As can be seen in Table 5, which is a statistical analysis of the data on human rights violations collected by the Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum since 1998, there are violations that are much more frequent during elections than at non-election times.7 Abductions, assaults, attempted murder, death threats, property-related violations (theft and/or property destruction), and torture were all more commonly seen during election periods. There were no differences between election months and other times in respect of the other violations described above. 3. Overview & Conclusions In this brief report we have not attempted to review the very extensive literature on organised violence and torture in Zimbabwe. There are a number of reviews, and the interested reader can go to these for the details.8 Here we have attempted a more empirical approach, using available data bases, and trying to examine the question about whether Zimbabwe is a violent country in a quantitative manner. In using this approach, it seems to conclude that Zimbabwe is indeed a violent country as regards political violence. Comparisons with four other countries in the SADC region – Angola, Mozambique, Namibia and South Africa – clearly show Zimbabwe to be the most violent of the five countries now governed by former Liberation Movements. The rationale for choosing these five countries was deliberate. Countries that have a history of armed struggle against colonial domination usually end up with governments formed by the victorious armed movements, but not exclusively. It is debatable whether the independence gained by South Africa was a result of armed struggle as much as the internal struggles by labour, civics and churches, as well as an enormous international campaign and the position of the United Nations (Southall. 2013). This case apart, it does seem that liberation movements, as Way has suggested (Way. 2011), find it difficult to overcome the narrow means-ends analysis of armed struggle when dealing with the problems of governance and dealing with contests over political power. Zimbabwe may be paramount in being unable to forsake this approach to politics. As the analysis of the ACLED data demonstrated, more cases of political violence were reported for Zimbabwe, over the period 1998 to 2018, than any other of the five southern African countries. The vast majority (72%) of the political violence was directed against civilians, and, as was demonstrated in a previous study (RAU.2016), Zimbabwe was unique in this in comparison with the four other countries. Zimbabwe was also unique amongst the five SADC countries in that the majority of the perpetrators (63%) can be described as political militia, meaning war veterans, youth militia (the so-called “Green Bombers and other groups), and ZANU-PF supporters. Thus, in Zimbabwe, there is a picture of “directed violence” against civilians, and it becomes clear that this is both in defence of maintaining and capturing political power, with elections 7 For the purpose of this analysis, election months were taken as the three months prior to, and including, the month during which the election took place. This is somewhat arbitrary as some elections, such as 2002, were marked by a long period in which violations took place, and during which there were many violent byelections. However, for ease of comparison, the selection was restricted to just the three months and the byelections were deemed to be stand-alone events. 8 The Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, for example, has more than 40 reports since its inception in 1998, and these can be supplemented by visiting the Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and Solidarity Peace Trust websites. 6