and party can lose an election and opposition candidates can be returned and take over the reins of government. In the absence of a tolerant political atmosphere, elections will do little to curb the excesses of the Executive. 2. Term-limits Restricting the number of times a person may hold a particular post is another important check on the exercise of Executive power, as has been recognised since the days of ancient Rome. If politicians know that their time in office will come to an end within a relatively short period, they are more likely to moderate their conduct so as to avoid retribution when they cease to hold office. Because term-limits are so effective in curbing one-man rule, rulers have frequently tried to abolish them, sometimes unsuccessfully (Zambia’s President Chiluba in 2001), sometimes successfully (Uganda’s President Museveni before the 2006 elections). To be truly effective, therefore, term-limits must be firmly entrenched in the Constitution. [It should be noted that, strictly speaking, term-limits are undemocratic in that they prevent voters from re-electing a person whom they wish to continue in office. While this may be true, the beneficial effects of term-limits in preventing permanent one-man rule and moderating the conduct of rulers while they are in power far outweigh any technical quibbles about their democratic nature.] 3. Diffusing Executive power Many of Zimbabwe’s problems have stemmed from the concentration of Executive power in the hands of one person. Although the Constitution requires the President to carry out most functions in accordance with the advice of a Cabinet of Ministers (and, under the GPA, in some cases with the consent of the Prime Minister) in practice he has tended to make most decisions himself. Reasons for this include: • The President appoints Cabinet Ministers, without having to take advice from anyone (though under the GPA Ministers from the two MDC formations are nominated by those formations). Ministers who owe their appointment and political futures to the President are naturally reluctant to cross him. • By virtue of a dubious convention, Cabinet’s advice is officially conveyed to the President through documents that are signed by only two Ministers, and the advice is presumed to be that of the Cabinet. There seem to be no safeguards to ensure that the documents do indeed reflect the decision of the whole Cabinet, nor is there provision for the Cabinet to ratify advice given in the documents. As a result, it is possible for the President to by-pass his Cabinet. • The President heads a former liberation movement with a limited tolerance for internal dissent. Power within the party is wielded by the President and a circle of close associates chosen by himself. Ministers who are appointed from such a party are unlikely to risk their careers by resisting the President’s ideas. A new constitution must try to diffuse Executive power by requiring Executive decisions to be taken collectively rather than by a single individual. Some ways in which this might be done are the following: 1. Increasing the powers of the Cabinet: This can be done by reducing the President’s ability to act unilaterally, i.e. by reducing the number of decisions that the 44