5  The Third Phase: Deployment into the communities Although the third phase seemed initially to be wholly concerned with the Presidential Election, it is evident that the militia have remained a cornerstone in the Mugabe regime’s strategy for maintaining political control in the aftermath of highly discredited election. During the Presidential Election, the relationship between the militia, both “war veterans and youth militia, and the bases was once again seen. In the first phase, described above, the target for the militia strategy was the rural unemployed youth. There were clearly great advantages for this group in joining the militia, and, as has been described in other African settings, much of the recruiting did not have to rely upon force since the excitement and power that came with being associated with the militia was inducement itself. There are good reasons for using the young, as has been described in Liberia 8: I think they use kids because the kids don’t understand the risks. And children are easier to control and manipulate. If the commanding officer tells a child to do something, he does it. In this society, children are raised to follow instructions. Similar comments could be made about Zimbabwe. The strength of a patriarchal, commandist society puts young people in a position where they are amenable to control and adult authority. However, this is only part of the story: the susceptibility to authority and control was complimented by excitement and inducements. This too has been seen in other African settings9: Food was very scarce; some joined to get food for themselves and their families. Some joined from peer pressure; they saw their friends join. Some joined fro adventure. Most of them joined voluntarily. Sometimes they were promised money or told they would learn to drive. There were many reports that the young men that joined the militia would get jobs, be paid, or get further education. This is evidenced not only by these reports, but also by the reports indicating that the youth were very disgruntled by the failure of ZanuPF to make good on its promises after the Parliamentary Elections and the Presidential Election. In one story carried in See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (1994), Easy Prey. Child soldiers in Liberia, NEW YORK: HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH/AFRICA/HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH CHILDREN’S RIGHTS PROJECT. 8 9 See again HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (1994), Easy Prey. Child soldiers in Liberia, NEW YORK: HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH/AFRICA/HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH CHILDREN’S RIGHTS PROJECT.