistant-Inspector	4	6.8
Detective	2	3.4
Sergeant	14	23.7
Constable	18	30.1

## 10. The current situation

The militia remain deployed throughout the communities of Zimbabwe, both urban and rural. Training camps have been increased, and there have increased intakes for all camps. The reports of militia-driven violence are increasing, but the most sinister development in the current time frame is the involvement of militia in food related activities. There are now numerous reports of militia determining who shall have access to food and other scarce commodities. This has been a feature of all the recent reports of the Food Security Network (FOSENET), an alliance of NGO's concerned with the humanitarian crisis. In their January report, FOSENET makes this comment<sup>xxxix</sup>:

*Reported political interference in commercial sales has also increased compared to November reports, with reports of youth militias and police controlling food queues also making decisions on access or claiming preferential access for some. The reported control by police of food queues for commercial supplies appears to have been a response to the tensions generated by scarcities, but has also brought increased report of political bias through militias. Political barriers have superseded cost as the major reported barrier to accessing commercial supplies.*

Similar comments were made in the November 2002 report issued by FOSENET, but this report did not identify militia as primary offenders, rather making the comment that there was political interference with food access in 38% of the districts surveyed<sup>xxx</sup>. There are also allegations that the militia are being given preferential access to food and other scarce commodities, and that they have hence become deeply involved in black market activities. FOSENET's most recent report shows little improvement in the situation<sup>xxxi</sup>.

This adds a whole new dimension to the already serious problems, and raises the concerns about possible genocide. Whilst this may seem a little dramatic, it should be borne in mind that genocide, as defined by the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide, does include the withholding of access to crucial vectors of support under the definition of genocide. Amongst the other acts or behaviours that constitute genocide, the Convention includes "deliberately inflicting conditions of life calculated to destroy a group", and this includes the deliberate deprivation of resources needed for the group's physical survival, such as clean water, food, clothing, shelter or medical services. Here it should also be pointed out that conspiracy to commit genocide is as punishable under the Convention as actually committing genocide, so it becomes very important to disentangle ZanuPF merely condoning the militia interfering with food access from actually encouraging this. Here evidence that the government and ZanuPF are taking

active steps to control the militia or disband the militia would be necessary to rebut the view that they are encouraging them.

There has also recently been a massive outbreak of torture perpetrated against the MDC in the wake of the national stay away. This was widely reported in the media and documented in detail by the human rights groups in Zimbabwe. This outbreak of violence was probably the worst single occurrence of torture since the violence of the 1980s in Matabeleland<sup>xxxii</sup>. The situation remains critically serious to date.

## 10. Conclusions

In summary, the following conclusions appear to be common cause:

- *All reports show that the violence has been disproportionately one-sided, and against the MDC and other groups not supporting ZanuPF;*
- *All reports show that the violence attributed to ZanuPF is different to the violence attributed the other groups, both in the scale and in the nature;*
- *The violence attributed to ZanuPF shows evidence of systematic torture, abductions, disappearance, summary executions and extra-judicial killings, and this is very rarely the case with violence attributed to other groups such as the MDC;*
- *The systematic torture shows a strong associations with officials of the State – members of parliament, the police, the CIO, and other officials – as well as an association with groups closely affiliated to the ZanuPF political party – "war veterans", youth militia, ZanuPF youth, ZanuPF supporters, ZanuPF party officials, etc ;*
- *The evidence shows that plausible allegations can made for the involvement of senior party and government leaders, and there are many statements from victims implicating such persons;*
- *The evidence suggests that a strong case can be made for a planned strategy using militia. Firstly, the "war veterans" were deployed to manage the farm invasions and the Parliamentary Elections, and, secondly, a youth militia cadre was developed and deployed initially for the Presidential Election, but have subsequently been deployed all around the country. The evidence available shows a very strong association between the youth militia and torture, and it is not contested that there are training camps for the youth militia or that government funds have been allocated to such training;*
- *There is no or very little evidence, of any attempt by the executive or organs of the State to proactively deal with the violence;*
- *The evidence suggests, to the contrary, that there an enormous number of examples of hate speech, and encouragement to violence and lawlessness by virtually all members of the executive, the parliament, the party, and the supporters of the ZanuPF party;*
- *There is strong evidence for severe interference by the State, state officials, and ZanuPF supporters, with the judiciary, magistrates and law officers, including the ignoring of High Court and Supreme Court judgements and orders ;*
- *There is finally the promulgation of two Presidential amnesties - in 2000 and again in 2002 – which must raise strong suspicion that the State wishes to avoid guilt for its actions since these amnesties provided impunity for all the crimes of torture.*

