23 Judgment No. CCZ 3/18 Constitutional Application No. CCZ 15/18 specified in terms of paragraph (a) of that subsection as the number of elected members of Parliament who are members of that political party bears to one hundred and twenty: Provided that, where fewer than fifteen elected members of Parliament are members of a particular registered political party, that political party shall not be entitled to any moneys in terms of this Act.’ … What is most significant about this Act is that no registered political party with less than fifteen elected members of Parliament will be entitled to be paid any moneys by the State. Parties with the requisite number of elected members will receive funding every year and not only after a general election has taken place. The amount of such funding is calculable on the basis of the number of their members as a percentage of the one hundred and twenty common roll constituencies. Plainly the funding is designed to subsidise permanently the political parties that qualify and not merely to reimburse their election expenses.” The learned CHIEF JUSTICE continued at 266E-267D: “(4) THE THRESHOLD OF FIFTEEN ELECTED MEMBERS OF A PARTICULAR REGISTERED POLITICAL PARTY AS THE ENTITLEMENT TO RECEIVE FUNDING FROM THE STATE The justification for placing a reasonable limitation upon the payment of State funds to political parties admits of no controversy. Its purpose is understandable. It is to encourage serious political parties or candidates to contest an election and thereby strive to obtain representation in Parliament. Yet, on the other hand, it is to discourage inability to attract an important following - to command a significant proportion of the votes cast. Put differently, the aim is to inhibit the proliferation of trifling parties; to prevent them from participating in the election simply in order to secure public moneys. Jensen op cit at 113-114 points out that the regulation of public funding for elections has been identified with the following five goals: (i) to ensure equality of opportunity in a liberal democracy characterised by inequities in the distribution of wealth; (ii) to make enough money available that competitive campaigns can exist; (iii) to allow new entrants, while not encouraging frivolous candidates or propping up decaying political organisations; (iv) to reduce the opportunity for undue influence; and