TORTURE IN ZIMBABWE, PAST AND PRESENT wide-ranging and a matter for the court’s discretion. Where the court’s discretion has been used imaginatively and creatively an appeal court will be loathe to interfere, and it ruled that the suspension of a portion of the sentence on condition of payment to the (main) complainant of a lump sum as compensation for sexual assaults perpetrated on him was within the parameters of Section 358 (3) of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act [Chapter 9:07].177 ×Êòîò ̸» Ю¿½¬·½» During UDI, legislation effectively prevented victims of human rights abuses from 178 bringing civil claims arising from “ the suppression of terrorism,” as well as making perpetrators immune from prosecution. The Lancaster House settlement confirmed that position as far as the pre-independence period was concerned. 179 Even where victims were aware of their possible legal redress, and this applied to the Gukurahundi in the 1980s as well as the armed struggle of the 1970s, their fear of further retribution was an over-riding factor in deterring them from suing Government agencies.180 Sometimes civil actions were brought against the Government. In December 1981, an elderly white MP, Wally Stuttaford, was detained and tortured, accused of conspiring with Joshua Nkomo to overthrow Mugabe. In papers only released in 1996, the details of his brutal treatment were revealed for the first time, as the civil trial he had instituted years before had been held in camera “ for security reasons” . What also emerged was that he had been awarded substantial damages, but Mugabe had refused to pay at the time, saying it was “ a waste of money” . Stuttaford revived the case in 1996 (on the basis of a judgment only prescribing after thirty years under Zimbabwe law), and the matter was settled out of court after the deputy sheriff attached a tractor belonging to one of the CIO agents.181 The indemnity Regulations promulgated in July 1982, which were based squarely on the repealed UDI statute, sought to give Mugabe’s security forces the same indemnity from both criminal and civil proceedings that Smith’s security forces had enjoyed. However, in 1984, the Supreme Court held that the good faith provision of the Regulations was unconstitutional, ruling that an objective test for the reasonableness of an officer’s belief that he was in good faith had to be applied, not the subjective test set out in the Regulations. 182 Despite this ruling, very few claims for damages arising from the period were ever brought.183 177 The Supreme Court sat as a full five-bench court to hear the appeal, as a number of Constitutional issues had been raised, including the question of whether consensual sodomy was still a crime in Zimbabwe. It ruled 3-2 that it was. All 5 judges agreed that the trial court had used its discretion correctly in terms of Section 358 (3) of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act (Chapter 9:07). It did however set aside part of the trial court’s compensation order. The trial court had required Banana to pay money to the dependents of a man who the main complainant had murdered (in addition to paying the main complainant himself), the murder having been provoked by the deceased mocking the main complainant as being ‘Banana’s wife.’ The Supreme Court ruled that this went beyond the ambit of the Section, and that only the main complainant himself was entitled to compensation. 178 The Indemnity and Compensation Act 45 of 1975: see above p. 15. 179 See III 2.A. for details of the British Governor’s two Amnesty Ordinances which were later made into Acts of Parliament. 180 Breaking the Silence (supra) at p. 26. Thus PF-Zapu leaders in the 1980s who were well aware of their rights under the law and the Declaration of Rights, were being persecuted and were in hiding. To seek legal redress would have exposed their lives to real threats. In addition, ordinary persons faced harsh economic restraints making lawyers often beyond their means. 181 Ibid. at pp. 68-69. 182 Granger v Minister of State 1984 (2) ZLR 92 (S); 1984 (4) SA 908 (ZS). The case involved a lawyer, Mr Granger, who had been taking photographs of a motor accident scene, but was accused of photographing a vehicle belonging 36