CRS-21 Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank’s International Development Association (IDA) because it is in arrears to those institutions for debt payments. Policy Options93 Diplomatic Pressure. Certain countries, including the United States, have already declared the Mugabe Administration illegitimate. Some have suggested that these governments should officially recognize Tsvangirai as President, and allow him to establish a government in exile. According to reports, though, authorities have confiscated his passport, and he may have difficulty leaving the country. Many analysts suggest that the SADC governments may have the greatest leverage with the Mugabe Administration, but that international support for their efforts could prove helpful. The MDC and others have called for the United Nations to deploy human rights monitors to investigate the ongoing violence. Although South Africa and SADC have already deployed inquiry teams, the presence of U.N. monitors could be influential. The U.N. Security Council is considering the appointment of a special envoy to Zimbabwe, although results from the appointment of such an envoy in 2005 were limited.94 Nevertheless, as recent developments in the region have shown, President Mugabe’s allies within the international community appear less willing to publicly support his government than in the past. Some analysts have suggested that the United States should take greater initiative to expose external sources of support for the government of Zimbabwe.95 Diplomatic efforts toward Zimbabwe may progress toward one of three possible outcomes.96 Some have suggested that the United States, and others, should push unequivocally for Mugabe’s exit, preferably through diplomacy aimed at Southern 93 There have been a number of studies conducted on policy options to re-engage Zimbabwe, including, Michelle D. Gavin, Planning for Post-Mugabe Zimbabwe, Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) Special Report No. 31, October 2007; Todd Moss and Stewart Patrick, The Day After Comrade Bob: Applying Post-Conflict Recovery Lessons to Zimbabwe, Center for Global Development Working Paper no. 72, December 2005; and “After Mugabe: Applying Post-Conflict Recovery Lessons to Zimbabwe,” Africa Policy Journal, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, vol. 1, Spring 2006. 94 In 2005, the Zimbabwean government implemented Murambatsvina, a massive demolition program aimed at allegedly illegal urban structures, which rendered over 700,000 homeless. Then-Secretary-General Kofi Annan named Tanzanian-born Anna Tibaijuka, Executive Director of UN-HABITAT, as the U.N. Special Envoy on Human Settlements Issues in Zimbabwe to investigate the humanitarian impact of the demolitions. The presentation of her report to the U.N. Security Council stirred controversy and China, Algeria, Benin, and Russia objected to debate on it. The majority of Security Council members voted to allow its discussion, albeit in a closed session. Many observers suggest the Zimbabwean government did little to respond to the U.N. envoy’s recommendations. 95 96 Gavin, Planning for Post-Mugabe Zimbabwe, CFR Special Report No. 31, October 2007. Further discussion of these outcomes may be found in ICG, “Negotiating Zimbabwe’s Transition,” Africa Briefing No. 51, May 21, 2008.