Judgment No. SC 18/18 Civil Appeal No. 137/16 The “grace period” of thirty days granted to the first respondent by the court a quo has no founding at law and cannot be legally justified. The initial thirty days awarded by BARTLETT J were in terms of the Contractual Penalties Act. The purchaser, having already been granted this thirty-day period in terms of the law, cannot be granted a further thirty-day period not provided for in terms of the law, to the prejudice of the seller on no legal basis. Judicial discretion should at all times remain guided by the dictates of the law. A court is not entitled to determine a dispute placed before it, wholly based on its own discretion, which is not supported by the issues and facts of the case. It is required to apply the law to the facts and issues placed before it by the parties. 2. Whether or not the law calls for the strict application of the rei vindicatio? Mr Mpofu for the appellants submitted that in view of the court a quo’s findings, the appellants’ ownership of the property ‘should have been vindicated by the court a quo regardless of the court a quo’s considerations of equity and justice, on the basis of the strict application of the rei vindicatio. Mr Uriri for the first respondent and Mr Mapuranga for the fourth respondent without laying a clear legal basis for their submissions supported the court a quo’s decision. The court a quo came to the conclusion that the contract was never properly cancelled at the instance of Shorai Nzara. However, by the time Dzingai attempted to claim title based on the judgment of 9 May 2001 which had superannuated and the time within which payment should have been made had long passed. Therefore, the late Dzingai failed to perform his obligations in terms of the contract. He therefore could not lawfully claim title to the property. This means 15