the ambiguities of the agreement, for the most part under the nose of the SADC facilitator.4 In
recent months MDC‐T ministers have been arrested and harassed on spurious charges while the
capacity of both MDCs to conduct their party campaigns has been undermined by state
interventions.5 In addition civic leaders and human rights defenders have also been subject to
state harassment. Overall attempts to deal with the outstanding issues of the GPA have been
‘negligible.’6 Under these circumstances Morgan Tsvangirai has expressed frustration at
Mugabe’s unwillingness, or inability to stop the continued, though admittedly lower levels of
violence, against his membership. In exasperation he has noted the ‘increasing polarization’
within the government ‘as the starkly conflicting visions of the main political parties lead to
delay, deadlock or dispute over even the simplest of policies or reforms,’7 concluding that there
is a ‘third force within the government, which acts with impunity.’8
The response of the Mugabe regime to the GPA is based on the fact that it draws its legitimacy,
less from a representative and democratic state than from its legacy in the liberation struggle.
The party’s conception of sovereignty is thus based on its self perception as a revolutionary
vanguard party that embodies the general will of the people of Zimbabwe, not through elections
but because of blood spilled under its auspices during the war of liberation. This makes it
extremely difficult for Zanu PF to formulate its conception of sovereignty in a settled fashion,
through more stable functioning state institutions, because it views itself as a privileged minority
that persistently distinguishes itself from the rest of the citizenry through a state that it regards
as a party state. Moreover while it controls this state it also regards itself as above any structures
of accountability within it, and within this view there is no substantive place for stable
representative institutions.9 In the last decade Zanu PF has consistently undermined and
weakened functioning state structures. It is within this context that Mugabe himself can
persistently be seen to be above ‘normal’ political accountability, as witnessed in a comment by
Defense Minister Emmerson Mnangawa in March 2011: “Mugabe will continue to rule this
country. Nobody will stop him, even if the GPA collapses he will continue ruling. Zimbabweans
4
Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights, ‘ZLHR’s Position on Key Political Processes and Imperatives’. Press Statement,
Harare, 20 January 2011; Derek Martyszak and Tony Reeler, ‘Articles of Faith: Assessing Zimbabwe’s “GPA” as a
mechanism for change: A Legal Perspective.’ RAU, Harare, May 2011.
5
Moses Matenga, ‘Police crush MDC rally.’ NewsDay, 21st March 2011
6
Veritas, ‘Inclusive Government still failing to Implement 24 Agreed Points.’ 2nd Feb. 2011.
7
Morgan Tsvanigirai,’ Adress by the Prime Minister Tsvangirai to the New Zimbabwe Lecture Series ‘, Harare, 15th
Feb. 2011. www.newzimbabwe.com/news/printVersion. aspx?newsid=4487 Accessed on 17/02/11.
8
Guthrie Munyuki, ‘Bob losing grip, says Tsvangirai.’ www.dailynews.co.zw/news/34‐news/1947‐bob‐losing‐grip‐
says‐tsvangirai.html Accessed on 29.03/11.
9
Charles Taylor, Modern Social Imaginaries, Duke University Press, Durham and London, 2007.
7