166 | Zimbabwe Rule of Law Journal repay. The court noted that declaring law or conduct inconsistent with the constitution and invalid was plainly an obligatory power vested in the court as borne out by the word “must”. Unlike the discretionary power to make a declaratory order in terms of s 38 of the constitution, the court had no choice in this particular matter but to make a declaratory order where s 172(1) (a) applied. Transparency and Accountability The standard set by the Constitution of Zimbabwe Although it remains far from being a perfect system, the practice of constitutional democracy in South Africa has enjoyed far greater success than Zimbabwe in holding members of the executive to account for alleged violations of the constitution which they are duty bound to uphold. This, in spite the fact that the constitutional and institutional frameworks prevailing in both countries are similar to the extent that both advocate for the democratic principles of transparency, accountability and the existence of independent institutions that ought to facilitate the advancement of such democratic principles. However, the question posed in this section is whether these frameworks in the case of Zimbabwe are adequately designed to ensure that members of the executive are subject to the principles of transparency and accountability enshrined in the constitution. Accountability of the President and Cabinet Members Similar to the South Africa context, the Constitution of Zimbabwe places a specific obligation on the President of Zimbabwe to “uphold, defend, obey and respect this Constitution.....” and so serious an obligation is it that the President may be removed from office for failure to uphold the same.19 Section 97 as an accountability mechanism 19 See s 90(1) as well as s 97(d) Inability to perform the functions of the office because of physical or mental incapacity is the fourth ground of removal.