JUSTICE IN ZIMBABWE 83 ____________________________________________________________________ Presidential notice to be ultra vires the Electoral Act. The court (Chinhengo J) held that the Association had made out a prima facie case: the Supreme Court’s order was still extant, and it seemed clear that the Electoral Act did not allow the President to override a court order. He granted a provisional order directing the Registrar-General to publish notices for the nomination of candidates and the holding of elections in Harare. His order modified the time limits set out in the Act in order to meet the election date of 11 February fixed by the Supreme Court.131 To avoid complying with the High Court’s provisional order132, the Registrar-General filed an appeal against it to the Supreme Court. The papers were laid before the Chief Justice in chambers, who noted that the order against which the Registrar-General sought to appeal was a provisional one, so the Registrar-General should have sought leave to appeal from the court a quo.133 He ordered the Registrar-General to do so. Finally, to avoid imprisonment for contempt, on Friday 1 February the RegistrarGeneral published a notice that Harare’s elections would be held on the 11 and 12 February, and that the nomination court for this would be held on Monday 4 February. At the same time he sought leave from the High Court to appeal against Chinhengo J’s provisional order, though he did so only after 9 a.m. on 4 February, which was the deadline given him by the Chief Justice. On 4 February the nomination court for the election was due to commence at 10 a.m., but the Registrar-General refused to receive any nominations at the court. This not only amounted to contempt of the High Court order, which he knew had to be complied with pending appeal, but also contravened the Electoral Act which obliged him to receive nominations. Later that day the Registrar-General sought leave from Chinhengo J to appeal against the provisional order. That evening the High Court refused to grant him leave, holding that the President’s Statutory Instrument was clearly ultra vires and the RegistrarGeneral therefore had no prospects of success on appeal. 134 This ruling, paradoxically, enabled the Registrar-General to approach a Supreme Court judge for leave to appeal, thereby giving the Supreme Court jurisdiction to hear the case. The next morning the government filed its application for leave at the