Finally, it must be pointed out that virtually all of these allegations occur not in respect of land reform, but in respect of elections. There are two highly disputed major elections and a number

of bye-elections, all of which have attracted adverse comments from local and international election observers. Apart from the widespread dissatisfaction with the electoral processes in these elections, the MDC has mounted 37 challenges to the results of the 2000 Parliamentary Election, and a serious and credible challenge to the Presidential Election. The election petitions to date have shown prima facie evidence of gross human rights violations, and six of the results have been invalidated by the Zimbabwe High Court . Furthermore, it was instructive that not only was impunity imposed after both major elections, but that the witnesses in the elections petitions were harassed and suffered further human rights violations for their courage in testifying against ZanuPF . Thus it is possible to conclude that there have been gross human rights violations primarily during elections, and, more strongly, it can be concluded that there has been epidemic-scale torture and gross human rights violations in the pursuit of the unlawful maintenance of political power during peacetime.

Quite obviously this analysis can only be a partial examination of the gross human rights violations and those responsible for these. It draws only on the published data, and can be no substitute for a full-blown commission of inquiry, but it raises very serious questions indeed about the responsibility of the ZanuPF government for gross human rights violations against the people of Zimbabwe. This is not the first time such concerns have been raised, and there is still no credible accounting for the gross human rights violations committed in the 1970s and the 1980s.

It is evident that impunity has been an important factor in allowing the violence and torture to continue, and this impunity has been both formal, using Presidential amnesties, and informal through the failure to ensure that the Zimbabwe Republic Police enforce the law and their constitutional duty. This strongly supports the argument that the violence and torture was organized and condoned.

This analysis shows the involvement of MPs, policemen, government officials, "war veterans", and ZanuPF party supporters, and repeated involvement. It shows patterns of involvement around elections, and in areas in which severe threats to ZanuPF's political hegemony have been posed. This analysis shows few changes between the two important recent elections in Zimbabwe – the Parliamentary Elections of 2000 and the Presidential Election of 2002 – and indicates one of the strategies behind ZanuPF's campaign to maintain political power.

Elsewhere I have argued that this picture makes a very strong prima facie case for crimes against humanity having been committed, and that prosecutions should consequently take place<sup>xxxiii</sup>. I have also argued that the timing and the nature of such prosecutions should be left to the post-transitional process in Zimbabwe: that Zimbabweans themselves should be consulted as to the course of action that they wish to take against the perpetrators of these horrible crimes. After all, we know who they are, and we know what they have done. But it may not be enough to leave the problem blindly to the future, and this is what this symposium is about: looking at the facts and deciding what are our options.

Firstly, there is considerably more research that needs to be done. The evidence that I have summarized above is a tiny subset of the total number of cases that have actually occurred, and, by implication, covers only a small number of the total number of the perpetrators. We need to examine all the data, and we particularly will need to have access to official records – Cabinet minutes, Politburo minutes, CIO records, etc – in order to clearly lay out the chain of command, the instructions given, and the responsibilities taken for the gross human rights violations. Here there needs to be a very determined effort to secure records before they are destroyed. Bear in mind that records from the Smith regime were destroyed or moved before the transition occurred, and even in South Africa there was massive destruction of official records. Whilst it may be possible to reconstruct the total picture from the victims' stories, the evidence from official

records will be crucial to both legal processes and the construction of an accurate history of the past 4 years.

