strategy; the need to reconnect with civil society; dysfunctional provincial structures; the need for a new paradigm; lack of party discipline; the need to discard idioms and mannerisms that alienated the support base; transform from a movement to a political party; need to deliver and show difference of performance in local governance.68 All these issues point to a party that has not been able to strengthen its organizational and strategic framework against a repressive regime that has constantly harassed its leadership and structures. However, since 2009 these weaknesses have eroded the support of both MDCs, as was evident from opinion polls carried out in 2012, which showed a drop in support for the MDCs and Tsvangirai and an upsurge in popularity for Mugabe and his party.69 These weaknesses and, of particular importance to the election campaign, the failure of the two MDC formations to develop an electoral pact in 2013, resulted in the loss of several seats to ZANU PF due to a split vote. For example in Matabeleland South, 8 of the 13 seats were lost to ZANU PF because of the this factor, while in Matabeleland North a united opposition would have won 11 of the 13 seats instead of which ZANU PF won 7 out of the 13. Together these factors meant that the MDCs were a much weaker force in 2013 than they were in 2008. Regional and International Factors For SADC, and South Africa in particular, the major priority in settling the Zimbabwean crisis was to ensure stabilization, not democratization.70 In practice this meant that despite the persistent calls from the regional body and the SA facilitation team for the full implementation of the GPA prior to elections, there was little evidence, beyond diplomatic exhortations, that the organization was willing or able to take further actions. Thus, in the face of ZANU PF’s unwillingness to fully implement the GPA reforms, SADC eventually settled for minimal electoral reforms, a new constitution, and the absence of the levels of violence that marred the 2008 elections. Guided by liberation solidarity with ZANU PF and the need to stabilise the political situation with the support of political‐military establishment in Zimbabwe, Zuma blinked in the face of Mugabe’s humiliating affront to South Africa, and SADC took what can only be described as a supine position on the electoral outcome. The MDC‐T’s comment on the SADC election report clearly expressed its dissatisfaction with the regional position:                                                              68 MDC: NSC Strategic Planning Retreat, Harare, 12 September 2013. 69 See Freedom House, ‘Change and “New” Politics in Zimbabwe,’ Harare, 18 August 2012. 70 For a fuller discussion of this see B.Raftopoulos, ‘An Overview of the GPA,’ op cit 2009.   25