Judgment No. SC 54/2018 Case No. SC 228/14 Given these significant distinctions, I take the view that what is sought in the final order on the return date is materially different from what was granted by way of interim relief by the court a quo. Furthermore, I am unable to perceive any categoric finality or definitiveness in the terms or effect of the interim relief granted. It does not preclude the appellant from expediting the proceedings and resisting the confirmation of the provisional order on the return date. In particular, it leaves ample leeway for the appellant to argue the merits of its case on the premise that the absence of a court order does not ipso facto negate its right to disconnect water supplies in order to enforce payments due for water supplied to its consumers. The Relevant Enabling Act At the hearing of the matter, Mr Girach raised the entirely new argument that the enabling law for present purposes was the Ordinance of 1911 and not the Urban Councils Act [Chapter 29:15]. Therefore, para 69(2)(e) of the Third Schedule to the Act could not be applied, as was done by the court below, to render the Bye-laws ultra vires. In response, and being quite justifiably aggrieved, Mr Mpofu countered that this argument was highly improper in light of argument to the contrary advanced and dealt with a quo as well as the thrust of the grounds of appeal and heads of argument filed before this Court. I entirely agree with Mr Mpofu that this fresh attack on the judgment appealed against is entirely improper and should not ordinarily be entertained. Be that as it may, it is abundantly clear that Mr Girach has completely misapprehended the legislative DISTRIBUTED BY VERITAS e-mail: veritas@mango.zw; website: www.veritaszim.net Veritas makes every effort to ensure the provision of reliable information, but cannot take legal responsibility for information supplied. 9