Secondly, we need to use the evidence to develop a clearer understanding of the levels of responsibility for the violations. As I have indicated earlier, the data summarized shows a strong association between leadership in ZanuPF - whether MP, party official, war veteran, policeman, etc – and the perpetrators. This will probably require the setting up of a research department as soon as possible. There is considerable expertise within the region that could be drawn upon here.

Thirdly, we will need to consider very carefully as civic society the various options for pursuing accountability. This will be a complex process, and we are fortunate to have this opportunity in this conference to both consider the options and to have the insights from so many regional and international colleagues to assist us in this process.

Finally, we have the opportunity to develop a collective civil society position for the future, and I believe that this will be a critical development in both the immediate short-term as well as the long-term for Zimbabwe. Civil society has been in the engine room of the drive for democracy in the recent past, and it will undoubtedly be so in the future, but in no area will civil society's contribution be more important than in dealing with the problems of organized violence, torture, and impunity.

***This paper owes everything to the dedicated work of my fellow human rights workers in Zimbabwe; to the heroic adherence to the path of peace and democracy of all those members of the MDC and civil society organizations who became the victims as a consequence of their beliefs; and, finally, to the support given to the cause of human rights by a number of countries.***

**Appendix 1.*****The fifty most frequently mentioned perpetrators of gross human rights violations.***

Josaya, Norman (16)	Hurungwe East	ZNLWVA
Mupamombe (15)	Hurungwe East	ZNLWVA
Mashonga (14)	Hurungwe East	ZNLWVA
Chitoto, Biggie (11)	Mberengwa East	ZNLWVA
Rwodzi (10)	Hurungwe East	ZNLWVA
Ngoni (9)	Hurungwe East	ZNLWVA
Chingodza, M (9)	Hurungwe East	ZPF
Mujuru (8)	Mudzi	ZPF
Kasambarare, Givemore (7)	Goromonzi	ZPF
Karungaire, E (7)	Hurungwe East	ZNLWVA
Chinotimba, Joseph (6)	Harare	ZNLWVA
Kazembe (6)	Hatfield	ZPF
Musauki, Joseph (6)	Guruve North	ZPF
Salim, Abraham (6)	UMP	ZPF
Hunzvi, Chenjerai(6)	Budiriro	ZPF
Chipanga, Shadreck(5)	Makoni East	MP
Paprika (5)	Hurungwe East	ZNLWVA
Chuitsi, T (5)	Gokwe North	ZPF
Gava, Simon (5)	Zhombe	ZPF
Masenda, J (5)	Hurungwe East	ZPF
Gezi, Border (5)	Bindura +	MP
Kasukawere, Saviour (5)	Bindura +	MP
Manyika, Elliot (MP) (5)	Bindura	MP
Kaukonde, J (5)	Mudzi	ZPF
Chiwara, Lucky (4)	Gokwe North	ZNLWVA
Donsa, C (5)	Mberengwa East	ZNLWVA
Jamela, Festo (5)	Mberengwa E	ZNLWVA
Mangena, Langton (5)	Mberengwa East	ZNLWVA
Chinembiri, Elliot (5)	Zhombe	ZPF
Chivata (5)	Hatfield	ZPF
Danda, Webster (5)	Zhombe	ZPF
Denere, Lazarus (5)	Zhombe	ZPF
Jimmy (5)	Hurungwe East	ZPF
Kirmukiyani, Emmanuel (5)	Guruve North	ZPF
Mapako, B (5)	Zvishavane	ZPF
Mativenga, Tauya (5)	Zhombe	ZPF
Maumburudze (5)	Hatfield	ZPF
Mavingwa, Collin (5)	Zhombe	ZPF
Mufari, Nelson (5)	Zhombe	ZPF
Nyoka, Frian(5)	Murehwa North + South	ZPF
Sakahowa, Lovemore (5)	Shurugwi	ZPF
Kagodo, Last (4)	Muzarabani	ZPF
Machona, Constable (4)	Buhera North	ZRP
Madiro, Mark (4)	Hurungwe East	MP
Mafiosi, Dickson (4)	Bindura	ZPF
Matiza, Joel(4)	Murehwa North + South	MP
Mazinyani, Sgt. (4)	Shurugwi	ZRP
Mhiripiri, Punish (4)	Makoni West	ZPF
Mutemachani, Boniface (4)	Chiredzi North	ZNLWVA
Mwale, Joseph(4)	Buhera North	CIO

