delay and, in any event, within a proposed period of 72 hours of the closing of the polls. 2. Zimbabwe Electoral Commission The legal framework for the ZEC appears comprehensive and detailed. However, as above, there are inconsistencies and gaps between relevant constitutional prescriptions and provisions of the Electoral Act relating, notably, to the exercise of the ZEC’s powers in fulfilment of its constitutionally and legislatively mandated responsibilities, as well as the effectiveness of established standards and rights. Notably, Section 239(k) of the Constitution empowers the ZEC ‘to receive and consider complaints from the public and to take such action in regard to the complaints as it considers appropriate’. Section 4A of the Electoral Act establishes the ZEC as (1) ‘a body corporate capable of suing and being sued and, subject to the Constitution and this Act, of performing all acts that bodies corporate may by law perform’. Additionally, (2) stipulates that the ZEC ‘shall have power to do or cause to be done, either by itself or through its agents’ essentially all foreseen operations and (pursuant to the Sixth Schedule) ‘to do all such things as may be necessary, conducive or incidental to the exercise of its powers and the performance of the functions of the Commission’. In spite of these provisions, it appears, nonetheless, that the ZEC is not specifically empowered with effective implementation of all its responsibilities (e.g. pursuant to Section 160J of the Act, to police election-related hate speech or incitement in the media). This is especially so with regard to decisions it may make over complaints received (other than those foreseen for consideration by specified judicial recourses). In this respect, there is no established mechanism (such as a dedicated committee, as the ZEC is empowered to establish) or published procedures for the receipt or treatment of complaints. Such a mechanism and procedures, broadly publicised, to receive, consider and decide upon complaints (including possible orders), in a timely manner, would be conducive to greater effectiveness and to the promotion of public confidence. The guarantee of the ZEC’s independence is rendered uncertain in the light of its dependency, in practice, on the Minister of Justice, and financial allocations from the executive. The stipulations in the Constitution (Section 235) guaranteeing independence should be aligned with the Electoral Act and practice with the effect that the ZEC reports directly to Parliament and secures its own funding and the financial resources for its mandated responsibilities (i.e. the conduct of elections and referenda) free from undue influence (e.g. to obtain its allocation as part of the Consolidated Funds). With respect to administration, the provision of full and timely funding of human and material resources prescribed by law or necessary for the fulfilment of the ZEC’s mandate would contribute to the effective conduct of elections, including crucial efficiencies on Election Day and in the counting, tabulation and related transparency 20