APCJ_1528_Win2010_00i_122_4 12/30/10 3:22 PM Page 101 Darfur, Grand Conflict: Inter-Communal Rift and Grass-root Initiatives 101 lines.48 In 2003 and 2004, these stresses led to clashes in which members from both groups were killed. Viewing the events as a localized conflict, sheikhs and omads (local leaders and notables) from the two sides successfully led an intra-communal reconciliation effort in July 2005 that restored peace. Agreements were reached on the payment of blood money for victims according to custom and for handling future violations. As a result, South Nyala villages have since experienced sustained stability, despite an actual inability to pay blood money.49 Selia’a, east of Nyala, provides another example of a successful grass-root initiative for inter-communal reconciliation and restoration of peace. Selia’a was home to 16,000 people, mainly Barno, Birgid, and Fur (tribes of African identity), with Rezeighat cattle herders neighboring to the south. In 2004 some of the Darfuri armed movements moved into the area, attracting army and government-backed militia attacks. Selia’a was ransacked and its inhabitants displaced to camps near Mahajriyya and Greida, close to the Rezeighat Arab pastoralists and also where the displaced Africans remained subject to government-backed militia attacks. In 2005 Rezeighat pastoralists and the armed movements reached an understanding according to which the latter would open a corridor for passage so the Rezeighat could resume their seasonal north-south and south-north movements in return for the prevention of attacks on the displaced African population. The security situation for the displaced African groups substantially improved. The government, however, then took actions that could have jeopardized the newly restored local peace. That same year, 2005, it issued legislation narrowing pastoralist corridors from one kilometre to one hundred fifty metres and increased the distance between areas of temporary pastoralist settlements.50 The local leadership of both groups formed two committees, one from each side, to find an alternative to the legislation acceptable to both of them. The two committees agreed that the government legislation was unreasonable; that the widely accepted customary rules establishing the width of passage corridors or routes and the distance between areas of temporary pastoralist settlement would be adopted; and that the Rezeighat would commit themselves to conforming to customary rules governing the tracking of bandits in cases of robbery.51 This ensured the Rezeighat’s responsibility for controlling attacks on the displaced African communities. The agree48. Informal interview, Hashim Zakaria, director of the Sudanese Popular Committee for Relief and Rehabilitation, Nyala, July 2006; informal interview, Zuhier Mohamadi, UNAMIS (United Nations Mission in Sudan) political officer, Nyala, July 2006. 49. The government, though not part of the reconciliation process, but recognizing that these communities were too poor to pay blood money, promised payment instead. It did not fulfill its promise, but intercommunal peace withstood this test. 50. There are two types of temporary settlements: one involves their placement every fifteen kilometres, where pastoralists rest for a few days before moving on, and the other allows pastoralists to settle temporarily for a month or so, to graze their animals on nearby pasture and gather provisions. FAO, ‘Nomads in North Darfur’, 2–4. 51. Interview, Hashim Zakaria. The customary rules governing tracking bandits and attackers is called tatyeeb al-manazil. According to it, a tribe or community whose dar, or neighborhood, has been entered— determined by the tracking or footsteps of an attacker—is compelled by tradition or custom to do one of three things: prove that the footsteps or the tracks lead out of its neighborhood; submit the attacker to those in pursuit; or take full responsibility for the crimes committed by the attacker if unable to meet one of the first two conditions. In this case, the custom dealing with bandits is applied to attackers. This information was gathered from different Darfuri sources during field visits in 1990, 1995, 1996, 2005, and 2006 in addition to interviews with Darfuri sources in Khartoum post-2006.