182 | Zimbabwe Rule of Law Journal on an even-handed basis with people and which treat like cases alike”. In its judgment the court noted further that “... under a constitutional democracy such as Zimbabwe there is recognition that society’s power is dangerous to its members if it is exercised by one group of individuals. It is recognised therefore that there must be a separation of powers to perform the three jobs which have to be done - that of making the law (by Parliament) that of applying the law to particular cases (by the judiciary) and that of enforcing the laws and decisions of the courts (by the executive)”. Similar to the Nkandla judgment, the court in this case concisely drew imperative distinctions necessary for a true democracy and also cautioned against the danger of majority politics as representing a threat to democratic and constitutional principles. Conclusion The constitutional principles of separation of powers, rule of law, transparency and accountability which were defended in the Nkandla judgment serve as examples of how the rule of law ought to apply in Zimbabwe. The measure by which a nation esteems and values its constitution is not found in the mere existence of a constitution. It achieves that quality or status of a constitutional democracy only when the constitution acquires a practical significance, in other words, when the principles and rights enshrined in it can be translated into practice. The South African courts including the constitutional court have demonstrated repeatedly that separation of powers is not mere rhetoric but a lived reality; that the rule of law is not an unattainable concept but can be practically applied for the benefit of all; and that transparency and accountability apply as much to the political elite as they do to the majority of ordinary South Africans and the Nkandla judgement reaffirmed these principles. However, this is not the case in Zimbabwe for a number of reasons; constitutional democracy