In interpersonal or criminal cases, the punishment of a wrongdoer (and especially the wrongdoer’s acceptance of that punishment) can be a process by which the wrongs of the past are redressed. The power of punishment to put the past to rest can be explained in a number of different ways such as removing unfair advantage (Morris 1968), satisfying the victim’s anger (Hershenov 1999), or reaffirming the equal moral status of victims (Hampton 1992). Criminal prosecutions as punishments help victims regain sense of status as rights holder and so enhance dignity (Nino 1998, Bennett 2008). because of the potential for biased application of the policy and because it encourages the continuation of suspicion among former enemies (Govier 2006). In view of this approach, the central question is, if Zimbabwe pursues this option as part of the reconciliation processes, can it exercise it without bias towards political reconciliation only. g) Reparations The term ‘reparations’ has been used more and less broadly to refer to efforts to repair the harm that results from a wrong. A narrow use of the term refers to a transfer of goods or wealth to directly compensate for goods that were taken, damaged or destroyed. The payment is made either by the party who was responsible for the harm, by the wrongdoers’ descendants or other beneficiaries, or potentially by a third party acting on the wrongdoers’ behalf. This sort of transfer is perhaps better labeled ‘restitution.’ Transfers made in response to losses that are not literally replaceable such as deaths or injuries, are also referred to as restitution or reparation. A still broader use of the term includes material transfers that have a more purely symbolic function. These payments are meant to send a conciliatory message of some sort rather than to suggest that the wrong or harm is being paid back. The term ‘reparations’ is also used even more broadly to include acts other than material transfers, such as apologies or instances of truth-telling (Torpey 2003, Walker 2010). In transitional environments, some scholars concentrate specifically on the significance of trials in response to collective and politically significant crimes, such as those involving human rights abuses by officials. Criminal trials mark a clear break from the past (Malamud-Goti 1990). Trials symbolise the official disapproval of the actions that may not have been officially condemned before. Criminal trials and punishment are also claimed to make a crucial contribution to societal reconciliation by reaffirming the normative standards that should govern interaction. Punishment can reaffirm a country’s loyalty to the rule of law, as well as the faith institutions upon which the rule of law depends (C. Murphy 2010). On the other hand, a number of scholars are skeptical about the reconciliatory impact of criminal trials, especially in response to widespread wrongdoing. Shklar (1964) and Arendt (1977) argue trials do little to heal victims wounded by wrongdoing and have little pedagogical role regarding the normative standards that should govern relations. Trials fundamentally are oriented towards the establishment of the guilt of perpetrators, not the pursuit of the truth about the past. To situate trials within acceptable African limits, the indigenous gacaca courts in Rwanda provide relevant approaches to harmonise retributive and restorative justice. As Howard McGary (2010) has pointed out, material transfers in response to harm may be understood either within or independently of a process of reconciliation. McGary emphasizes that a backward-looking sense of justice can justify the repayment of a comparable value to victims who have suffered a wrongful loss or harm. Here, the past wrong itself calls out for rectification. To bring in the rhetoric of reconciliation suggests instead that the wrongdoers’ reason for the transfer is to secure better future relations with the victims. McGary argues that this forward-looking goal of reconciliation can insultingly suggest that a concern for justice is an insufficient reason to compensate the victim—that justice for these victims is only worth securing when it is also in the interest of the wrongdoers. f) Lustration Lustration refers to legal measures that permit or require the investigation of individuals running for public office to see if they collaborated with the previous repressive regime. Collaboration is established on the basis of past crimes or membership in a political group. Such measures are characteristically adopted in countries transitioning to democracy. In some cases, proven collaborators are barred from holding public office. In others, the past of collaborators is revealed publicly to an electorate, in turn diminishing prospects for election (Kaminski and Nalepa 2008). Lustration is sometimes defended as a means of reestablishing trust in government, by assuring the public that past wrongdoers will no longer be in power. Chiu (2011) argues that lustration policies are compatible with a commitment to ethical individualism and due process. On the other hand, lustration has been criticized as a means of pursuing political reconciliation, both McGary’s critique points to the generally fraught question of how justice is related to reconciliation, which is addressed further in section 4. It also highlights how significant the interpretation of a material transfer is in processes of reconciliation. Commentators who defend the conciliatory power of material reparations frequently interpret such payments as acknowledgements of responsibility, expressions of respect for the moral status of the victims, acts of remorse or caring, evidence of increased trustworthiness or a recommitment to the norms of justice (Thompson 2002, Brooks 2004, Gray 2010, Walker 2010). Yet the meanings of reparations can change, be undermined or repudiated, depending on the manner 9