**Appendix 2.**  
***Names, stations, section, and rank of State agents mentioned in human rights reports.***

<b>Name</b>	<b>Station</b>	<b>Section</b>	<b>Rank</b>
Mudadi	Kwekwe Central	Head of Operations	Assistant-Inspector
Dowa	Harare North/central	ZRP	Assistant-Inspector
Majora	Chikomba	ZRP	Assistant-Inspector
Sanyateve	Goromonzi District	ZRP	Assistant-Inspector
Chinyoka	Chipinge South	ZRP	Chief Inspector
Marange		ZRP	Chief Superintendent
Chineka	Buhera North	ZRP	Constable
Chinembiri	Chimanimani	ZRP	Constable
Chirere	Chimanimani	ZRP	Constable
Dzvairo	UMP	ZRP	Constable
Gumbo	Chimanimani	ZRP	Constable
Machivenyika	Hurungwe East	ZRP	Constable
Machona	Buhera North	ZRP	Constable
Mahuwa	Buhera North	ZRP	Constable
Mandeya	Mt Darwin Sth, Bindura, Rushinga	ZRP	Constable
Manzunzu	Buhera North	ZRP	Constable
Mapete	Chimanimani	ZRP	Constable
Marise	Mbare Post	ZRP	Constable
Mazinyari	Shurugwi	ZRP	Constable
Moyo	Kadoma Central	ZRP	Constable
Mudenge	Gweru Central	ZRP	Constable
Munangangwa	Mkomba	ZRP	Constable
Ncube	Rio Tinto	ZRP	Constable
Nechibaba	Mazowe West	ZRP	Constable
Dzambwa	Buhera North/ South	ZRP	Detective
Jambwa	Buhera North/ South	ZRP	Detective
Muza		CIO	District Commanding Officer
Chidhuza	Gokwe Central	ZRP	Inspector
Dhliwayo	Harare central	ZRP	Inspector
Humba	Gokwe East	ZRP	Inspector
Mabunda	Harare Central	ZRP	Inspector
Makedenge	Harare central	ZRP	Inspector
Matira	Bulawayo Central	ZRP	Inspector
Mbedzi	St. Mary's	ZRP	Inspector
Mtombeni	Goromonzi District	ZRP	Inspector
Musindazi	Mamina	ZRP	Inspector
Jongwe	Hurungwe East	ZRP	Inspector
Mabunda	Hurungwe East	ZRP	Inspector
Muyambo	Buhera North	ZRP	Inspector
Mudziwapasi		ZRP	Member in charge
Marange	Gokwe Central	ZRP	Officer Commanding
Garidzania	Nehanda	ZRP	Officer-in-Charge
Gwenzi	Nkukumane	ZRP	Officer-in-Charge
Mataruse	Mberengwa	ZRP	Officer-in-Charge
Mkwalo	Nehanda	ZRP	Officer-in-Charge
Chidyamakono	Shurugwi	ZRP	Sergeant
Dube	Bulawayo South	ZRP	Sergeant
Maguneyi	Gweru Central	ZRP	Sergeant
Maidei	Gweru Rural	ZRP	Sergeant
Mamomembe	Mkomba	ZRP	Sergeant
Mangena	Mkomba	ZRP	Sergeant
Mawarire	Lower Gweru	ZRP	Sergeant
Mazinyani	Shurugwi	ZRP	Sergeant
Moyo	Nehanda	ZRP	Sergeant

