Judgment No. CCZ 7/16 24 Const. Application No. CCZ 17/15 habeas corpus. The right to freedom of conscience and religion is conspicuously absent from this list of absolutely sacrosanct and inviolable rights. The necessary implication is that freedom of religion is not inviolate or non-derogable. The provision that I deem most apposite to the resolution of this matter, and which I now turn to consider, is s 86(1) of the Constitution. It declares that “fundamental rights and freedoms …. must be exercised reasonably and with due regard for the rights and freedoms of other persons”. The analysis of conflicting rights postulated by s 86(1) calls for an essentially unitary approach. The question whether a given right is being exercised reasonably is inextricably intertwined with the question whether it is being exercised with due regard for the rights and freedoms of others. What is required is the balancing of actually or potentially antagonistic rights, having regard to the nature of those rights, the manner in and the extent to which they impinge upon one another, and the circumstances in which they have been or are to be exercised. It is trite that a contract concluded in contravention of the written or unwritten law, or one that is contrary to public policy, is susceptible to being struck down and rendered of no force or effect. The doctrine of sanctity of contracts is obviously subject to constitutional limits. As was observed in Bredenkamp and Others v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2010 (4) SA 468 (SCA) at para. 39, every contract or institutional rule must pass constitutional muster. Again, in Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 (5) SA 323 (CC) at para. 15, it was emphasised that: “All law, including the common law of contract, is now subject to constitutional control. The validity of all laws depends on their consistency with the provisions