Land reform is generally advocated in Zimbabwe as urgently necessary to address the stark inequalities in land distribution and wealth. However, as stated in the African Charter and reinforced by the provisions of the ICCPR and other binding international treaties, the rules providing for compulsory purchase should be clearly set out in law, and those affected should have the right to voice opposition to the acquisition and to challenge it before a competent and impartial court. In addition, the security forces and criminal justice system must provide equal protection to all those who are victims of violence, and the law should take its course without interference from political authorities. VI. ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY The international community does not come with clean hands to the current fast track land reform process. The British government in particular, the former colonial power responsible for brokering the Lancaster House Agreement that led to the 1980 transition to majority rule, has been protective of white farming interests in Zimbabwe and in the early years insisted on a land redistribution policy based on government purchase of land at full market value from willing sellers. The World Bank, another key donor, was widely blamed for the damaging effects of the Economic Structural Adjustment Plan (ESAP) for Zimbabwe, embarked on in 1991. The Bank itself remarked that the reforms under ESAP “could certainly not be regarded as a roaring success,” noting that the percentage of households classified as poor rose from 40 percent in 1991 to over 60 percent in 1995, and that “the programme design itself was flawed, particularly in the under-estimation of its social consequences.”175 The response of other African countries to Zimbabwe, meanwhile, has been strongly shaped by the history of southern Africa, and the long struggle for an end to colonial and white minority rule. Issues of control over land resonate forcefully in South Africa and Namibia, in particular. At least partly as a consequence of this history, the strong criticism of the fast track program voiced by the British and Americans in particular has not been matched by similar statements from Zimbabwe’s African neighbors. In late 2001, however, both the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and in particular the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) began to take a stronger—though often inconsistent—line in criticizing the disorder and economic chaos unleashed by fast track land redistribution and other developments, and urging President Mugabe to restore the rule of law to the land reform program and the elections scheduled for March 2002. The Commonwealth, which brings together both rich and poor former colonies of Britain, has been more outspoken. However, African countries have refused to endorse sanctions against the Mugabe government introduced by the European Union and United States in response to political violence and restrictions on election observers. Britain In 2000, just as farm occupations accelerated, the British government stated that it was “not convinced that the Zimbabwe government has a serious poverty eradication strategy nor that it is giving priority to land reform to help the poor of Zimbabwe. The UK remains concerned about transparency in the election of settlers and the arrangements to help resettlement.” Accordingly the British government stated that, in the absence of a government program conforming with the principles agreed at the 1998 donors’ conference on land reform, it would make available £5 million over three to five years from 2000 for land redistribution through nongovernmental channels.176 The British government’s public statements have maintained the same position on land redistribution since the fast track program began. At the Abuja meeting of the Commonwealth (see below), Britain stated that, subject to a land reform program being adopted conforming with the Abuja agreement, it would make “a significant financial commitment” to support land reform, and lobby for other money to be raised 175 Thomas W. Allen, World Bank Resident Representative in Zimbabwe, Structural Adjustment in Zimbabwe: The World Bank Perspective, resource paper, 1999. The IMF declared Zimbabwe ineligible to access its resources in September 1999, following an accrual of arrears. 176 Background Briefing, Land Resettlement in Zimbabwe (London: Department for International Development, March 2000). Human Rights Watch 38 March 2002, Vol. 14, No. 1 (A)