EU nor the US, with both expressing doubts about its free and fair status, and with the latter making it clear that US sanctions would continue. The UN commended a ‘broadly peaceful election day,’ but stressed that concerns about certain aspects of the election process should be pursued through established channels.33 The MDC formations and the major civic bodies rejected the legitimacy of the elections with claims of election fraud. Mugabe’s immediate response to this challenge was less than gracious: Those who cannot accept defeat are wasting their time. They can even go hang if they want, but even dogs will not sniff at their corpses…. We voted democratically. We brought democracy. We have delivered democracy on a platter. If they do not want to take it, let it be, but the people have delivered it.’34 However after an initial threat to challenge the results in the Constitutional Court Tsvangirai dropped the action and both parties decided not to challenge the results any further in the courts. Explaining the Election Results While there were always clear indications that the MDCs would continue to face major challenges in attempting to defeat ZANU PF at the polls, the sheer scale of the latter’s victory left many Zimbabweans and political observers stunned. In explaining the recent victory of Mugabe and ZANU PF three areas need to be analysed: The strategies of ZANU PF in the context of the transformed political economy of Zimbabwe; the weaknesses of the MDC formations; the politics of SADC, the EU and US. The Strategies of ZANU PF Much of the commentary on the elections results from the MDCs and the civic movement has concentrated on the violations of the electoral law both before and during the election process. Most of these factors have already been referred to above. Added to these, it is clear that ZANU PF systematically blocked the central reforms of the GPA throughout the period of the Inclusive Government.35 Even as ZANU PF largely kept the energies of the MDCs concentrated on the single issue of constitutional reform, the former concentrated its activities on election preparations from the inception of the GPA. This strategy was combined, from late 2012, with the systematic arrest and harassment of civil society leaders monitoring and documenting human rights violations, providing psycho‐social and                                                              33 Statement Attributable to the Spokesperson for the Secretary‐ General on elections in Zimbabwe. New York 2 August 2013. www.un.org/sg/statements/ Accessed on 6 August 2013. 34 Everson Mushava and Obey Manayiti, ‘Tsvangirai can go hang‐Mugabe.’ News Day 13 August 2013. 35 See B.Raftopoulos 2013 op cit for details on this issue.   15