The unfairness of the 1992 PPF Act prompted the United Parties (UP) to file an application in the Supreme Court under section 24(1) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe arguing that The Political Parties (Finance) Act section 3 (3) was unconstitutional (BCLR 224 (ZS):225). The Supreme Court judgment in this case provides such relevant material to this study that it is necessary to quote it at length. The judgment reads in part) Turning to the question relating to political funding, the Court observed that unhindered freedom of political expression was essential to the proper functioning of a democratic system. Political parties contending for ascendancy should not be subject to legislative measures that limited their capacity to engage in dialogue and communicate arguments and opinions to enable the populace to make informed judgments as to how they should be governed. Public funding of political parties was a vital element of sound democracy both as an egalitarian measure and as a means of curbing the dependency of political parties upon private interests. The system of public funding had, however, to be respectful of pluralism and the possibility of political change. It had been recognized internationally that the regulation of public funding for elections had five goals: (a) To ensure equality of opportunity in a liberal democracy characterized by inequalities in the distribution of wealth; (b) to make enough money available for competitive campaigns to occur; © to allow new entrants, while not encouraging frivolous candidates or propping up decaying political organizations; (d) to reduce the possibility for undue influence; and, (e) to prevent corruption. The formula adopted to allocate State funding to political parties would determine whether these goals would be achieved or not. Certain formulae would do no more than entrench and re-enforce the regime of the major political parties, and sideline their minor or new opponents (BCLR 224 (ZS):225-226, quoted in Makumbe and Compagnon (2000). It therefore becomes obvious that the Political Parties (Finance) Act (1992) favored the ruling party at the expense of other political parties. The formula adopted in the Act was therefore clearly designed to “entrench and re-enforce the regime of the major political parties and sideline their minor or new opponents.” It must be borne in mind that Zanu PF was receiving no less than Z$32 million (nearly USD 4,6 million) each fiscal year from the national Treasury from 1992 to 1996. In 1997 the ruling party was allocated a staggering Z$64 million (about USD 9 million) for the eighteen months from July 1997 to December 1998. Efforts to establish how the ruling party uses this money were frustrated as the party’s officials refused to release such information citing sections of the ubiquitous Official Secrets Act. It is important to note that practically all of the five goals itemized in the judgment quoted above were violated in one way or other through or as a result of the Political Parties (Finance) Act. The Act did the very opposite of ensuring equality of opportunity in that it provided the ruling party with an undefeatable head-start in virtually all forms of political contest. To that extent, public financing of political parties under the Act made an already uneven playing field even more rugged. The Act did not make money available to opposition parties, which most badly needed it in order to effectively compete with the ruling party, especially during election campaigns. It also totally excluded new entrants since its criterion for funding was based on the existence in parliament of, at least, fifteen members of a political party. To the extent that opposition parties had to depend on the financial and other resources of generous individuals, businesses and private organizations, the Act can be argued to have neither reduced undue influence nor prevented the possibility of the occurrence of corruption. The Supreme Court was, evidently, aware of this unhealthy situation as its judgment continues: The legislation in casu provided a very high threshold for entitlement to receive State funding in the form of the requirement that the party should have at least fifteen elected representatives. The effect would be that small but meaningful voices would not be heard. In a poor society where inadequate funding from private sources was available, the threshold rendered it virtually impossible for other political parties to gain any foothold. The practical effect of the funding system which had been provided was that the ruling party alone would receive assistance. This had been demonstrated in two general elections. While the enactment was neutral on the face of it, it offended the 22