APCJ_1528_Win2010_00i_122_4 12/30/10 3:22 PM Page 29 Beyond the Ethno-Religious Theory of the Jos Conflict 29 value. In other words, whether perceived as intra- or inter-ethnic or religious, conflicts in Jos represent the struggle for resources due to the fact that the ethnic groups that trace their history to the earlier occupation have an ancestral connection to a geographical area, allowing them to lay claim to ownership of the place and exclusive rights and predominance in privileges in theory meant for all citizens of the area.48 In the same manner, the conflict between the supporters of Dariye and Mantu over political control of the state devoid of all pretences is squarely about who will have control of public resources or exclusive claim to allocate these resources. Beyond the facade of political anxiety is the real issue of revenue-yielding facilities in the Jos North LGA that drive the economic factors behind the perceived ethnoreligious strife. Theses outfits include the motors garages, where dues are collected from motor vehicle transport owners going in and out of Jos, banks, shops, the Jos Model Market (Terminus Market), hospitality facilities, and other symbols of a modern city and state. In Jos South, where the Beroms carried out their attack on the Fulanis in January 2010, although the fear of a Muslim takeover may point to political anxiety, events there occurred in a context similar to those involving the fears expressed by the Jos North indigenes connoting economic apprehension (though that area does not command the same economic weight or have more economic value than Jos North). The economic dimension of the conflict was further buttressed by the fact that the Fulanis who lost loved ones in the January attack had urged the Beroms to release the cattle they had seized during the campaign. Their plea was ignored. Although Ndirang is of the opinion that the Fulanis would have attacked the Beroms even if they had returned the cattle, that they did not provided ample reason for the Fulanis to retaliate two months later.49 It is germane to underline in this regard the strained relations between the nomadic Fulani herdsmen and the Beroms over grazing land dating back to the mid1940s. Just as the dust over the recent violence in the area appeared to be settling, reports cropped up that pastures used by the Fulani in the Berom area had been poisoned. THE NEW POLITICAL ECONOMY OF WAR Conventional wisdom about wars and insurgents, as duly noted by Ukoha Ukiwo, holds that acts of violence originate in perceptions held by insurgent groups of relative deprivation and social injustice.50 He also notes, however, the influencial perspective presented in Paul Collier’s pioneering work on the ‘new political economy of war’.51 According to Collier, people rebel not necessarily because of historical and social grievances, but because of the opportunities available should they prosper from war. This trend can be seen in the conflict in the oil-rich Niger Delta region of Nigeria, where militant youths engage in all manner of criminal activities, such as kidnapping, sabotage of oil and gas pipelines, and siphoning of refined and crude oil and gas in the 48. Nwosu, ‘The political economy of citizenship-indigeneship controversy’, 80. 49. Interview, Bekky Ndirang, Abuja, 16 March 2010. 50. Ukoha Ukiwo, ‘From “pirates” to “militants”: A historical perspective on anti-state and anti-oil company mobilization among the Ijaw of Warri, Western Niger Delta’, African Affairs, 106:425 (2007), 589. 51. Paul Collier, ‘Doing well out of war: an economic perspective’, in M. Berdal and D. Malone (eds.), Greed and Grievances: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars (Boulder, Colorado, Lynne Rienner, 2000), 91–112, cited in Ukiwo, ‘From “pirates” to “Militants”’, 589.