Ncube	Senga	ZRP	Sergeant
Shereni		ZRP	Sergeant
Shumba	Senga	ZRP	Sergeant
Shumba	Buhera North	ZRP	Sergeant
Sibanda	Gweru Rural	ZRP	Sergeant
Chipembe	Marondera	CID	
Mhene	Gwanda	CID	
Ngewa	Masvingo Central	CID	
Nyamuzuwe	Marondera	CID	
Tsvarai	Marondera	CID	
Bvukumbwe	Marondera	CIO	
Chinove	Marondera	CIO	
Hungwe		CIO	
Mampala	Kwekwe	CIO	
Masholondengu	Murewa Centre	CIO	
Muzonzini	Marondera	CIO	
Muzonzini	Chivhu	CIO	
Mwale	Chimanimani	CIO	
Nyagura	Marondera	CIO	
Sengweni		CIO	
Sydney	Marondera	CIO	
T.K.	Gokwe Central	CIO	
Chapisa	Marondera	Law & Order	
Manyengwa	Marondera	Law & Order	
Mathema	Harare Central	Law & Order	
Muuya	Marondera	Law & Order	
Sibanda	Bulawayo Central	Law & Order	
Chaminuka		PISI	
Chikanda	Amaveni Station	PISI	
Dube	Amaveni Station	PISI	
Jowa	Kwekwe Central	PISI	
Panganai	(Recently Transferred) Mbizo Station – Now at Marondera	PISI	
Pasipatorwa	rural	PISI	
Zimbangu	Amaveni Station	PISI	
Zvavagora	Amaveni Station	PISI	
Banda		ZRP	
Chawasarira	Redcliff Police Station	ZRP	
Chikande	Harare Central	ZRP	
Chikono	UMP	ZRP	
Chimedza	Gokwe North/East/West	ZRP	
Chipinda	Kwekwe	ZRP	
Chiyake	Harare Central	ZRP	
Dende		ZRP	
Desmore	Chikomba	ZRP	
Dhakiwa	UMP	ZRP	
Dhliwayo	Harare Central	ZRP	
Dowa	Harare Central	ZRP	
Dube	Mberengwa East	ZRP	
Duwa	Harare Central	ZRP	
Dzimbanhete	Mt Darwin/Bindura/Rushinga	ZRP	
Dzowa	Harare Central	ZRP	
Homu		ZRP	
Hove		ZRP	
Jiri	(Now at Mbizo)	ZRP	
Jonga	Kuwadzana	ZRP	
Ladla		ZRP	
Magwemise	Kadoma	ZRP	
Majongosi		ZRP	
Makaza	Kadoma rural	ZRP	

Makiyi	Mudzi	ZRP
Makore	Shurugwi	ZRP
Mapfumo	Chikomba	ZRP
Masuka	Nehanda	ZRP
Matsvaimbo		ZRP
Mazmabani	Murehwa South	ZRP
Mhaka	Harare North	ZRP
Millies	Zhombe Police	ZRP
Miilo	Masvingo Central	ZRP
Mnangagwa	Harare South / Murehwa North	ZRP
Muchengadawa		ZRP
Mukwena	Kwekwe	ZRP
Munandi	Kwekwe	ZRP
Mungofa	Bindura	ZRP
Munyandiani	Mutare West	ZRP
Murada	Kwekwe	ZRP
Mushamba	Murehwa North/South	ZRP
Mushowe	Kwekwe	ZRP
Musoni	Mount Darwin South, Bindura	ZRP
Mutandavari	Kwekwe	ZRP
Mutora	Nembudziya	ZRP
Muziwi	Mutare West	ZRP
Mvenge		ZRP
Mwakaliwa	Headlands	ZRP
Ncube	Mutapa	ZRP
Ngazimbi	Gweru Central	ZRP
Ngwenya	Bulawayo Central	ZRP
Nkomo	Majora Police Station – Gokwe	ZRP
Nyanyire,	Buhera North	ZRP
Nyathi	Southerton	ZRP
Nzuma	Buhera North	ZRP
Sadomba	Mbizo Station	ZRP
Shirichena	DZ Police	ZRP
Shoko		ZRP
Shumba	Harare Central	ZRP
Skhova	Harare Central	ZRP
Usayi	Mazowe East	ZRP
Zishiri	Mount Darwin South, Bindura	ZRP

