6 the Zimbabwean press, Vice-President Msika was confronted by angry youth demanding payment for their “support” during the Presidential election10. "We worked for you and you should pay us because we sacrificed our lives campaigning for the party in dangerous conditions but some of the people who were supposed to pay us put the money to their own use," the youth said. Loyalty is not merely bought by inducements however. The militia, and certainly the adults in the “war veterans” and ZanuPF Youth, must all have been aware that many of the activities in which they were engaged were criminal, but the rationale – another “Chimurenga” – helped overcome many of the militia’s scruples. For the young though, there was no prima facie allegiance to the rhetoric of the Liberation War: these were the stories of the previous generation. Thus, other methods must have come into play, and the most likely method was compulsion, which operated in two ways. Both methods use well-known psychological techniques. The first revolves around creating a forced commitment: quite simply, get someone to participate in an act and they will be more likely to continue to do so. The process of commitment will be stronger if such commitment is done publicly, and putting young men in the situation where they commit actual violence is well known as a form of recruiting in many countries, as has been shown in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Rwanda. This will be more effective if allied to a strong psychological induction process. The second method also relies upon compliance, and is produced again through exposure to violence: witnessing the torture of others for their political or religious beliefs will produce a strong selfprotection motive, identification with the aggressor, and at the least compliance to the aggressor. However, it is probable that the strongest motive for young men, and occasionally young women, to associate with the militia was community pressure, and some evidence for this comes from a analysis based on the reports on organised violence and torture by the Human Rights Forum 11. This report indicated that a very high proportion of the names of known perpetrators were similar, as was their place of operation, suggesting that, in the rural areas, youth militia were being recruited through family The suggestion that recruiting to the militia operated through family and community pressure is perhaps different to other settings. The point here is that not all situations in which militia operate are the same. Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Rwanda are distinct in many ways. Recruitment 10 11 See the Zimbabwe Independent, 24 May 2002, ZanuPF militia confront Msika over allowances. See Reeler, A P (2003), Who should be sanctioned? [www.zwnews.com].