•
When the Commission reports on an election to the President and Parliament, it will be
obliged to give the report to the political parties that contested the election. It will also be
obliged to prepare the report within six months from the date of the election. 5 It is certainly
appropriate for political parties to be given the Commission’s electoral reports, but it is
doubtful if the Commission will be able to meet the six-month deadline. It has not yet prepared its report on the 2005 election.
•
The Executive in particular the Minister already has considerable power to control the
Commission in the exercise of its functions, and the Bill extends that control still further by
prohibiting the Commission from accepting donations or grants, whether from local or foreign donors, without the Minister’s permission.6 The Commission will also have to obtain
the Minister’s approval before investing its funds.7 On the other hand, the Commission will
no longer have to provide the Minister with copies of all minutes of its meetings and will be
able to enter into arrangements or contracts with governmental bodies in Zimbabwe without getting the Minister’s permission.8
None of the changes made by the Bill will have much effect on the functioning of the Commission unless the Commission’s members are perceived to be politically independent, efficient,
and dedicated to ensuring that elections are held in accordance with the law. This can be
achieved only by changing the way in which members of the Commission are appointed and
carry out their duties. The Commission is established in terms of the Constitution, as pointed
out earlier, and consists of a chairperson who is a judge appointed by the President in consultation with the Judicial Service Commission, and six other members appointed by the President
from nominees submitted by the parliamentary Committee on Standing Rules and Orders.9
The Amendment Bill cannot of course change the way in which commissioners are appointed,
but it could prescribe the way in which the Committee on Standing Rules and Orders selects
nominees to be recommended for appointment. It would be helpful if the Bill were to state that
each party represented on the Committee (ZANU (PF) and the MDC) had to nominate an equal
number of persons for appointment, and that the other party had a right to veto any of the persons so nominated. In other words, each party would put forward a list of nominees knowing
that the other party could veto any or all of them. This would lead to both parties putting forward relatively non-partisan nominees who would be likely to survive a veto, and the final list of
nominees sent to the President would consist of politically independent people. To improve the
Commission’s effectiveness, the Amendment Bill should require the commissioners to divide
among themselves responsibility for the Commission’s different activities so that each commissioner would be responsible for a particular activity. This would avoid what has happened in
previous elections, where the chairman has assumed control of all the Commission’s activities,
to the exclusion of his fellow-commissioners. An alternative way of distributing functions between Commissioners would be to give each Commissioner the responsibility for a particular
Province.
The Commission’s effectiveness and impartiality would also be enhanced if officials from electoral commissions were seconded to its service for the forthcoming elections. Some of the
electoral commissions in the SADC region are notably effective, and their officials could show
their Zimbabwean counterparts how to carry out their duties professionally.
5
Clause 8 of the Bill.
6
Clause 5 of the Bill.
7
Clause 6 of the Bill.
8
Clauses 13 and 14 of the Bill.
9
Section 61 of the Constitution.
6