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## Endnotes:

<sup>i</sup> See Reeler, A.P (2003), *Who should be sanctioned?*, [www.zwnnews.com] for a report on the involvement of government officials and others in the organised violence and torture.

<sup>ii</sup> See Zimbabwe Independent, 31 January 2003, *Militia impose curfew in Kuwadzana*.

<sup>iii</sup> See Reeler, A.P (2001), *State Sponsored Violence in Zimbabwe, Paper presented to "Crisis in Zimbabwe: Implications for South Africa and Southern Africa", South African Institute of International Affairs, 14 February 2001, Johannesburg, South Africa*.

<sup>iv</sup> See Reeler, A P (2003), *Who should be sanctioned?*; Reeler, A. P(2003), *The role of militia groups in maintaining ZanuPF's political power*; Reeler, A.P (2003), *Crimes against Humanity and the Zimbabwe Transition*, [all on www.zimnews.com].

<sup>v</sup> So successful has been the land gambit that it still is referred to in the solution proposed by Presidents Obasanjo and Mbeki to the Commonwealth. This is outlined in the letter from President Obasanjo to Prime Minister Howard of Australia.

<sup>vi</sup> The "obvious" strategy has been well-expressed in a report of the Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum:

[The Government] is fighting a Third "Chimurenga." This new "war" is a struggle to achieve economic justice for the black majority. The Second Chimurenga war was fought to liberate the country from the yoke of white minority rule. This armed struggle resulted in the political emancipation of the black majority, but not economic emancipation as after 1980 a tiny white settler community continued to dominate the agricultural and commercial economy. In particular, a small number of whites still owned a huge proportion of the most fertile farmland, with the black majority being relegated to poor quality land. This gross social and economic injustice could not be allowed to continue. Thus when the landless people "spontaneously" invaded white farmland to register their protest against this gross injustice, Government then felt compelled to act. It thus embarked upon its fast track resettlement programme. The new political party, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), was formed as a front for the whites to resist the moves towards the redistribution of the economic assets of Zimbabwe. Britain and other European powers are sponsoring the MDC because they wanted to protect the property rights of whites and are vigorously opposed to the expropriation of white-owned farmland. These Governments are also waging a vicious propaganda campaign against Zimbabwe. The Government was justified in taking all necessary measures to prevent the MDC and its Western allies from denying the black majority the economic justice they cried out for. It was perfectly justifiable to use necessary force to overcome resistance to the transformation of the economy in favour of the black majority to achieve economic justice. After all, the colonial regime had violently dispossessed the black majority of their land and had brutally suppressed them for many decades.

<sup>vii</sup> This early indicator was given in a Zimbabwe Broadcasting Service report on 12 January 2000, where it was reported that war veterans had demonstrated over a demand that the draft constitution deal with land redistribution. This was clearly an effort to bolster support for the notorious "fast track" land clause included in the draft constitution.

<sup>viii</sup> See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (1994), *Easy Prey. Child soldiers in Liberia*, NEW YORK: HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH/AFRICA/HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH CHILDREN'S RIGHTS PROJECT.

<sup>ix</sup> See again HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (1994), *Easy Prey. Child soldiers in Liberia*, NEW YORK: HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH/AFRICA/HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH CHILDREN'S RIGHTS PROJECT.

<sup>x</sup> See the *Zimbabwe Independent*, 24 May 2002, *ZanuPF militia confront Msika over allowances*.

<sup>xi</sup> See Reeler, A P (2003), *Who should be sanctioned?* [www.zwnews.com].

