28 6. Conclusions The judges and the electoral act The judges’ treatment of the electoral act spanned a full spectrum of varying interpretations. The judges diverge mainly on two specific points: • • the issue of agency; the definition of general violence. The Electoral Act makes no specific mention of persons who simply act on behalf of the respondent but who are not formally appointed as actual election agents of the respondent per se. It only states that an election may be void if: Any corrupt…or illegal practice has been committed with reference to the election…by or with the knowledge and consent or approval of the respondent…or any of his agents… xxvi This leaves judges a certain amount of discretionary power in interpreting agency and determining liability in the commission of corrupt practices during an election. In his Buhera North opinion, Judge Devittie accepted that there was a link between the respondent and the murderers of Tichaona Chiminya and Talent Mabika, even though the murderers were not express agents of the respondent, Mr. Manyonda. However, Justice Ziyambi clung to a more narrow reading. In her Zvishavane opinion, she concerned her inquiry almost exclusively to determining whether the respondent or his agent had been personally involved in the commission of corrupt practices. She gave cursory regard to any testimony that did not directly implicate the respondent or his agent. Although in the Chiredzi North case, testimonial evidence convinced Ziyambi that violence and intimidation prevailed in the constituency on a large scale, she refused to make a determination on the issue of agency. Were the war veterans implicated in the Chiredzi North terror campaign recognized and accepted by the respondent? Justice Devittie, in his Shurugwi opinion, went further than adopting the expansive interpretation of agency that he had upheld in his Buhera North opinion. He suggested that the common defence that was led by all the respondents in the cases before him- namely ignorance of violence and intimidation- cast further doubt on the respondents’ proclaimed innocence, rather than the opposite. Wilful ignorance of violent acts, especially when they are intended for the benefit of the respondent, is a deficient line of defence. Among the judges, defining general violence and intimidation was less varied. All three understood that “general” meant that violence and intimidation should need to have permeated a community to a degree and extent as to reasonably affect individuals’ ability to freely exercise their vote. Where they diverge is in their interpretation of evidence in regard to this definition. In her Chiredzi South opinion, Justice Ziyambi found that the violence and intimidation spanned about two weeks, and therefore believes that it did not meet the standard of being “general.” Justice Garwe agrees with Ziyambi’s assessment. Since Chinhoyi was largely an urban constituency, and most of the alleged violence and intimidation occurred on farms, the charge itself could not possibly meet the standard for inquiry. Justice Devittie on the other hand, in his Shurugwi opinion, finds that even localized violence and intimidation could potentially void an election especially if it is found that law enforcement agencies either encouraged violence or intimidation or stood by helpless to prevent such acts. xxvi Electoral Act, Part XX, Section 124 AMANI TRUST: Neither Free nor Fair: High Court decisions on the petitions on the June 2000 General Election.