For example, the regime governing the USSR had lasted 72 years, and that of Mexico 70 years, but clearly post-colonial regimes had mostly only been in existence since the 1960s. Hence, regime length is not a useful variable for this analysis. There was a slightly greater frequency of institutional regimes than individual ones, 51% as opposed to 44%, but no great difference. Table 3: Type of Transition % State creation 7 Collapse 10 Domestic Overthrow 15 Emergence from Civil War 5 Foreign Overthrow 5 Negotiated regime-led 39 Negotiated-Opposition-Led 19 More than half of the transitions were negotiated, with regime-led transitions being twice as common as opposition-led transitions (Table 3 above). Given the period under consideration was 1990 onwards, and that the Cold War had ended, it may be assumed that authoritarian regimes were seeing the writing on the wall, and this was the part of the process that Huntington termed the “Third Wave” of democracy (Huntington. 1991). Negotiated transitions, whether regime or opposition-led, seemed more possible where the form of government was either civilian or military-institutional. Examples of civilianinstitutional forms are Hungary, Poland, Romania and Russia in Europe, and Kenya, Mozambique and Senegal in Africa. For military-institutional forms, South American countries – Argentina, Brazil, El Salvador, etc. - dominate here, but Africa is only represented by Algeria. Africa, in fact, according to Polity IV, is dominated by militaryindividual forms of authoritarian governments: of the 17 countries in which this form of authoritarianism prevailed, nearly 60% were African countries where the “Big Man” ruled. With the growing international interest in support for human rights that was accelerated by the end of the Cold War, it is interesting to see how much influence this had upon domestic moves for justice and accountability. As seen in Table 4 (below), pre-transitional processes revolved almost totally around amnesties and domestic criminal prosecutions, but, as Reiter and Fishman point out, these amnesties are mostly to do with establishing impunity or dealing with political opposition to the regime, such as coups or mutinies (Reiter & Fishman. 2016). (Here see also sections 4.6.1 and 4.6.3 later for greater detail). Table 4: Pre-transition justice mechanisms Amnesties No. % 51 86.4 5 8.5 43 72.9 Civil Trials 1 1.7 Foreign criminal prosecutions 4 6.8 Reparations 1 1.7 Vettings 4 6.8 Truth Commission Domestic Criminal Prosecutions 14