<sup>xii</sup> See Reeler, A P (2003), *Who should be sanctioned?* [www.zwnews.com].

<sup>xiii</sup> Here see *Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum (2002), Teaching them a lesson. A report on the attack on Zimbabwean teachers*, HARARE: ZIMBABWE HUMAN RIGHTS NGO FORUM.

<sup>xiv</sup> The Daily News, for example, carried stories on the attacks on teachers. On 20 June 2001, the newspaper reported that 32 teachers had been fired and 8 headmen deposed in Buhera by war vets and ZanuPF supporters for supporting the MDC. Later, the same newspaper carried a story on a report from the Progressive Teachers Union of Zimbabwe that teachers forced to pay protection fee, with 107 000 affected, and thousands had been reported kidnapped or raped (Daily News, 5 September 2002).

<sup>xv</sup> See *Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum (2000), Who is responsible? A preliminary analysis of pre-election violence in Zimbabwe*, HARARE: ZIMBABWE HUMAN RIGHTS NGO FORUM; *Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum (2001), Who was responsible? A consolidated analysis of pre-election violence in Zimbabwe*, HARARE: ZIMBABWE HUMAN RIGHTS NGO FORUM; *Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum (2002), "Are They Accountable?: Examining alleged violators and their violations pre and post the Presidential Election March 2002"*, HARARE: ZIMBABWE HUMAN RIGHTS NGO FORUM.

<sup>xvi</sup> Here it is relevant to point out that previous research into past epidemics of gross human rights violations in Zimbabwe have shown that the numbers can be frighteningly large. For example, epidemiological investigation of the numbers affected during the Liberation War of the 1970s indicated that 1 adult in 10 over the age of 30 years was a survivor of torture, whilst figures on the Gukurahundi period indicate 5 adults in 10 were survivors. A more recent study, on commercial farm workers indicated that 71% of the sample had suffered from torture: see Amani (2002), *Preliminary Report of a Survey on Internally Displaced Persons from Commercial Farms in Zimbabwe*, HARARE: AMANI TRUST.

<sup>xvii</sup> A more detailed exposition for this section can be found in Reeler, A.P (2003), *Who Should be Sanctioned?* [www.zimnews.com].

<sup>xviii</sup> This is a conclusion supported throughout the many human rights reports on current Zimbabwe, and is additionally supported by the conclusions of the many reports from election observer groups. Hence, it is not a problematic or contentious assertion to exclude the MDC from analysis.

<sup>xix</sup> See here especially, Amani (2002), *Beating your opposition. Torture during the 2002 Presidential campaign in Zimbabwe*, HARARE: AMANI TRUST.

<sup>xx</sup> The involvement of members of parliament has continued to date, with a report of the involvement of Elliott Manyika – Minister and MP – accompanying militia in attacks on MDC supporters during the strike in June. Here see the affidavit below:

G.M.

*27 year old Male from Glenview 1, Harare, Zimbabwe.*

*I was at the house of an MDC Councillor. There were about 30 of us MDC youths present. At about 3am today, Wednesday 4th June, 2003 the front door of the Councillor's house was forced open and a group of about 15 soldiers came into the house. They were dressed in camouflage uniform and 1 was in Police Riot blue uniform, and all carried AK 47 rifles and batons. They asked us why we were there, "you are the guys we want to see, you are MDC". They told us to chant our slogans. At first we kept quiet, then we chanted the MDC slogans. One of our group was seen climbing under the bed and he was dragged out, the bed was then put up against the wall and we were made to lie on our stomachs and were beaten again with the baton and rifle butts. The soldiers were saying " why do you want Mugabe to go, how much money are you being given, where is MADZORE (MDC MP for Glen View)?". Afterwards they made us collect all the food and groceries in the house and carry them out to their Army lorry and a light blue Mazda 323. I did not recognise any of the soldiers but I did see ELLIOT MANYIKA MP with them. I sustained injuries to my back, right leg and arm and buttocks.*

<sup>xxi</sup> See Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum (2000), *Who is responsible? A preliminary analysis of pre-election violence in Zimbabwe*, HARARE: ZIMBABWE HUMAN RIGHTS NGO FORUM.

