The relative absence of public funding provisions in both the new constitutions and the laws that governed the recent transitions to multiparty democracy in Africa are testimony to the extent to which the transition programmes were directed and dominated by incumbent authoritarian rulers who had no shortage of financial resources. From the perspective of such rulers and ruling parties, adopting provisions for the public funding of political parties (including opposition parties) was or seemed like a careless dissipation of the advantages that incumbency conferred. Thus even parties that “came in from the cold” to topple autocrats and despots, such as the MMD in Zambia, promptly saw the advantages of not having the state prop up the opposition, which is how the concept of public funding of parties or candidates is viewed by those ensconced in power. The incumbents somehow view legislated public funding of political parties as tantamount to providing oxygen and other nutrients (instead of withdrawing or withholding them as much and as far as possible) to political rival (dubbed ‘enemies’ of the state by some intolerant incumbent authoritarians). Thus in Uganda, President Yoweri Museveni declared his opposition to public funding of political parties, even before the people had the chance to vote in a promised referendum on whether Uganda should remain a ‘no-party’ state or become a multiparty democracy. In Ghana, the then ruling NDC in 1999, not surprisingly, declared its opposition to a bill to authorize public funding of political parties (Ghanaian Chronicle 3 December 1999). The New Patriotic Party (NPP), in government since January 2001, prevaricated over the issue of legislation for public funding of political parties notwithstanding that it argued passionately for it when the party was in opposition. Ruling parties in the new, multiparty contexts have been not only reluctant to help their opponents (as they see it) remove one of the major reasons for their ineffectiveness, namely, their lack of financial resources. But worse, as Cowen and Laasko have observed: “the strategies of many African governing regimes have been directed precisely at making opposition parties as institutionally weak as possible” (Cowen and Laasko, 1997:736). The partisan self-interests of the ruling parties is a major reason for the relative absence of public funding schemes in Africa. The poor economic and financial base of the state in Africa can also, no doubt, be invoked as a contributory factor. Another technique and often a substitute to direct donations, involves patronage appointments to bolster party finances. Those receiving such appointments are often expected to contribute a portion of their salaries to the party that appointed them. These practices clearly favour the party in power, with electoral defeat often creating a crisis of party finance. The major change in this traditional pattern of party finance came with the passage of the 1974 Election Expenses Act, which attempts to regulate party fundraising activities and to provide public subsidies for election expenses. One reason for its passage was that campaign expenditures were increasing so rapidly that all of the parties feared their inability to raise adequate funds in future elections. As a result, the parties collectively turned to public funding and proceeded to raid the public treasury without greatly changing the existing practices of party finance. It is not Zimbabwe alone that seeks to regulate political parties financing, Mali, for instance, bans the funding of political parties and election campaigns through foreign donations but has no provisions regarding other aspects of political financing. Benin, another West African Francophone state, limits campaign expenditure and has provisions on public funding but not on other aspects of political financing. Ghana has disclosure provisions and bans foreign donations, but the relevant act is silent on other equally pertinent issues of political financing, such as limits on campaign expenditure. South Africa has no provisions on general disclosure or bans on foreign donations but it has provision for substantial public funding and accounting requirements with respect to the public funds. Kenya used to have limits on campaign spending by parties and candidates (although admittedly these were universally ignored), but removed them in 1992, before the first multiparty elections to be held there since the 1970s. In 1999, however, the 17