JUSTICE IN ZIMBABWE 36 ____________________________________________________________________ persons. It was so inadequate that it induced “a sense of shock and outrage in the minds of all right-thinking people.” By imposing an inadequate sentence, the judge had trivialised the seriousness of the offence. He went on to say this: “The Attorney-General’s office is bemused by the meaninglessness of it all. The nation should know and be told that the leniency of the sentence constitutes a betrayal of all civilised and acceptable notions of justice and of Zimbabwe’s sovereign interests.” Mr Chinamasa went on to say that the imposition of the inadequate sentence came against the backdrop of repeated complaints made to him by his law officers of hostility and abuse directed at them and their submissions by the judge during proceedings. “All these developments”, he said “erode the office’s confidence in the administration of criminal justice.”59 The first contempt proceedings and the appeal These remarks led to a contempt of court charge being brought against Mr Chinamasa. At the instance of Mr Justice Adam the Registrar of the High Court issued a citation in which Mr Chinamasa was instructed to appear before the High Court on a specified date to show cause why an order for contempt of court should not be made against him. Mr Justice Blackie heard the case in October 1999. Counsel acting as amicus curiae prosecuted the case. Counsel for Mr Chinamasa argued that only the Attorney-General could prosecute the charges against his client since they were criminal in nature, and that the charge violated his client’s constitutional right to freedom of expression. At counsel’s request the judge referred the matter to the Supreme Court for a decision on these issues. The Supreme Court considered the case later in the year. It rejected both the contentions put forward by Mr Chinamasa’s counsel, though it expressed no opinion as to whether the contempt charge was justified in the circumstances. 60 The Supreme Court found that the limitation on the offence of contempt of court aimed at protecting the administration of justice and was a permissible derogation from the freedom of speech protection. It pointed out that line between scandalising the court and fair and legitimate criticism is not always easy to draw. But although courts must be strong enough to withstand criticism, the court said, criticism that imputes improper or