25 S.C. 128\02 Section 11 and the Fifth Schedule of the Act which are impugned seem to be modelled on the above provisions of the British Act. The same Act is also significant in that it lays the basis for the licensing of Television Channels 3,4 and 5. While the Act specifies a number of criteria for the selection of a licensee, it makes special precautionary provisions for the cash dimension of set criteria. Nominally, section 17 provided that the licence should go to the highest cash bid. However, section 17(5) qualifies this in a way that betrays the locus of licensing power. It provides that should the Commission have any reason to suspect in respect of an applicant that “any relevant source of funds is such that it would not be in the public interest for the licence to be awarded to him”, the application together with supporting documents is referred to the Secretary of State. The Commission shall not award the licence in such a case unless the Secretary of State has given his approval. Subsection 17(6) states:- “On such a reference the Secretary of State may only refuse to give his approval to the licence being awarded to the applicant in question if he is satisfied that any source of funds is such that it would not be in the public interest for the licence to be awarded." The above section confers on the British Secretary of State, a political functionary, considerable power to determine what constitutes in the public interest for the purpose of refusing or the granting of a broadcasting licence. Section 4 of the Zimbabwean Act constitutes the Broadcasting Authority to be appointed by the Minister after consultation with the President composed of no fewer than five and not more than