It is very important that we have an appropriate understanding of the continent and the region in which we are situated, so that our expectations of what SADC can do, and even the AU, should be properly tempered…..although SADC has got 14 member countries, perhaps slightly more, the contribution of these different member countries of SADC was differential in the search for a solution to the problem of Zimbabwe-not because they have different levels of commitment but because not all of them could contribute to the same extent. We have to position ourselves in such a way that we can have the possibility to persuade all parties to the conflict. And if one party decides to place itself beyond persuasion there is very little you can do. I do think that working within this reality there is some progress that we can show for the SADC mediation effort. It is not exactly what we wanted, but it is more than we could have achieved if we went the route of megaphone diplomacy or coercive diplomacy.24 Given these limitations it is most likely that a withdrawal by the MDCs from the GPA would weaken the opposition both at national and regional levels, and leave it without a viable alternative strategy internally, and no substantive regional backing. It is unsurprising then that, notwithstanding the occasional threats of withdrawals by members of the opposition, this is not a strategy that is being seriously considered by either formation of the MDC. Option Two: An early election There have been recent suggestions, particular from President Zuma and South African Foreign policy officials that, ‘parking’ the outstanding issues of the GPA, and concentrating on moving towards an early election in 2011, on the basis of certain minimum reforms necessary for elections, might bring a resolution to the Zimbabwe questions.25 However with the lack of progress on key issues in the GPA, in particular around electoral, constitutional and media reform, and the continuing challenges around the security sector, an early election would most likely result in another contested election and take Zimbabwe back to the situation in 2008. For the central problem in Zimbabwe has been, not the ability of the MDC to win an election, for it has shown that even under very difficult conditions it can do so. The major issue has been the inability of the MDC to transform electoral victory into state power, due to Zanu PF’s hold over the military and security apparatus in the country. Thus this alternative is not likely to produce any progress in the political impasse. Option Three: An extended power sharing period preceding new elections                                                              24  Transcript of Sydney Mafumadi’s input at the Zimbabwe Consultative Conference on Regional Solidarity,  organised by the Zimbabwe Institute, Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition, FiPep  and the Zimbabwe Solidarity Forum,  Harare, 21st July 2009.    25  “Tsvangirai should be flexible: Zuma.” www.newzimbabwe.com/news/printVersion.aspx?newsID=1651  Accessed on 18/01/10; “Zuma likely to back down on early Zim vote.”  www.zimonline.co.za/Article.aspx?ArticleId=5841 Accessed 19/03/10.   11