National Congress (Border Branch) v Chairman, Council of State of Ciskei 1992 (4) SA 434 (CkG) at 447G–I. The thrust of the argument advanced by Mr Muganhu, who appeared for the AttorneyGeneral, was that subss 20(6) and 21(4) were to be accorded a wide and not a restricted meaning; that they provide a definite restraint upon the enjoyment of the rights to freedom of expression and assembly; that in clear and unambiguous language they totally prohibit such freedoms in or on any place which exists for the free passage of persons or vehicles, and that it matters not that their exercise will cause no interference therewith. Accordingly, where legislation proscribes the enjoyment of these freedoms in roads, streets, pavements and other similar places, it must be taken to be intra vires the Constitution. And s 6 of the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act is just such a provision. Per contra, Mr Gillespie, for the applicants, submitted that viewed in their contextual setting ss 20(6) and 21(4) are plainly susceptible of a restricted meaning which, he said, is to this effect: The exercise of the freedoms of expression and assembly is limited in public thoroughfares only to the extent that it prevents, or interferes with, the free passage of persons or vehicles in places existing for such traffic; that what is excluded from the asserted freedoms, is the consequent right to impede traffic in public ways, in the course of a public gathering or procession; but not the freedom of a person to express himself, or to foregather with others, without creating a public nuisance or obstruction. Stated otherwise, the purport of ss 20(6) and 21(4) is to preserve the freedoms of expression and assembly in the places specified, provided the right of access is reserved for traffic both pedestrian and vehicular. What has been removed is nothing more than a right to impede traffic in thoroughfares by forming a public gathering or procession. The force of the opposing contentions demonstrate, to my mind, the existence of an area of ambiguity in the meaning to be assigned to ss 20(6) and 21(4). This being so, since the provisions in question interfere with fundamental rights, an interpretation which favours the liberty of the individual is to be given. See Dadoo Ltd & Ors v Krugersdorp Municipal Council 1920 AD 530 at 532; Sigaba v Minister of Defence and Police & Anor 1980 (3) SA 535 (Tk) at 541A. Klass & Ors v Federal Republic of Germany 2 EHRR 214 at para 48. The adoption of a restricted meaning is, moreover, in accordance with the purpose of s 11 — the key or umbrella provision in the Declaration of Rights — which is to strike a necessary accommodation between the enjoyment of Page 61 of 1994 (1) ZLR 49 (S) the freedoms and the potential prejudice resulting from their exercise both to others and to the public interest. It also avoids the withdrawal of protection from the most visible, effective and immediate means by which grievances can be brought to the knowledge of those in authority, by the holding of a public procession, where such an exercise would not prevent or hinder free passage of persons or vehicles in places set aside for such traffic. Finally, it is logical to suppose that if the intention of the framers of the Constitution had been to emasculate the freedoms protected in ss 20(1) and 21(1) in the manner suggested by Mr Muganhu, the limitations would have been contained in those subsections; for it is there that the freedom of expression, and that of assembly and association, are defined.