Judgment No CCZ 8/16 21 Const. Application No CCZ 48/15 out at European level, provided that the system chosen does not contravene the principles set forth in the Convention.” In Vinter’s case (supra), the European Court reiterated that the imposition of a whole life sentence for especially serious crimes was not in itself incompatible with Article 3, so long as the sentence is de jure and de facto reducible. Thus, in order to be compatible with Article 3, a life sentence must include the possibility of review and the prospect of release. The same concerns were expressed by Mahomed CJ in Tcoeib’s case (supra) at 1006: “The nagging question which still remains is whether the statutory mechanisms to which I have referred, constitute a sufficiently ‘concrete and fundamentally realisable expectation’ of release adequate to protect the prisoner’s right to dignity, which must include belief in, and hope for, an acceptable future for himself.” Consequently, having found, at 1007, that the statutory arrangements were not arbitrary or unpredictable, because the parole and release boards were required to act impartially, in accordance with the law and subject to the supervision of the courts, it was concluded, at 1009: “For the reasons which I have articulated I am unable to hold that life imprisonment as a sentence is per se unconstitutional in Namibia, regard being had to the fact that the relevant legislation permits release on parole in appropriate circumstances.” Insofar as concerns the provisions of Part XX of the Prisons Act, there is no doubt that they differentiate between prisoners generally and those sentenced to life imprisonment. By excluding life prisoners from the statutory process of possible release