Zimbabwean government’s repressive politics, necessitated a new initiative to move the country beyond the political impasse. For the different parties involved in the Zimbabwe political crisis there were varied motives for entering the facilitation process. The South African Government saw this as a new opportunity to extend its policy of “quiet diplomacy”, and to push for a process that would initiate the stabilization of the Zimbabwean situation, preferably through a government of national unity, a long cherished goal of the Mbeki administration. For the Mutambara formation of the MDC there has been a strong concern, especially since the October 2005 split in the MDC, to keep the South African Government engaged in the Zimbabwe crisis. This was due largely to a recognition that, because of the general weakening of the opposition forces in Zimbabwe, and the weakness of their own formation in particular, a SADC brokered settlement provided a good opportunity to move out of the deepening crisis in the country. The Tsvangirai MDC was more circumspect about the role of the South African government, because of the shaky relationship between Tsvangirai and Mbeki which emerged as a result of several actors: The Mbeki administrations perception of a “western” backed MDC; the initial relations between the MDC and the DA; and the Tsvangirai formation’s perception that Mbeki had favoured the Welshman Ncube formation in the united MDC and thus played a role in the final split of the MDC. 5 Nevertheless it was also clear to the Tsvangirai MDC that an electoral solution facilitated by the regional body remained the most feasible route to power given the existing balance of forces in the country. The Mugabe regime reluctantly accepted the facilitation process because of its formal accountability to SADC, and as a way of using the process to reconstitute the electoral process and political conditions to prolong its stay in power. Notwithstanding this position it was clearly difficult for ZANU PF to negotiate with an opposition that it had for so long defined as a foreign construction. For a party so unaccustomed to dissent, parlaying with a major centre of opposition was a bitter pill for Mugabe and the hawks in his party to swallow. Central to the facilitation process was Mbeki’s objective of sealing an agreement that would result in a generally acceptable election process in Zimbabwe. In order to achieve this objective it was intended that the dialogue would: • Endorse the decision to hold parliamentary and Presidential elections in 2008. • Take steps to ensure that all concerned parties accept the results of the elections as being truly representative of the will of the people. • Agree on the measures that all political parties, and other social forces, must implement and respect to create the climate for such acceptance.6 At the onset the parties to the facilitation agreed that within the context of the above objectives the talks should be confined to the following major areas: The question of a new constitution; Electoral laws; Security legislation, in particular the Public Order and Security Act; Communication legislation, in particular the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act and the Broadcasting Services Act; matters relating to the political climate in Zimbabwe such as the land question, sanctions, politically motivated violence and external interference in Zimbabwe. As this facilitation was essentially between ZANU PF and the MDC, civil society groups felt marginalized in the process from the beginning, notwithstanding some attempts by South African 5 The split in the MDC is discussed in Brian Raftopoulos, “Reflections on Opposition Politics in Zimbabwe: The Politics of the Movement for Democratic Change.” In B.Raftopoulos and K.Alexander (Eds), Reflections of Democratic Politics in Zimbabwe. Institute for Justice and Reconciliation in Zimbabwe, Cape Town, 2006. 6 Brian Raftopoulos, “The ‘Frog’ and the ‘Puppet’: The Makoni Moment and Opposition Politics in Zimbabwe.” Perspectives, No 2, 2008. 9