adjustment and reform programme’. This would in turn be an ‘important stepping stone towards helping Zimbabwe re‐engage with the international community.’14 Thus, by the end of June 2013 there was a growing consensus between SADC and the EU in particular about the success of the referendum and the need for generally acceptable free and fair elections, even if this was underlined by nagging doubts about the possibility of such an outcome. The EU linked its re‐engagement to the management of the forthcoming elections, and stated that it was ‘ready to engage with whatever government that is formed as a result of peaceful, transparent and credible elections.’15 The US, as it did throughout the period of the GPA,16 took a harder line stating that while it applauded the holding of a successful referendum, it urged the Zimbabwe Government to welcome both domestic and international observers to monitor the elections. This position set out by US Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, Johnny Carson, earned an immediate rebuke from the Zimbabwean Presidential spokesperson for putting forward such ‘obnoxious’ conditions.17 Notwithstanding the US position, there appeared to be an increasing convergence between SADC and the West on the need for free and fair elections in Zimbabwe, an emerging consensus that had, by mid 2013, already pushed the EU into a substantive movement away from the ‘sanctions’ measures imposed by the Mugabe regime from the early 2000’s. However, as will be discussed further in the paper, this seeming convergence barely concealed the tensions and contradictions in the discourses on transition at play between and sometimes within these groups. The Election Process As he had done prior to the 2008 election, in contravention of the GPA, Mugabe proceeded to take a unilateral position on the setting of the election date. Notwithstanding the unfinished reform agenda set out in the GPA, and against the persistent recommendations of several SADC fora on the need for a full implementation of the GPA before an election, Mugabe and his party set in train a series of processes that would once again imperil the SADC facilitation process in Zimbabwe. On the 2nd May 2013 Mr. Jealousy Mawarire, the Director of the Centre for Democracy in Southern Africa, and widely believed to be working for ZANU PF, filed an urgent application to the Supreme Court seeking an order directing                                                              14 International Monetary Fund, ‘IMF Managing Director Approves a Staff Monitored Programme for Zimbabwe.’ Press Release No. 13/174, 13 June 2013. 15 Report of the Delegation of the Development Committee of the European Parliament to Zimbabwe (29 April‐3 May 2013.) 3 July 2013. 16 B.Raftopoulos, ‘An Overview of the Politics of the Global Political Agreement: National Conflict, Regional Agony, International Dilemma,’ in B.Raftopoulos (Ed), The Hard Road to Reform, op cit. 17 US seek to observe Zimbabwe elections. www.thezimbabwemail.com/zimbabwe/16751‐us‐seek‐to‐ observe‐zimbabwe‐elections.html Accessed on 08/04/13.   11

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