been hacked but individuals have clearly hacked the copies of the electronic roll they were given as to remove the security features/ encryption thereon. 10.14. The Electoral Commission’s apprehension necessarily extends to the printed voters’ roll as well. Once an editable version of the electronic voters’ roll with voters’ pictures is in the public domain, it is possible to print out an edited copy of that voters’ roll. Where valid printed rolls with voters’ pictures are in the public domain, many would be incapable of distinguishing the genuine rolls from the manipulated ones. Again, this unduly erodes the credibility of the electoral process. 10.15. These events spoke to the prudence of shoring up the credibility of the voters’ roll to safeguard voter information and prevent the possibility of identity theft and motivated the Electoral Commission’s decision not to avail the BVR roll to any political party or individual. The decision was not made with respect to the applicant alone but to all candidates and political parties contesting the 2018 general elections. 10.16. Further, the reasonableness of the privacy considerations relating to release of the BVR roll were considered in the matter of Ethel Mpezeni v The Electoral Commission of Zimbabwe & 10 Others HC6332/18, wherein the applicant approached the High Court seeking an order barring the Electoral Commission from making public a voters’ roll with her picture on it. Her reason for seeking such relief was that she feared that such a voters’ roll was in violation of her right