14 Judgment No. CCZ 2/18 Constitutional Application No. CCZ 86/15 fundamental human rights. As a principle of good governance, it is not simply interpretative. Good governance means putting in place measures, including legislative measures, that advance and protect public interest. The Constitution requires that good governance be carried out in terms of laws enacted by the institution vested with the power to make the necessary laws in compliance with the fundamental principle of governance under the rule of law. Section 3(2)(k) of the Constitution requires that the principle be borne in mind by the State and all institutions of government at every level when action that has the potentiality of impairing vested rights is contemplated or taken. The doctrine of “due respect for vested rights” has long been recognised as the progenitor of the modern law of substantive protection of the law or substantive due process. The modern jurist has essentially long moved beyond being concerned with retrospectivity. He or she treats retrospective application for practical purposes no differently from any other legislative determination in assessing whether there has been due observance of the requirements of permissible limitation of the exercise of legislative power prescribed by the Constitution. In other words, the question is whether there has been a violation of substantive protection of the law in the enactment of retrospective legislation that impairs vested rights. The question is never, why has the statute been retrospectively applied? This is not a case of retrospective impairment of rights. It is a case of retrospective imposition of a new obligation with respect to transactions already completed. The acts of terminating contracts of employment on notice had already been completed. The transitional provision did not make the termination of employees on notice which was lawful when it occurred