Moreover,
the
Inception
Report
of
the
SADC
Electoral
Advisory
Council
(SEAC)
adds
a
further
dimension
to
these
protocols
by
extending
the
election
and
oversight
of
electoral
processes
in
Member
States.
Thus
amongst
other
recommendations
it
calls
for:
• A
stronger
role
for
the
SEAC
throughout
the
election
cycle,
with
more
details
regarding
the
role
of
the
SEAC
during
the
pre-‐election
period,
the
election
itself
and
the
post-‐election
period,
including
the
importance
of
Goodwill
Missions
and
Pre-‐election
assessments,
and
the
advice
that
will
flow
from
these
regarding
the
technical
requirements
for
the
SADC
Electoral
Observer
Missions.
• The
recognition
of
the
imperative
of
Long
Term
Observer
Missions
aimed
at
complementing
Short
Term
Observer
Missions
and
addressing
gaps
identified
in
the
effectiveness
of
Short
Term
Observer
Missions
to
date,
indicative
of
a
more
holistic
conceptualisation
of
the
electoral
cycle
and
the
potential
for
conflict
dynamics
to
escalate
at
any
stage
of
the
cycle.38
It
is
clear
that
there
are
sufficient
grounds
for
strong
advocacy
and
lobbying
on
the
challenges
around
the
Zimbabwe
elections,
within
the
existing
and
propose
election
protocols
of
the
regional
body.
Thus
in
accordance
with
these
guidelines
the
Zimbabwe
Congress
of
Trade
Unions
called
upon
SADC
and
the
International
Community
to
‘monitor
the
environment
right
from
the
voter
registration
process
until
after
the
announcement
of
results’.39
The
problem
at
present
is
that
Zimbabwe
has
fallen
off
the
SADC
agenda
since
the
2013
elections
and
the
end
of
the
SADC
facilitated
GPA.
At
present
there
are
other
more
urgent
crisis
that
appear
to
be
developing
in
the
region
such
as
the
problems
of
Swaziland,
Lesotho,
Zambia
and
the
DRC.
More
specifically
in
South
Africa
the
ANC
Government,
under
serious
pressure
due
to
accusations
of
state
capture
and
increasing
corruption,
has
also
resorted
to
the
language
of
‘regime
change’
to
confront
both
its
internal
and
external
opponents.
In
his
presentation
to
the
ANC
National
Conference
at
the
end
of
June
2017
the
ANC
Secretary
General
warned
that
‘regime
change,
as
an
agenda,
is
a
reality
facing
all
progressive
governments
in
developing
countries.’
However
he
also
presented
a
more
nuanced
position
on
this
issue
noting
that
concerns
about
outside
agendas
should
not
blind
the
ANC
to
the
real
domestic
problems
it
faces
in
its
own
party.
In
his
words:
A
narrative
was
developed
to
link
any
discomfort
with
the
influence
of
the
Gupta
family
to
the
regime
change
agenda.
While
it
must
be
acknowledged
that
regime
change
is
a
real
threat
that
needs
to
be
analysed
and
a
strategy
to
defend
the
country
and
the
movement
needs
to
be
developed,
this
cannot
be
used
as
a
response
to
the
perception
or
reality
of
corruption.
Both
objective
and
subjective
factors
in
this
regard
need
to
be
understood.40
The
ANC
must
be
reminded
that
it
needs
to
apply
the
same
nuanced
assessment
to
Mugabe’s
use
of
anti-‐imperialist,
Pan
Africanist
and
anti-‐regime
change
discourse
to
legitimise
the
undemocratic,
authoritarian
nationalism
of
Zanu
PF’s
politics
against
the
citizenry
of
Zimbabwe.
38
SADC,
Inception
Report:
Development
of
the
SADC
Electoral
Advisory
Council
(SEAC)
Mediation
Strategy
for
Pre
and
Post-‐Election
Related
Conflicts.
7
July
2016.
39
Information
Department
of
the
ZCTU,
‘ZCTU
worried
by
rising
political
violence’,
Harare,
26
July
2017.
40
ANC
Secretary
General,
‘A
Diagnostic
Organisational
Report:
National
Policy
Conference,
June
30-‐
July
5th
2017.
12