APCJ_1528_Win2010_00i_122_4 12/30/10 3:22 PM Page 81 Violence as a Bargaining Tool: The Role of Youths in the 2007 Kenyan Elections 81 Valley, Coast, North Eastern, and Nairobi. The PNU retained seats in its strongholds— central Kenya, central Rift Valley, and parts of Eastern.23 In the presidential balloting, vote counting began at the stipulated time on 27 December 2007. As results trickled in, there were indications that Odinga was leading Kibaki. Tensions rose when results from PNU strongholds were delayed; at this juncture, Kibaki was trailing Odinga by more than a million votes. The release of the delayed results narrowed the gap, and Kibaki was ultimately declared the winner, by 321,728 votes, by the Electoral Commission of Kenya.24 Violence erupted across the country in ODM strongholds, with supporters venting their anger by attacking PNU supporters, mainly Kikuyus, in their communities. In early January 2008, tensions heightened further after Samuel Kivuitu, chair of the election commission, stunned the country by announcing that he did not know for certain whether Kibaki had won the election and acknowledged that he had announced the winner, perhaps prematurely, under pressure. He later advised a recount, which neither party took under consideration. On 24 January 2008, organized retaliatory attacks began in PNU strongholds, targeting ODM sympathizers. The conflict transformed into an ethnic, economic, and class struggle spearheaded by youths, especially those from lower economic strata.25 Peter Mwangi Kagwanja notes how youth violence had become an integral part of the current quest for democracy in Africa.26 He posits that in undemocratic situations, such as those during the Moi regime, youths are not only among the exploited, but are exploiters as well. As an example, he cites Mungiki gangs, who were used by the system to create chaos, but who also took advantage of the situation to consolidate and strengthen their own power, which they then used as a tool of trade for causing insecurity that ensured their survival. In 1995 Mungiki had become prominent in parts of central Kenya, Nairobi, Naivasha, and Nakuru, extorting protection money from communities in which they were the cause of insecurity. At the height of the 2007–2008 post-election violence, Mungiki—mainly Kikuyu youths mobilized across Central and Rift Valley provinces—were allegedly enticed to kill perceived opponents of the Gikuyu community in Molo, Nairobi, Naivasha, and Nakuru, among other places. Prominent Kikuyu politicians were rumored to have masterminded and financed killings in some communities. Other equally vicious groups—including the Chinkororo (Kisii, in Nyanza), Kalenjin Warriors (Kalenjin, in Rift Valley), Taliban (Luo, in Kariobangi and Nairobi), and Baghdad Boys (Luo, in Kisumu and Nyanza)—are said to have had links to politicians or political parties who recruited them as agents provocateurs during election cycles.27 Other groups engaged in vigilantism include the Jeshi la Mzee (cutting across ethnic groups in Nairobi), Siafu (in Nairobi), the Manyala (in Eldoret), the Marakwet Warriors (in Eldoret), 23. United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘Report from OHCHR fact-finding mission to Kenya, 6–28 February 2008’, 14, www.ohchr.org/Documents/Press/OHCHRKenyareport.pdf. 24. Ibid. 25. Ibid. 26. Peter Mwangi Kagwanja, ‘Facing Mount Kenya or facing Mecca? The Mungiki, ethnic violence and the politics of the Moi succession in Kenya, 1987–2002’, African Affairs, 102:406 (2003), 25–49. 27. PeaceNet Trust, ‘Post election violence in Kenya: Facts and figures’, Nairobi, 2008, 53–54.