• Legislative procedures must allow adequate debate on all legislation. Members
must be give adequate time to consider the legislation; “fast-tracking” Bills should be
prohibited or at least minimised.
• There must be adequate consultation before legislation is presented in
Parliament. Current parliamentary procedures do require Bills to be considered by
portfolio committees and allow the committees to hold public hearings, but the
constitution itself should lay down the need for full consultation.
In addition, though this need not be specified in the constitution, the procedural rules
should be made as simple as possible so that members understand them easily and
do not have to be subjected to lengthy induction before they are able to take part
effectively in debates.
5. Powers of the Legislature over National Finance
In Britain since the 17th century the Executive has had to rely on Parliament to
provide it with the necessary finance to maintain the government, and Parliament
has used its financial power to keep the Executive in check. This is reflected in the
present Zimbabwean constitution, which gives Parliament (primarily the House of
Assembly) power to raise finance through taxation, requires all government revenues
to be paid into a single Consolidated Revenue Fund, and prohibits the Executive from
withdrawing money from the Fund unless authorised to do so by Act of Parliament.
The new constitution should certainly continue this position, and if possible should
strengthen it, perhaps in the following ways:
• The constitution should state that no taxes can be raised except under the specific
authority of an Act of Parliament. The present Constitution does not state this
expressly, and the President has raised some taxes temporarily through regulations
made under the Presidential Powers (Temporary Measures) Act.
• Parliament should be required to set statutory limits on the level of national debt
and borrowings by the State.
• All public accounts without exception should be audited by the Comptroller and
Auditor-General and scrutinised by Parliament. At present some accounts relating to
the President’s office are not scrutinised.
• The power to fix and raise the salaries and allowances of State officials, including
the President, Ministers and members of the legislature, should be made subject to
approval by an independent Salaries Commission set up by the constitution.
6. Dissolution, Adjournment and Sessions of the Legislature
At present, the President has power, in his personal discretion, to summon
Parliament to its annual sessions, to prorogue (i.e. adjourn) Parliament and to
dissolve it. He cannot abolish Parliament completely, because Parliament must meet
at least once every six months but he can keep its sittings to a minimum. The
maximum life of Parliament (i.e. the period between general elections) is five years
but the President can shorten that period by dissolving Parliament before the fiveyear term has elapsed.
If Parliament cannot even determine the dates of its own sessions it cannot be
regarded as a truly independent legislature. Clearly the new constitution must
reduce the President’s powers in this regard.
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