6. Power to appoint ambassadors Under the present Constitution the President appoints ambassadors acting on the advice of Cabinet; under the GPA he must get the agreement of his Vice-Presidents, the Prime Minister and the Deputy Prime Ministers to all such appointments. Ambassadorial appointments fall somewhere between Ministerial appointments, which are essentially a political matter, and appointments to the civil service, which should be non-partisan. Ambassadors are supposed to represent the country as a whole, but must also be able to communicate the views of the government currently in power. Under the new Constitution, therefore, the head of government should continue to choose ambassadors, acting on the advice of his or her Cabinet, but the appointments should be subject to parliamentary approval. 7. Power over the Defence Forces and the Police Force Under the present Constitution the President has considerable personal control over the security forces. He is the supreme commander of the Defence Forces and appoints their operational commanders after consultation with the Minister of Defence. He appoints the Commissioner-General of Police after consultation with a board consisting of the chairperson of the Public Service Commission, the retiring Commissioner-General, and one permanent secretary. These powers of appointment have been reduced somewhat by the GPA, under which the President must, again in theory, get the Prime Minister’s consent to “key appointments … under and in terms of the Constitution”, and must get the consent, not only of the Prime Minister, but also of his Vice-Presidents and Deputy Prime Ministers when appointing people to “senior government positions”. It is not clear which of the two provisions concerned applies to appointments of members of the security forces, but either of them would, if put into practice, curtail the President’s discretion in making such appointments. It is obviously undesirable for the head of government to have unrestricted control over the coercive forces of the State, whether through his power of appointment or though a power to deploy those forces. The new Constitution must ensure that: • Defence Forces and Police Force commanders are appointed by an independent, impartial process similar to that outlined above for members of the civil service; • there is civilian oversight over the deployment of the Defence Forces either inside or outside the country. This can be achieved by: o prohibiting any deployment of the Defence Forces without the consent of the Cabinet as a whole, and o requiring parliamentary ratification as soon as possible after the Defence Forces have been deployed. • the conduct of the Police Force is likewise subject to civilian control, which can be ensured by: o creating a Police Authority composed of members of Parliament and civil society, to give policy directives to the Commissioner-General of Police, and o creating a Police Complaints Commission, to investigate complaints against the Police. [The Constitution should at least mandate the establishment of these two bodies while leaving details of their composition and functions to be regulated by an Act of Parliament.] 42