Constitutional Court Mawarire v Mugabe NO & Ors Chidyausiku CJ Executive, the Judiciary and the Legislature. This principle is entrenched in the Constitution in the various sections which state in peremptory terms that there shall be a President, a Parliament and a Judiciary. Nowhere in the Constitution is there an excuse to function without anyone of these branches for an extended period of time. Whatever exceptions are dictated by transitional imperatives of the going out and coming in of governments, these are always kept at the minimum possible. In fact, so important are the tripartite pillars of State that even in a time of emergency or war, these three institutions are preserved. See subss 63 (5) and (6). The principle of constitutionalism which we referred to earlier, is embodied in s 3 of the Constitution which states: "This Constitution is the supreme law of Zimbabwe and if any other law is inconsistent with this Constitution that other law shall, to the extent of the inconsistency, be void." If one applies both the doctrine of separation of powers and constitutionalism, it is inconceivable that an interpretation that permits or allows for any extended period without one or other arms of State, in this case Parliament, can be sustainable. To exist too long without a Parliament would be tantamount to shredding the Constitution and inviting a state of lawlessness and disorder. It would, with respect, be tantamount to an "annihilation" of the Constitution, in the words of MALABA JA (as he then was) in Mike Campbell (Pvt) Ltd and Another v Minister of Lands and Another 2008 (1) ZLR 17 (S). If s 58 is a repeal or amendment of the peremptory requirement that "there shall be a Parliament", it should have said so explicitly. It does not do this. It is also instructive to note that in terms of s 158 of the new in-coming Constitution the timing of elections is such that they must be held before the expiry of the life of Parliament, thus: "158 Timing of Elections (1) A general election must be held so that polling takes place not more than– (a) thirty days before the expiry of the five-year period specified in section 143. " (emphasis added) The submission that the mischief of rule by decree consequent upon no elections being held by 29 June 2013 is obviated by the continuation in office of both the President and Cabinet in terms of s 29(1) of the Constitution totally misses the point that what is at issue is rule by the Executive in the absence of the checks and balances of a Parliament. It matters not whether the rule by decree is that of a single individual or that of a group, such as a Cabinet. The purpose of this section is to allow a smooth handover between the retiring and the incoming Executive in the shortest possible time. Its existence is also further proof of the need to ensure that the period between the dissolution of one Parliament and the inauguration of the next is as short as possible. Furthermore, the applicant is correct in submitting that the fourth respondent fails to appreciate that the overarching philosophy in s 31 E(2) is in fact constitutionalism and not proof that governance without Parliament is acceptable. The section is an exhortation to anyone appointed as Vice-President, Minister or Deputy Minister (from outside Parliament) to become members of Parliament within three months. The only time when such officials are allowed to exceed those three months is when during that period Parliament is dissolved (thus frustrating him or her from becoming a member). Only then can the period be extended to "until Parliament first meets after dissolution". In fact, this provision presupposes the prior existence of Parliament and not its wholesale absence and caters for a few desired members of the Executive who may not have made it to Parliament. 10