<sup>xxii</sup> See especially Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum (2002), *Human Rights and Zimbabwe's Presidential Election: March 2002*, HARARE: ZIMBABWE HUMAN RIGHTS NGO FORUM

<sup>xxiii</sup> See Human Rights Watch (1996), *Shattered Lives. Sexual Violence during the Rwanda Genocide and its Aftermath*, NEW YORK: HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH. As this report notes: "During the Second World War, some 200,000 Korean women were forcibly held in sexual slavery to the Japanese army. During the armed conflict in Bangladesh in 1971, it is estimated that 200,000 civilian women and girls were victims of rape committed by Pakistani soldiers. Mass rape of women has been used since the beginning of the conflict in the Former Yugoslavia. Throughout the Somali conflict beginning in 1991, rival ethnic factions have used rape against rival ethnic factions. During 1992 alone, 882 women were reportedly gang-raped by Indian security forces in Jammu and Kashmir. In Peru in 1982, rape of women by security forces was a common practice in the ongoing armed conflict between the Communist Party of Peru, the Shining Path, and government counterinsurgency forces. In Myanmar, in 1992, government troops raped women in a Rohingya Muslim village after the men had been inducted into forced labor. Under the former Haitian military regime of Lt. Gen. Raoul Cédras, rape was used as a tool of political repression against female activists or female relatives of opposition members".

<sup>xxiv</sup> See Amani (2002), *Preliminary Report of a Survey on Internally Displaced Persons from Commercial Farms in Zimbabwe*, HARARE: AMANI TRUST.

<sup>xxv</sup> See Daily News, 16 April 2002, *Women vow to expose sexually abusive political thugs* ; see also Daily News, 5 December 2002, *Women protest against abuse in Zanu PF camps*

<sup>xxvi</sup> These concerns have already been raised by Amnesty International. See *Amnesty International, Zimbabwe: Assault and sexual violence by militia, 5 April 2002.*

<sup>xxvii</sup> See the various conclusions and recommendations in the following reports: *Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum (1999), A Consolidated Report on the Food Riots 19–23 January 1998*, HARARE: ZIMBABWE HUMAN RIGHTS NGO FORUM; *Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, (1999), Organised Violence and Torture in Zimbabwe in 1999*, HARARE: ZIMBABWE HUMAN RIGHTS NGO FORUM; *Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum (2000), Organised Violence and Torture in Zimbabwe in 2000*, HARARE: ZIMBABWE HUMAN RIGHTS NGO FORUM; *Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum (2001), Organised Violence and Torture in Zimbabwe in 2001*, HARARE: ZIMBABWE HUMAN RIGHTS NGO FORUM.

<sup>xxviii</sup> See *Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum (2003), Torture by State Agents in Zimbabwe: January 2001 to August 2002*, HARARE: ZIMBABWE HUMAN RIGHTS NGO FORUM.

<sup>xxix</sup> See *NGO Food Security Network (2003), Community Assessment of the Food Situation in Zimbabwe, December 2002 / January 2003*, HARARE: FOSENET.

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<sup>xxx</sup> See *NGO Food Security Network (2002), Community Assessment of the Food Situation in Zimbabwe November 2002, HARARE: FOSENET.*

<sup>xxx</sup><sub>i</sub> See *NGO Food Security Network (2002), Community Assessment of the Food Situation in Zimbabwe, February and March 2003, HARARE: FOSENET.*

<sup>xxx</sup><sub>ii</sub> See *Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition (2003), A Report on Organised Violence and Torture in Zimbabwe from 20 to 24 March 2003, HARARE: CRISIS IN ZIMBABWE COALITION.*

<sup>xxx</sup><sub>iii</sub> See *Reeler, A.P (2003), Crimes Against Humanity and the Zimbabwe Transition, [www.zimnews.com].*