THE CASE OF HENRY DOWA pending such a full investigation, to immediately suspend his privileges and responsibilities as an UNMIK official.40 “We regret that UNMIK cannot pursue criminal prosecution” The dossier reached UNMIK in early June 2003, and following further correspondence stressing the urgency of the matter, the SRSG Michael Steiner replied in a letter dated 3 July 2003: “We acknowledge the gravity of allegations made against [Dowa] and the importance of the principles enshrined in [CAT]. However, after very careful consideration and in consultation with UN Headquarters, we have with regret concluded that UNMIK cannot pursue criminal prosecution of the officer in Kosovo… In reaching this conclusion we have given particular attention to the presence outside of Kosovo of a significant body of evidence relevant to the case to which UNMIK does not have assured access. In addition, UNMIK’s judiciary has a very limited number of international judges and prosecutors to whom the case would have to be referred. ”41 The plea of ‘scarce resources’ did not take into account the obligations arising from CAT, including the making of an immediate inquiry into the facts in terms of Article 6 (2).42 The SRSG’s letter simply failed to mention what, if anything, was going to be done in respect of the Zimbabwe torture allegations. On behalf of the victims REDRESS therefore turned firstly to the UN Secretary-General, and then to the media. A letter was immediately dispatched to Kofi Annan, briefing him fully on the whole case and asserting that Steiner’s response was “ …utterly unacceptable, and certainly contrary to the aims and purposes of the United Nations, under whose auspices the Convention against Torture was agreed…”43 Among other points made to the SecretaryGeneral was that it was ironic that as a CIVPOL officer Dowa was supposed to be offering ‘best practice’ to new Kosovan police recruits emerging from conflict. The Secretary-General was asked to resolve the matter urgently. 40 Memorandum of Law (supra). The Memorandum also detailed that there were no applicable immunities barring prosecution, and that UNMIK had a duty to remove officials implicated in serious international crimes from office. In these regards see also below, footnote 69. A full set of all the papers relating to the case was also sent to Professor Theo van Boven, Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights on the Question of Torture, Office of the Commissioner for Human Rights, at the UN’s Commission Office in Geneva, asking him for support, particularly in ensuring respect for Article 5 (2) of CAT, and in advising the SRSG of these obligations. 41 The letter concluded with the following cryptic statement: “Our decision in this case should not preclude you from pursuing the matter through other channels.” As Steiner was directly accountable to the Secretary-General, with whom it appears he had already consulted (“…in consultation with UN headquarters…”), he presumably did not mean that REDRESS could approach his superior. He may instead have been suggesting the possibility of extradition; however, under CAT the obligation is to ‘extradite or prosecute’, which does not mean that UNMIK had the right not to prosecute on the off-chance that after the decision not to prosecute some other State might seek to extradite. Such an approach is entirely misconceived and flies directly in the face of CAT’s clear provisions. 42 See above page 7. 43 Letter dated 4 July 2003. The letter was copied, with supporting documents, to Mr. Bertrand Ramcharan, the UN Acting High Commissioner for Human Rights in Geneva. 9