Zi m ba bw e’s CONST I TUT I O na l REFORM pr o ce ss silent on matters traditionally controlled by the executive, such as diplomatic appointments, the making of treaties and the calling of referenda (ZLHR 2011: 6). Although the government ignored the NCA draft, the constitutional reform organisation ‘managed to keep the constitutional issue on the national agenda despite operating in a difficult political, social and economic environment over the years’ (Lumina 2009: 2). The Kariba Draft Constitution In September 2007, as part of inter-party dialogue, members of ZANU-PF and the two MDC formations met secretly at Lake Kariba in Zimbabwe, where they unilaterally negotiated and produced the document now referred to as the ‘Kariba Draft Constitution’. Restricting the constitutional-reform process to a select team of partisan representatives meant that most Zimbabweans were ‘denied their right to write a constitution for themselves’ (NCA 2009: 1). Since the Kariba exercise was an elite process from the start, it is hardly surprising that its content is undemocratic. The Kariba document is, in essence, a hybrid of the much-amended Lancaster House constitution and the Constitutional Commission’s draft. More than half of the articles in the Kariba Draft mirror those in the Constitutional Commission’s draft, essentially replicating some of the shortcomings of the latter (NCA 2009: 2). The Kariba Draft also incorporates the existing constitution’s provisions that enable the executive to dominate the other branches of government. It imposes a two-term limit for the presidency but proposes that this should not apply to terms served by the existing president, thus allowing the incumbent Mugabe to serve additional terms. The Kariba Draft has also been criticised for failing to protect fundamental rights and freedoms (NCA 2009: 1). Although it had not been adopted prior to the harmonised elections of March 2008, the Kariba Draft was annexed to the GPA of September 2008, and analysts feared that it would form the basis of future constitutional reform. The COPAC Process The GPA recognised that the inadequacies of the existing Lancaster House Constitution made it imperative for ‘the Zimbabwean people to make a constitution by themselves and for themselves’ (GPA 2008). Zimbabwe’s history of election-related violence also made the adoption of a new democratic constitution central to the GPA’s goal of creating an environment that is conducive not only to conducting peaceful, free and fair elections but for laying the foundations of a democratic society, free from violence and intimidation. Article 6 of the GPA required the transitional inclusive government, comprising ZANU-PF and the two MDC formations, to set up COPAC and establish a new constitution within 20 months of its formation. This is a marked departure from the prior Constitutional Commission’s reform process, which allowed the president to dominate the process. However, the GPA lacked specific details, and the inauguration of the inclusive government, and by extension the implementation of the Article 6 timetable for constitutional reform, was delayed until February 2009 due to disagreements over implementation of the agreement. COPAC was indeed inaugurated in April 2009, within two months of the establishment of the inclusive government – as provided for under the Article 6 timetable. It consisted of 25 parliamentarians selected to reflect parliament’s gender balance and the relative strengths of the different parties in both the senate and the house of assembly. (Thus COPAC consists of 17 men and 8 women, 11 members of MDC-T, 10 ZANU-PF members, 3 MDC-N members and 1 representative of the traditional chiefs.)  The COPAC process offered Zimbabwe’s main political parties a platform to develop a 5