Court. His “reasoning” was not referred to by either. However, during the hearing the Chief Justice, Godfrey Chidyausiku, displayed considerable discomfort at the prospect of having to declare that certain Ministers had been unconstitutionally appointed by Mugabe. He suggested to Counsel for the Appellants that perhaps it would suffice merely to order the reduction of the number of Ministers to 31, leaving it to Mugabe to select who these should be. This approach would overlook the initial unlawfulness of the appointments. The Chief Justice then surprised some of those observing proceedings by descending in to the arena and suggesting to the Counsel for the State that he might want to consider whether there was some procedural defect in the appeal, thus rescuing him from having to rule on the substance of the matter. The Chief Justice, for example, suggested to State Counsel that perhaps ZANU PF should have been cited as a party in the application. The hapless Counsel could not, however, find any argument to lend support to this and other similar suggestions from the bench. Neither the erstwhile enthusiasm for compliance with the explicit language of the Constitution and the nullity which accompanies any failure in this regard, nor the assurance displayed in setting aside the appointment of the Speaker of Parliament, was evident when called upon to set aside the appointment of the extra Ministers. What did the Chidyausiku Court thus do in the face of the “explicit” language of the Constitution, which seemed to “allow no variation” to the quota of 31 Ministers? Unable to immediately see any basis upon which the case could be dismissed on procedural grounds, the Court has simply not ruled on the matter. Two years have gone by, the Inclusive Government has ended, and the unlawfully appointed Ministers have completed their full tenure without any judgment issued. This instance of unconstitutional executive excess has thus effectively been allowed to pass by the Courts. The matter is not, however, now merely academic. Regulations were introduced by some of the invalidly appointed Ministers, rendering the validity of these regulations themselves suspect. Most notable amongst these are the Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment (General) Regulations 21 of 2010, a key component of government policy, made by Saviour Kasukuwere. Fast forward to the introduction of a new Constitution for Zimbabwe on 22nd May 2013, and we see little change in the modus operandi of the Mugabe administration in regard to constitutionalism. Due to political considerations, the new Constitution became law very shortly after it had been agreed. Inadequate time was left to prepare for the establishment of various Commissions and institutions required by the new charter, or for the amendment of numerous pieces of legislation to bring them into line with the Constitution. The result was a plethora of constitutional violations the moment the new Constitution became effective. But, in addition to these passive violations of the supreme law of the law, there have been active violations of the Constitution by the President, seemingly simply because he and his Administration do not like the certain provisions thrust upon them by the negotiating process that led to drafting of the document. Two examples will suffice to illustrate the point: firstly, the use of the Presidential Powers (Temporary Measures) Act.9 This Act granted the President sweeping powers to make law by way of presidential regulation. Laws made in this way overrode the provisions of any Act of Parliament to the contrary. However, a part of the new Constitution pertaining to elections which became 9 Chapter 10:20.