APCJ_1528_Win2010_00i_122_4 12/30/10 3:22 PM Page 99 Darfur, Grand Conflict: Inter-Communal Rift and Grass-root Initiatives 99 lands that the Fur had been forced to abandon because of the grand conflict.40 In 2005 a Nawaiba-Hotiyya inter-tribal conflict erupted around Zalengie over this issue, leaving 136 Hotiyya and 64 Nawaiba dead and many others injured.41 Ironically, Fur leaders became the main mediators between the Nawaiba and Hotiyya. Fur local leaders of all ranks, together with leaders from other tribes, entered the conflict zone under heavy exchanges of fire to mediate an end to the intra-Arab tribal violence. Arab defense of Fur land and Fur mediation to resolve an intra-Arab conflict, together with other examples of Arab-African inter-communal gestures lend credibility to other findings that ‘individual participation in government-backed militia does not imply tribal responsibility in the eyes of the people from Darfur including the victims’.42 In other words, although people have been polarized along Arab-African lines, they do not hold deep inter-tribal animosities. The Darfur grand conflict is viewed by those directly involved as a government-instigated dispute, not an inter-tribal problem. The Fur leaders’ actions are illustrative of two elements necessary for reconciliation: The first is a genuine willingness to reach out to the other, thus dispelling suspicion and surmounting mistrust, and the second is the role wise tribal leadership, from outside the conflict, can play in reconciliation and the restoration of peace. Along these lines, an Arab sheikh from the Eiteifat (a camel herding tribe) in North Darfur was quoted by a reliable source in El Fashir as saying, ‘We want to reconcile with our African neighbors, . . . and we will do what it takes to meet their demands’.43 The importance of peaceful coexistence to the pastoralists’ livelihood has been a major factor contributing to a softening of positions, giving impetus to inter-communal reconciliation from below. The two groups’ interwoven interests and complementarities have made it imperative for them to start interacting in mutually beneficial exchanges after years of distrust. The interdependence of the pastoral and peasant economies, for which village markets in the past were the main intersection, has led to the resurgence of some large rural markets, despite widespread insecurity. The markets are protected by agreements forged by local leaders to allow both groups to gather and feel secure in their exchange of goods. One of these large, flourishing markets, in Treij, some sixty kilometres south of Zalengie, takes place one day a week and attracts men and women of assorted tribal origins from surrounding areas. The Treij market, or sauq, evolved from a grass-root need on both sides to sell and buy commodities and local tribal leaders’ willingness to respond by taking action. In the agreement made by the local leaders, no individual can enter the market with 40. The area surrounding Zalengie consists of Fur land rich in water and tree cover with numerous seasonal streams providing an abundance of water and fertile soil. The area has been one of the main targets of the government’s counterinsurgency campaign. Most peasant farmers, who cultivated vegetable and fruit gardens, were displaced by the violence. The farms became pasture for camel and cattle, used particularly by Nawaiba and Hotiyya, whose seasonal movements in 2010 were blocked. 41. State of West Darfur, ‘Reconciliation conference for Nawaiba and Hottiya conflict’ (in Arabic), Zalengie, 2006; interview, Shartai Yagoub. 42. Victor Tanner, ‘The rule of lawlessness: Root and repercussions of the Darfur crisis’, Sudan Advocacy Coalition, Interagency Paper, January 2005, 19, www.hlrn.org/img/violation/darfur%20-%20report %20final%20rule%20of%20lawlessness.pdf. 43. Interview, Mohamed Ahmed.