The right to freedom of assembly is often exercised by persons taking part in public processions. See Ezelin v France (1991) 14 EHRR 362 at para 32; and freedom of assembly covers not only static meetings but public processions as well. See the judgments of the European Commission of Human Rights in Christians Against Racism and Fascism v United Kingdom App No. 8440/78, at p 148, para 4, and H v Austria, App No. 15225/89, 15 EHRR CD 70. A procession, which is but an assembly in motion, is by its very nature a highly effective means of communication, and one not provided by other media. It stimulates public attention and discussion of the opinion addressed. The public is brought into direct contact with those expressing the opinion. In an as yet unpublished article entitled “Order, The Daughter not the Mother of Liberty — Processions and the Constitution”, D Matyszak expounds: “Public assemblies do not only impact upon those who personally see the demonstration, but influence the broader community. Where the message is an unpopular one, or one that mainstream thought would prefer to ignore, the constant presence on the streets of processions promoting a contrary view has an unsettling effect which forces the opinion to be debated. The underlying problems giving rise to the procession are thus brought into the open and a redress of grievances may result. The very physical presence of the demonstrators is indicative of the possibility of violent consequences if the issues are not attended to. Historically, the use of the public assembly and procession has proved itself indispensable as a technique for the propagation of unpopular minority views, from the demonstrations of the suffragettes in the United Kingdom to the Civil Rights movement in the United States. Important issues were brought to the public attention through these movements in a manner which could not be ignored and mass violence on the part of the demonstrators averted.” Page 58 of 1994 (1) ZLR 49 (S) In Hague v Committee for Industrial Organisation 307 US 496 (1938) Justice Jackson was at pains to spell out the importance attaching to the right to freedom of expression in public places. He said at 515-516: “Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions. Such use of the streets and public places has, from ancient times, been a part of the privileges, immunities, rights and liberties of citizens. The privilege of a citizen of the United States to use the streets and parks for communication of views on national questions may be regulated in the interest of all; it is not absolute, but relative and must be exercised in subordination to the general comfort and convenience, and in consonance with peace and good order; but it must not, in the guise of regulation, be abridged or denied.” The need to reconcile the rights of freedom of expression and assembly — being freedoms that shape a democratic regime — with governmental responsibility to ensure the sound maintenance of public order, was also graphically alluded to by Lord Scarman in the following passage in The Red Lion Square Disorders, Report of Enquiry (Cmnd 5919 of 1975): “Amongst our fundamental human rights there are, without doubt, the rights of peaceful assembly and public protest, and the right to public order and tranquillity. Civilized living