10 thus it is inappropriate to place short-time limits on claims for compensation. Some authorities therefore argue that there should be no time limitation on compensation or rehabilitation claims.17 Finally, there are the procedural considerations, dealing with the fifth point above: that of the manner of making claims for compensation. Given many of the observations above, it is evident that claiming for serious human rights abuses can be a very difficult process for a person, and hence it is extremely important that the manner of claiming does not disadvantage the survivor or exacerbate their suffering. “Primum non nocere” - “first do no harm” - must always be the guiding principle here, in law as in medicine. Obviously there must be a balance between ensuring that survivors are not further traumatised and the need to ensure that only legitimate claims are processed, and this balance is very much at issue in the current furore over the administration of the War Victims Compensation Fund. Fortunately, this balance is an issue faced elsewhere, and there are models for Zimbabwe to consult. Lutz offers the procedures set up under the Federal Indemnification Law of the Federal Republic of Germany as exemplary model.18 There are other alternative models, and still more are being developed, but there certain principles that should guide all procedures: 1. respect for a claimant’s privacy; 2. procedures should be as simple and non-confrontational as possible; 3. procedures should respect any cultural or linguistic differences between those who suffered persecution and the larger society; 4. must be latitude in evidence requirements. If records or other proof are unavailable, then the burden of proof should be on the government and not the claimant; 5. claimants should be entitled to appoint legal representatives to act on their behalf; 6. no person should be deprived of a rights to claim owing to inability to pay for the procedure; 7. there must be legal right of appeal for any denial of a claim. The justification for these points is largely obvious, but it should be remembered that these points will apply equally to claiming under a statutory provision, such as the War Victims Compensation Act, as they do the bringing of civil suits for damages. The general point once again is that the procedure needs to be “victim-friendly”, to use a contemporary phrase, rather than legalistic in the extreme. Before moving now to a consideration of the War Victims Compensation Act, it is worth spending a short time detailing the likely recipients of compensation in Zimbabwe, for, although the Act was promulgated to deal with war victims, it is now apparent that there were some groups of victims that were excluded or their needs inadequately understood at the time. 17 See Espersen & Genefke(1994), “Considerations concerning criteria for financial compensation to victims of torture, Copenhagen: IRCT. For detail of this procedure, see Bundesentschaedigungsgesetz (BEG), 29 June 1956; Also see Lutz (1989), “After the Elections: Compensating Victims of Human Rights Abuses”, in E.L. Lutz, H.Hannam, & K.J.Burke, (eds), “New Directions in Human Rights”, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. 18