application has been made, to issue directions which may amount to an absolute ban, irrespective of any consideration of the procession causing an obstruction to the free flow of traffic; and by virtue of the definition of “public procession” and “public place” in s 2, the prohibition may be applied to places other than those Page 63 of 1994 (1) ZLR 49 (S) mentioned in ss 20(6) and 21(4), such as a recreation ground, a park,or an open space to which the public are permitted access. Permission will only be granted if the regulating authority is of the opinion that the procession is unlikely to cause or lead to a breach of the peace or public disorder and then on such restrictive conditions as he decides to set. This is not the end of the matter however. Sections 20(2)(a) and 21(3)(a) of the Constitution permit the enactment of laws, or anything done under the authority thereof, which derogate respectively, from the right to freedom of expression and the right to freedom of assembly and association, in the interests of public safety and public order to an extent which is reasonably justifiable in a democratic society. It was not part of the argument addressed by Mr Muganhu that the existence of s 6 of the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act is reasonably justifiable in a democratic society. Notwithstanding, I must deal with this aspect by virtue of the applicability of s 24(5) of the Constitution. It reads: “If in any proceedings it is alleged that anything contained in or done under the authority of any law is in contravention of section 16, 17, 19, 20, 21 or 22 and the court decides, as a result of hearing the parties, that the complainant has shown that the court should not accept that the provision of the law concerned is reasonably justifiable in a democratic society on such of the grounds mentioned in section 16(7), 17(2), 19(5), 20(2) and (4), 21(3) or 22(3) (a) to (e), as the case may be, as are relied upon by the other party without proof to its satisfaction, it shall issue a rule nisi calling upon the responsible Minister to show cause why that provision should not be declared to be in contravention of the section concerned.” Thus, the applicants have to show that this court should not accept that s 6 is reasonably justifiable in a democratic society on the grounds of public safety or public order. If they succeed in doing so, the court must then give the responsible Minister the opportunity of producing proof to its satisfaction that the provision is reasonably justifiable in a democratic society. As observed by Beadle CJ in Maluleke v Minister of Law and Order and Attorney-General of Southern Rhodesia 1963 R & N 554 (SR) at 562H–I, 1963 (4) SA 206 (SR) at 215D–E: “… the court may not deprive the Minister of his right to put proof before the court, simply because the court may think that it may not be possible Page 64 of 1994 (1) ZLR 49 (S) for the Minister in the particular circumstances of the case to place any proof before it which might satisfy it. The Minister is entitled, as of right, to be heard on this issue ...” What is reasonably justifiable in a democratic society is an illusive concept — one which cannot be precisely defined by the courts. There is no legal yardstick save that the quality of reasonableness of the provision under challenge is to be judged according to whether it arbitrarily or excessively invades the enjoyment of a constitutionally guaranteed right. See, generally, Commissioner of Taxes v CW (Pvt) Ltd 1989 (3) ZLR 361 (S) at 370F– 372C, 1990 (2) SA 260 (ZS) at 265B-266D.