8 beneficiaries. The take up rate under this model however ranged from 42% (Manicaland) to 100% (Matabeleland South), with an average take up rate of 66% nationally. This failure by some 34% of applicants to take up their allocations implied a considerable amount of land lying fallow or unused while, ironically, thousands of would-be A2 beneficiaries were pressurising the authorities to be allocated land. 7 There is some uncertainty about the total number of commercial farms still operating in Zimbabwe since the "fast track" reform was initiated in 2000. Government figures in June 2000 suggested that at least 5,500 commercial farms were operating and would be included in the land reform. At this time, the Commercial Farmers' Union [CFU] claimed about 3,200 members of the 4,300 actual white commercial farmers, or nearly 80 percent of the large scale commercial farming sector. By February 2003, the CFU estimated that only some 800-900 of these farms were fully or partially operating. Currently, only approximately 400 white commercial farmers remain, only half of whom are in any form of production. This has had a significantly dire effect upon agricultural production levels across the board. The Food and Agriculture Organization [FAO] and the United Nations Development Programme [UNDP] estimated that output in the 2002/2003 agricultural season had dropped to about 10 percent of the production achieved during the 1990s. 8 Agricultural production has continued to decline since 2003, raising the increasing prospect of major food insecurity, amidst continued allegations of incompetence in the allocations, as well as accusations of patronage and corruption. In 2006, the government, in the form of the President, has itself admitted that only 40% of the land acquired was being utilized properly. 9 There has also been a general migration of settlers and farm workers off commercial farm land, and even out of communal areas, into urban areas, where food supplies were more secure. This trend is continuing , notwithstanding government actions such as Operation Murambatsvina. Outside of the issues around land acquisition and its legality, there was also the serious concern by some stakeholders over the manner in which these acquisitions took place. 10 7 ZIMBABWE 2003. REPORT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL LAND REVIEW COMMITTEE ON THEIMPLEMENTATION OF THE FAST TRACK LAND REFORM PROGRAMME, 2000-2002 (‘The Utete Report’). 8 See Food and Agriculture Organization & World Food Program, 19 June 2003, FAO/WFP Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission to Zimbabwe. 9 “Only 40% of Zim's seized farms are used”. The Mail & Guardian (SA), 21 July 2006. See Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum (2001), Politically motivated violence in Zimbabwe 2000–2001. A report on 10 the campaign of political repression conducted by the Zimbabwean Government under the guise of carrying out land reform, HARARE: ZIMABWE HUMAN RIGHTS NGO FORUM. A Preliminary Report on Human Rights Violations on Commercial Farms, 2000 to 2005.